Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Indicator Document

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Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support

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Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support

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Outcome 2.4 – Government-led intervention/diversion

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Outcome 3.2 – Post-release disengagement from radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration

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Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE

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Indicator: Understand that VE tends to be partly driven by grievances

Indicator: Understand that there is no standard pathway to VE

Indicator: Understand that physical responses and messaging are important

Indicator: Understand that civil society actors have an important CVE role

Indicator: Acknowledge the potential negative effects of security force excesses

Indicator: Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of stereotyping

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How to measure

Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and evaluation

Summary Table

Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and evaluation

Indicator: Number of evidence-informed CVE initiatives

Indicator: Number of CVE programs evaluated
Section 1: Instructions for users

Please take note of the following:

The aim of this evaluation indicator document is to provide suggestions to policy-makers and practitioners as to how they could measure particular outcomes as outlined in the Australian and New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee’s *National Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Framework and Guide* (Research and Evaluation Working Group CVE Sub-Committee, 12 May 2018). In Table 6 of that document, numerous example indicators are listed under various high-level outcomes. This document focuses on the sub-outcomes listed in Table 6 (e.g., Outcome 1.1, Outcome 1.2, Outcome 2.3, Outcome 2.4).

We have imposed some parameters in our review of different example indicators. While certain example indicators listed in Table 6 are easily defined and quantified (e.g., indicator *number of intervention programs*, under Outcome 3.1), others are more ambiguous in their focus (e.g., indicator *social cohesion*, under Outcome 1.3). Hence, a range of suggested measures can exist for particular example indicators, some of which have been debated and reviewed across a number of different policy and research fields. We have not reviewed the full body of work relating to particular example indicators given the extent of the existing literature and the number of suggested measures that already exist. Hence, there will be possible applicable measures we have not listed or considered. Other researchers, policy-makers and practitioners may have different ideas about or opinions on how certain example indicators should be defined and measured. This document is not meant to be a descriptive tool, and there will be occasions where suggested ways of measuring a particular example indicator will need to be adapted.

There will be differences of opinion on how certain example indicators listed in Table 6 can best be measured using either quantitative or qualitative methods. For some indicators, no standard metric or agreed to method of evaluation exists; therefore, for some indicators we have provided a broad description of how they might be measured rather than stipulating a specific metric. We have explained the relevance of each indicator to the field of countering violent extremism (CVE). Some indicators overlap, and ways of measuring them will be the same. We highlight these overlaps throughout this document.

Readers should be aware that the authors were not involved in discussions about the inclusion of example indicators listed in Table 6, why they were chosen and why stakeholders believed
they were relevant to CVE programs. We have taken the indicators as agreed and examined their applicability and measurement. Some readers may question the relevance or validity of indicators listed in Table 6.

Some of the example indicators listed in Table 6 have not been specifically measured or operationalised in the CVE field, and caution is needed when translating one method of measuring a certain issue (i.e., an outcome) to a different policy or research field. Many of the example indicators listed in Table 6 of the National Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Framework and Guide, under ‘Individuals, Environment and Communities’, relate to different aspects of what has been termed ‘resilience’. The aim of this document is not to provide a comprehensive overview of how resilience can be measured as a CVE outcome.

When it comes to applying any of the suggested methods of measuring the indicators listed in Table 6, one must be cautious in assuming there is a causal link between a program and an observed reduction or change in certain behaviours or attitudes that a measurement tool or dataset may demonstrate. That is, the data may demonstrate a change (e.g., improved critical thinking or wellbeing, increased community awareness of violent extremism, positive perceptions of Australia, recall of media campaigns, successful rehabilitation); however, this measured change or impact may not have been the result of the program itself. Other influential factors may also be at play that have not been captured or considered in the chosen method of evaluation.

This evaluation indicator document aims to supplement the National Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Framework and Guide (2017). Section 2 reviews each sub-outcome listed in Table 6. We provide a definition of the outcome, followed by suggested ways of measuring it, as well as drawing on pre-existing measures that exist across a range of research and policy fields. This is then followed by a brief summary of the relevance of the example indicator to CVE and how it should be understood as applicable to CVE evaluation. Appendix A provides an overview of existing CVE guides, tool kits and metrics developed by various research institutes and academics. It is important to note that in providing a list of these resources, we are not endorsing those documents as examples of good practice in CVE evaluation. They are simply provided as a list of additional resources.
At the start of each section we have provided an overview of each outcome indicator. We strongly recommend that these summary tables are not used in isolation from the contents of each section.
Section 2 – Measuring outcome indicators

Outcome 1 – Communities and individuals are resilient to violent extremism

Outcome 1.1 – Individuals

Summary Table

Outcome 1.1 – Individuals

This outcome includes the following eight indicators:

- Critical thinking skills.
- Coping skills.
- Sense of belonging.
- Self-efficacy.
- Strong cultural identity combined with openness to other sources of belonging.
- Wellbeing.
- Social participation.
- Strong social skills, problem solving and conflict resolution skills.

Why measure?

This outcome relates to building individual resilience and self-confidence and increasing protective factors against an individual’s radicalisation to violent extremism. Individuals who feel a strong sense of worth and are well connected to society (positive relationships with family and friends) are likely to be more resilient against negative anti-social influences that may lead them down a pathway of radicalisation. The capacity to solve problems through non-conflictual means can be understood as a protective factor against violent extremism. A lack of a sense of belonging to mainstream society and connectedness to social institutions (e.g., schools) can result in individuals seeking alternative avenues to develop a sense of identity. A CVE program may aim to improve self-efficacy (i.e., capacity to cope), increase the level of connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community, or encourage positive behaviours and attitudes towards the local community and the wider Australian community. The ability of individuals to cope effectively and constructively with the challenges they face is important to tackling radicalisation.

Ways of measuring

CVE programs may aim to increase social participation though a range of activities, thus triggering a greater sense of connectedness to mainstream values and norms and extending a sense of belonging. Programs may aim to assess a client's changing behaviours/beliefs
through their willingness to engage in various activities. Individuals identified as at risk of radicalisation could be assessed overtime to evaluate improvements in particular skills or problem-solving strategies gained through participation in a CVE intervention. A range of tools are proposed to measure these outcomes (e.g., Youth Life Skills Survey; Ways of Coping Measure; COPE Scale; Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale; Sense of Belonging Scale; Connection to Community Scale; General Self-Efficacy Scale; Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure; Emotional Stability Scale; Quality of Life Survey; Attitude Toward Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale; Social Problem-Solving Inventory). Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly.

**Indicator: Critical thinking skills**

Critical thinking can be understood as the ability to think clearly and rationally about what to do or what to believe, enabling an individual to actively judge, assess and challenge their thoughts and reflect on their attitudes and behaviours (Behar-Horenstein & Niu, 2011; Ennis, 1985; Lau & Chan, 2017). Critical thinking encourages an individual to ask questions such as: ‘why should I do or refrain from doing that?’ or ‘why should I believe that, or not believe it?’ (Bowell & Kemp, 2005). It encourages them to look for reasons and arguments to support their behaviours and beliefs, and to consider the implications of these behaviours and beliefs (Fisher, 2001). Specific abilities associated with critical thinking include the ability to analyse arguments, claims or evidence, make inferences using inductive or deductive reasoning, judge and evaluate decisions and reflect on the justification given for one’s own beliefs and values (Lau & Chan, 2017). It includes an individual's ability to analyse attempts made by others to persuade them by evaluating whether they are providing valid arguments (Bowell & Kemp, 2005). Questions that reflect critical thinking include:

1. What precise question or problem am I trying to answer?
2. From what point of view or perspective am I thinking?
3. What information am I using to base my decision upon?
4. Have I sought information from multiple sources or points of view?
5. Am I consistent in interpreting the information and alternative points of view?
6. How am I interpreting this information?
7. Am I drawing inferences that are logical and follow from the evidence?

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Standardised tests of critical thinking include the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA) (Watson & Glaser, 1991), one of the most widely used measurement tools to assess critical thinking in education and potential employment settings (El Hassan & Madham, 2007), and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (see Ennis & Millman, 2005), which is commonly used amongst younger students in an educational setting to assess their critical thinking abilities. Many scales of critical thinking must be purchased due to licencing restrictions.

Many of these tests are limited because they are designed to measure an individual’s critical thinking ability at a single point in time, not the process itself of using strategies and approaches to support the application of critical thinking to everyday problems – an important outcome of programs that aim to promote critical thinking. More appropriate measurement tools for use by program developers include:

**The Youth Life Skills Survey** (Mincemoyer et al., 2001; Mincemoyer & Perkins, 2005)

This survey was developed for use with youth between the ages of eight and 18, and includes a subset of questions on critical thinking. The scale contains 20 items assessing elements of critical thinking, those being reasoning, enquiry, analysis/information processing, flexibility and evaluation. The 20 items are:

1. I think of possible results before I take action.
2. I get ideas from other people when having a task to do.
3. I develop my ideas by gathering information.
4. When facing a problem, I identify options to solve it.
5. I can easily express my thoughts on a problem.
6. I am able to give reasons for my opinions.
7. It is important for me to get information to support my opinions.
8. I usually have more than one source of information before making a decision.
9. I plan where to get information on a topic.
10. I plan how to get information on a topic.
11. I put my ideas in order by importance.
12. I back my decisions by the information I got.
13. I listen to the ideas of others even if I disagree with them.
15. I keep my mind open to different ideas when planning to make a decision.
16. I am aware that sometimes there are no right or wrong answers to a question.
17. I develop a checklist to help me think about an issue.
18. I can easily tell what I did was right or wrong.
19. I am able to tell the best way of handling a problem.
20. I make sure the information I use is correct.
(Response options: 1= never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always.)

**Critical thinking skills and relevance to the CVE context**

When applied to the CVE context, developing critical thinking skills can help individuals question the validity of arguments put forward by extremist groups to attract them to their cause and that are used to justify their actions. This could include the capacity of young Muslims to assess the reliability and validity of the religious explanations groups like ISIS use to justify targeting civilians, or statements made by such groups to argue that Muslims in Western countries are obliged to undertake violent jihad. The acquisition of critical thinking skills (e.g., referring to other Islamic sources, schools of thought or scholars) is important to reduce the influence of these groups and their ability to encourage young Muslims to commit acts of terrorism via their extremist propositions. The same applies to far right extremism, where similar binary perspectives are used to vilify immigrants and ethnic groups (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017). Seeking out alternative explanations and questioning the foundation of such propaganda is essential to weakening the influence of extremist groups. Strategies to develop critical thinking are included in CVE programs and include psychological elements designed to directly challenge the thoughts, beliefs and attitudes of individuals at risk of radicalisation, or those who have committed extremist acts. For example, the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) (see Dean, 2014, 2016; NOMS, 2013; Jones, 2015) and the Developing Dialogue Toolkit (see Jones, 2015), both of which are part of interventions delivered by the UK’s Prison and Probation Service to convicted terrorists, have modules on critical thinking. These are not publicly available.

The measures outlined above to assess critical thinking are generic, and there is no validated, publicly available critical thinking scale as it relates to violent extremism. One issue to keep in mind when assessing levels of critical thinking among people who have committed or who are at risk of committing violent extremism, is the content of the types of messages or propositions with which they engage (i.e., the evidentiary base or rationalisations underpinning them). Hence, measuring any change in critical thinking would need to examine the general attributes of critical thinking, but also its application to the type of violent extremism (e.g., Islamists or far right/left) towards which an individual has gravitated.
**Indicator: Coping skills**

Coping skills encompass behavioural and psychological strategies that people adopt to master, tolerate, reduce or minimise stressful events or tasks (Cooper, Katona & Livingston, 2008; Taylor, 1998). They can include problem-solving strategies involving efforts to alleviate or solve demanding tasks, and emotion-focused coping strategies which aim to regulate an emotional response to stressful or potentially stressful events (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Taylor, 1998). Coping skills can be both constructive/adaptive and destructive/maladaptive. Constructive/adaptive coping skills can include activities that encourage positive behaviour and thinking regarding how to solve particular problems or challenges a person may face in their lives. One example is the application of strategies that involve goal setting. Destructive/maladaptive coping skills may include negative behaviours or reactions such as social withdrawal or aggression. Being able to cope constructively with particularly stressful or challenging situations is synonymous with resilience (Windle et al., 2011).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Direct measures of coping skills**

Two measurement tools have been used to directly measure coping skills. These include:

**Ways of Coping Measure** (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980)

**Ways of Coping (Revised)** (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985).

The Ways of Coping measure aims to assess a range of thoughts and actions people use to deal with the internal and/or external demands of specific stressful encounters. The revised and shorter version measures eight dimensions through 67 items. The eight dimensions and example items include:

1. Confrontive coping e.g., ‘I stood my ground and fought for what I wanted’.
2. Distancing e.g., ‘I went on as if nothing had happened’.
3. Self-controlling e.g., ‘I tried not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch’.
4. Seeking social support e.g., ‘I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice’.
5. Accepting responsibility e.g., ‘I realised I brought the problem on myself’.
6. Escape–Avoidance e.g., ‘I avoided being with people in general’.
7. Planful problem solving e.g., ‘I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work’.
8. Positive reappraisal e.g., ‘I changed or grew as a person in a good way’.
COPE (see Carver et al., 1989)

Brief COPE (see Carver, 1997)

The original COPE measurement tool measures 14 dimensions across 53 items on how an individual may respond when they are confronted with difficult or stressful events in their life. The shortened version, Brief COPE, was developed to be a more workable instrument depending on the context. Some example items include:

1. Active coping e.g., ‘I've been taking action to try to make the situation better’.
2. Substance use e.g., ‘I've been using alcohol or other drugs to make myself feel better’.
3. Use of emotional support e.g., ‘I've been getting emotional support from others’.
4. Use of instrumental support e.g., ‘I've been getting help and advice from other people’.
5. Behavioural disengagement e.g., ‘I've been giving up trying to deal with it’.
6. Venting e.g., ‘I've been expressing my negative feelings’.
7. Positive reframing e.g., ‘I've been looking for something good in what is happening’.
8. Planning e.g., ‘I've been thinking hard about what steps to take’.
9. Humour e.g., ‘I've been making jokes about it’.
10. Acceptance e.g., ‘I've been learning to live with it’.
11. Religion e.g., ‘I've been praying or meditating’.

(Response options: 0 – does not apply and/or not used, 1 – used somewhat, 2 – used quite a bit, 3 – used a great deal.)

Coping skills measured as resilience

Coping skills are considered synonymous with resilience, and numerous resilience scales have been developed and presented in the literature (see Windle et al., 2011). These can act as proxy measures of coping skills. Examples include:

The Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) (see Connor & Davidson, 2003)
The original CD-RISC comprised 25 items, each rated on a 5-point scale of 0 – not true at all, 1 – rarely true, 2 – sometimes true, 3 – often true, and 4 – true nearly all of the time, with higher scores reflecting greater resilience. A shortened version, including 10 of the original items that have also been validated and tested, could be a more workable measurement tool in some contexts (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2007). This refined version includes the following 10 items:

1. Able to adapt to change.
2. Can deal with whatever comes.
3. Tries to see the humorous side of things.
4. Coping with stress can strengthen me.
5. Tend to bounce back after illness or hardship.
6. Can achieve goals despite obstacles.
7. Can stay focused under pressure.
8. Not easily discouraged by failure.
9. Think of self as a strong person.
10. Can handle unpleasant feelings.

Resiliency, Attitudes and Skills Profile (RASP) (see Hurtes & Allen, 2001)
This is a measurement tool specifically developed for measuring resiliency in youth for recreation and other social services. It could also be used for CVE programs and interventions, particularly those aimed at youth at risk. RASP measures seven dimensions of resiliency across 34 items, with each item measured on a six-point response scale from 1 – strongly disagree to 6 – strongly agree. Some example items include:
1. Insights e.g., ‘I learn from my mistakes’; ‘I know when I am good at something’.
2. Independence e.g., ‘I say ‘no’ to things I don’t want to do’.
3. Creativity e.g., ‘When I am faced with a tough situation, I came up with new ways to handle it’.
4. Humour e.g., ‘I look for the “lighter side” of tough situations’.
5. Initiative e.g., ‘I can change my surroundings’; ‘I try to figure out things I do not understand’.
6. Relationships e.g., ‘I avoid people who could get me into trouble’.
7. Values orientation e.g., ‘It’s ok if I don’t see things the way other people do’; ‘I avoid situations where I could get into trouble’.

Coping skills and relevance to the CVE context
The ability of individuals to cope effectively and constructively with stressors and challenges they face in their lives is important to tackling radicalisation because, for some individuals, violent extremism could be an outcome of destructive or maladaptive coping skills. This has been found in some cases of lone wolf terrorists (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017). Hence, constructive coping skills can act as a protective factor against violent extremism. Further, lacking the ability to cope with everyday stressors and challenges may leave an individual feeling isolated and therefore open to negative and anti-social influences, which may lead them down a
pathway of radicalisation. It could leave them vulnerable to extremist groups who can provide a sense of belonging (whether in the virtual world or through group interactions). Providing individuals with constructive or adaptive coping skills can potentially help them avoid extremist ideologies or groups that aim to exploit feelings of disenchantment, depression and isolation (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Measures of coping skills, such as those described above, could be used on individuals identified as at risk of radicalisation with changes measured over time to see how their coping skills improve through a particular intervention.

**Indicator: Sense of belonging**

Sense of belonging is similar to the indicator *social participation*. Both relate to the level of connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community and/or the wider Australian community. Sense of belonging differs to social participation as it specifically relates to the degree to which an individual identifies with or relates to their local community and/or the wider Australian community. In other words, does the individual consider themselves as belonging to and being accepted by a specific group or the mainstream Australian population? A sense of belonging has been found to influence an individual’s health and wellbeing and is closely related to social and psychological functioning. It is an important element for mental health and social wellbeing, and may help build individual resilience (Hagerty et al., 2001). A sense of belonging can have two defining attributes: (1) the experience of being valued, needed, or important with respect to other people, groups or environments, and (2) the experience of fitting in or being congruent with other people, groups or environments through shared or complementary characteristics (Hagerty et al., 2001). The concept has been applied across a variety of policy and research domains, including education, youth mental health and wellbeing.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

The literature recommends that a sense of belonging be measured at the program level (i.e., measuring an individual’s sense of belonging within a particular program), or at the community level (measuring an individual’s sense of belonging to the wider community).

**Program level**

A sense of belonging at a program level represents the level of belonging/safety/attachment an individual feels to a particular program in which they are participating. The two following Sense of Belonging Scales (10-item and 5-item) are ways of measuring this at the program
level, and have been used to evaluate youth-focused prevention programs, such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters in the USA (Arthur, 1997).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense of Belonging Scale</th>
<th>Sense of Belonging Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(10-Item Belonging Scale)</td>
<td>(5-Item Belonging Scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I don’t have many friends at the program.</td>
<td>1. I feel comfortable at the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel comfortable at the program.</td>
<td>2. I am a part of the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The leaders at the program make me feel wanted and accepted.</td>
<td>3. I am committed to the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I feel like I am an important member of the program.</td>
<td>4. I am supported at the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I wish I were not a part of the program.</td>
<td>5. I am accepted at the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I am disliked by kids at the program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I am a part of the program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I am committed to the program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I am supported at the program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I am accepted at the program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community level

The Connection to Community Scale and the Social Trust Scale, developed by Price et al., (2011), aim to measure connection to the broader community and the degree to which individuals believe they can trust community members (e.g., police). These tools measure attitudes, not behaviours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connection to Community Scale</th>
<th>Social Trust Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I have a strong attachment to my community.</td>
<td>1. Most people can be trusted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I often discuss and think about how larger political and social issues affect my community.</td>
<td>2. I trust people in my neighbourhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I am aware of what can be done to meet the important needs in my community.</td>
<td>3. I trust the local police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I have the ability to make a difference in my community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. I try to find the time to make a positive difference in my community.

(Adapted from: The Technical Appendix of Price et al., 2011.)

These tools could be administered as a pre-test (before the person participates in a program) and as a post-test (following program participation). Each item is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 – strongly agree, 4 – agree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 2 – disagree, 1 – strongly disagree. Higher scores indicate that individuals feel a stronger connection to their communities.

**Sense of belonging and relevance to the CVE context**

A lack of a sense of belonging can result in individuals being attracted to violent extremist groups. Extremists can provide important peer and friendship networks that an individual may be missing in their lives. Within the literature on pathways into radicalisation, a sense of belonging is given prominence (Khosorokhavar, 2017; Moghaddam, 2005). A lack of belonging to mainstream society and connectedness to social institutions (e.g., schools) can result in individuals seeking alternative avenues through which they may find a sense of belonging and an identity. It is within this context that individuals may begin to gravitate towards radicalisation and violent extremism. When developing questions to measure a sense of belonging, consideration needs to be given to the source of belonging (e.g., the wider Australian community). Questions from the Connection to Community Scale and the Social Trust Scale may need to be adapted to reflect the source of sense of the belonging because reference to a term like ‘community’ can have different meanings. For example, the question regarding the individual’s attachment to community could refer to one’s racial, ethnic or religious group, each of which could represent a different type of community. Belonging at the program level is also relevant to CVE programs because it relates to the degree to which an individual finds the content of a program relevant and/or identifies with other program participants or leaders/mentors delivering an intervention. Measuring an individual’s sense of belonging at the program level could be used to identify those individuals most likely to attend or drop-out of a program. Participation rates and patterns of attendance could then be used to target certain individuals with particular activities.

**Indicator: Self-efficacy – A belief in their ability to cope and a sense of control over their life**

In the literature, self-efficacy is defined as a person’s belief in their ability to succeed in a given situation, and the degree of control they believe they have over a given situation (Bandura,
Low self-efficacy can impact on a person's belief in their own capabilities and thus may have a negative impact upon an individual’s behaviour, such as their self-confidence and ability to solve problems. This can result in individuals attributing negative intentions to others, and to believe they are unable to succeed in life and to set realistic goals. Self-efficacy has mainly been examined within the educational setting (Schunk, 1990). When students perceive they have made satisfactory progress towards achieving their goal, they feel capable of improving their skills and are able to achieve and set realistic future goals.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**The General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE)**

The GSE was created to assess a general sense of perceived self-efficacy, with the aim of predicting coping with daily hassles as well as the capacity to adapt after experiencing stressful life events. The scale is designed for the general adult population, including adolescents. It is self-administered, and takes on average four minutes to administer. Responses are made on a four-point scale, and responses to all 10 items are summed up to yield the final composite score with a range from 10 to 40.

**Scale of Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE)**

Social self-efficacy is defined as an individual’s confidence in her/his ability to engage in the social interactional tasks necessary to initiate and maintain interpersonal relationships (Smith & Betz, 2000). Smith and Betz (2000) measured social self-efficacy using an instrument called the Scale of Perceived Social Self-Efficacy, which measured six domains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE)</th>
<th>Scale of Perceived Social Efficacy (PSSE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(10-Item Scale)</td>
<td>(6-Item Scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.</td>
<td>1. Making friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.</td>
<td>2. Pursuing romantic relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.</td>
<td>3. Social assertiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.</td>
<td>4. Performance in public situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Groups or parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Giving or receiving help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Smith &amp; Betz, 2000)</td>
<td>(Smith &amp; Betz, 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.

Response options: 1 – not at all true, 2 – hardly true, 3 – moderately true, 4 – exactly true.

(Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995)

Self-efficacy and relevance to the CVE context

Low self-efficacy among individuals can be understood as a risk factor towards radicalisation and violent extremism. That is, an individual who perceives they lack a sense of control over their life may be attracted to violent extremist groups, due to the certainty they provide in relation to solving particular grievances an individual may have towards others. A CVE program may aim to improve self-efficacy (i.e., an individual’s capacity to cope) and to enhance their beliefs in their own capabilities to identify solutions that do not involve extremist behaviour, thus making them less vulnerable to radicalisation.

Indicator: Strong cultural identity combined with openness to other sources of belonging

This indicator relates to having a strong cultural identity and a sense of pride in one’s culture, while maintaining an openness and respect for other members from different cultures, religions and ethnic or social backgrounds. This indicator can also be understood as comprising tolerance for other social groups. A strong cultural identity may take the form of participation in cultural celebrations and traditions and may involve membership of ethnic or religious groups or kinship networks.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

One possible measure of a strong cultural identity and openness to other sources of belonging is the Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). MEIM is a widely used survey to measure
ethnic identification. It was developed for use with adolescents and young adults and has previously been used in research with Australian adolescents from diverse ethno-cultural groups (Dandy et al., 2008). It provides a measure of engagement with members of one’s own group and participation in cultural traditions. It canvasses opinions across the following four areas: positive ethnic attitudes and sense of belonging, identity and achievement, behaviours or practices, and other-group orientation.

**The Multi-group Ethnicity Identity Measure (MEIM)**

In terms of ethnic group, I consider myself to be___________________ (please write in).

1. I have spent time trying to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions and customs.
2. I am active in organisations or social groups that include mostly members of my own ethnic group.
3. I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means for me.
4. I like meeting and getting to know people from ethnic groups other than my own.
5. I think about how my life will be affected by my ethnic group membership.
6. I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to.
7. I sometimes feel it would be better if different ethnic groups didn’t try to mix together.
8. I am not very clear about the role of my ethnicity in my life.
9. I often spend time with people from other ethnic groups other than my own.
10. I really have not spent much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of my ethnic group.
11. I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group.
12. I understand pretty well what my own ethnic group membership means to me, in terms of how to relate to my own group and other groups.
13. In order to learn more about my own ethnic group, I have often talked to other people about my own ethnic group.
14. I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments.
15. I don’t try to become friends with people from other ethnic groups.
16. I participate in other cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music or customs.
17. I am involved in activities with people from other ethnic groups.
18. I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group.
19. I enjoy being around people from ethnic groups other than my own.
Strong cultural identity and relevance to the CVE context

A strong cultural identity, a sense of pride in one’s culture and an openness and respect for other people should be understood as protective factors against violent extremism. Greater identification with one’s religious and ethnic group can create a greater sense of belonging and make one more discerning when targeted by extremist groups that appeal to religious ideology or group loyalty to attract and recruit fellow Muslims, for example (Cherney & Murphy, 2017). Likewise, a lack of openness and acceptance of others is a key attribute of extremists, who often condemn other religious or ethnic groups, singling them out for persecution (Koehler, 2017). Measuring cultural identity, pride and openness is relevant to other indicators such as social cohesion, positive perception of Australia, sense of belonging and wellbeing. Attributes of cultural identity, pride and openness should mainly be focused on individual perceptions.

Indicator: Wellbeing

Within the literature, the term ‘wellbeing’ can refer to an individual’s health, or social or psychological wellbeing (i.e., life happiness). Wellbeing has much in common with other CVE indicators such as social skills, social participation, coping skills, sense of belonging and self-efficacy. Wellbeing can be reflected in positive relationships with family and friends, self-acceptance, the realisation of goals and life satisfaction. A measure of wellbeing at an individual level may give an indication of how happy a person is or how healthy they are. At a community level, it can reflect the degree of (perceived) social inequality. Wellbeing can be measured at a (national) population level and can be used as a barometer to measure how satisfied people are with their lives. It requires the use of subjective social indicators (e.g., asking how people feel about their lives). There is no single definition or single way of measuring wellbeing. The following section provides several options that cover a range of definitions and categories of wellbeing.
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

When looking at the indicator wellbeing, it is important to decide what dimension of wellbeing is to be measured (e.g., satisfaction with health, happiness, financial circumstances, peer and family networks). The following three tools are recommended for consideration as they include a range of definitions and measurements of wellbeing, and may need to be adapted for a program's cohort:

The Emotional Stability Scale
This scale is designed to measure emotional stability, the ability to deal with stress and to cope under stressful circumstances. It can give an indication of how resilient an individual is during stressful periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotional Stability Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How often have you had the following thoughts or emotions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Feeling blue (sad).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Feeling others are to blame for most of your problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Thoughts of ending your life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Urges to injure or harm someone else.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Difficulty making decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nervousness or shakiness inside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Not feeling liked or respected by others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Evans &amp; Skager, 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘1 – not at all’ to ‘5 – very much’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality of Life (QOL) Survey
A QOL Survey attempts to measure quality of life, comparing one population with another, and is useful for measuring the impact of public policy initiatives (Hagerty et al., 2001). Scholars point to the need for a range of indicators in a QOL Survey (e.g., Cummins, 1997). These can include life and job satisfaction, personal happiness, physical health status and satisfaction with personal income.

A QOL Survey must have relevance and meaning for the cohort with which it is being used. For example, if the QOL Survey is being used with young Muslim males at risk of being radicalised, then it must include questions and topics that are of relevance to that target group, but not necessarily applicable to the general population.
A QOL Survey designed for a specific target population within a specific social context would not necessarily capture (nor be appropriate for) other populations in different socio-political contexts. Hagerty et al. (2001) recommend the design of a QOL Survey across the following seven domains with each question domain weighted according to its importance/relevance to that population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Life (QOL) Survey</th>
<th>Question Domain Weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended Question Domains</strong></td>
<td><strong>Question Domain Weighting</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Relationships with family and friends.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emotional wellbeing.</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Material wellbeing.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Health.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Work and productive activity.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Feeling part of one’s local community.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personal safety.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hagerty et al., 2001; Cummins et al., 1994; Cummins, 1996, 1997)

The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index

The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index was designed as a barometer of Australians’ satisfaction with their lives (Cummins et al., 2003). The index comprises two sub-scales of Personal Wellbeing and National Wellbeing and includes questions covering how satisfied an individual is with their own life and life events, their satisfaction with life in Australia and their financial wellbeing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Thinking about your own life and personal circumstances, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole? (Global Life Satisfaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How satisfied are you with life in Australia? (Global National Wellbeing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How satisfied are you with…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Life Satisfaction:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Standard of living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Achieving in life.  
Relationships.  
Personal safety.  
Community connectedness.  
Future security.  

Social conditions in Australia.  
Government in Australia.  
Business in Australia.  
National Security in Australia.

**Life events examples**

1. Has anything happened to you recently causing you to feel happier or sadder than normal?  
2. On a scale from zero (very weak) to 10 (very strong), how strong do you feel this influence?

**Financial wellbeing examples**

1. How would you describe your personal financial situation? (The response options were: ‘very good’, ‘somewhat good’, ‘somewhat bad’ and ‘very bad’)
2. Thinking about your financial situation five years ago, are you better or worse off? (The response options were: ‘better’, ‘the same’ and ‘worse’)

*(Cummins et al., 2003)*

**Wellbeing and relevance to the CVE context**

Individual, social or psychological wellbeing can be understood as protective factors against violent extremism. Individuals who exhibit low levels of wellbeing may be more vulnerable to radicalisation, with it acting as a push factor. For example, an individual that has poor emotional wellbeing (e.g., not feeling respected or liked by others) may be attracted to violent extremist groups because they fulfil this emotional deficit by providing social acceptance. CVE programs may aim to improve different forms of wellbeing. For instance, a CVE program may aim to improve emotional wellbeing through a series of interventions such as psychological support or diversion/peer group activities (e.g., youth camps, or involvement in a Police Citizens Youth Club). In this context, questions relating to emotional stability would be relevant. Interventions may aim to improve an individual’s quality of life by providing health, educational or economic support. Here, questions from the Australian Unity Wellbeing index can be adapted. For example, one could ask a client prior to and following program participation how satisfied they are with their standard of living, individual health, achievements in life, personal relationships, personal safety, sense of community connectedness and future security, weighting each question on the basis of their priority within a program's outcome measures. Additionally, an intervention may provide vocational and
employment opportunities to an individual, creating greater financial independence. Financial independence can help create a greater stake in mainstream society. Questions relating to financial wellbeing can therefore be relevant.

**Indicator: Social participation**

The indicator *social participation* is similar to the indicator *sense of belonging*. Both relate to the level of connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community and/or the wider Australian community. This indicator differs in that it relates to the degree to which an individual participates in or engages with one’s community or the wider Australian community as a whole.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Attitude Toward Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale**

Developed by Price et al. (2011), this scale is a measure of social participation. It measures a range of civic activities, such as serving on a jury, the obligation to report crimes, participating in local organisations and keeping the local area safe and clean. It is a measure of the degree to which an individual accepts and adopts broader community norms around civic participation. This tool can be administered as a pre-test (before the person participates in a program) and as a post-test (follow up after participating in a program). Each item is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 – very likely, 4 – somewhat likely, 3 – not sure how likely, 2 – not too likely, 1 – not likely at all. Higher scores indicate that individuals attribute more importance to neighbourhood and civic involvement.

**Attitude Toward Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale**

How likely are you to do the following activities? Mark the box for each item that best indicates how likely you are to do what the item says:

- Serving on a jury, if called…
- Reporting a crime that you may have witnessed…
- Participating in neighbourhood organisations (school, religious, community, recreational)…
- Voting in elections…
- Helping to keep the neighbourhood safe…
- Helping to keep the neighbourhood clean and beautiful…
- Helping those who are less fortunate…

(Adapted from: The Technical Appendix of Price et al., 2011.)
Social participation and relevance to the CVE context

Social withdrawal can be understood as a risk factor for violent extremism, which can result in individuals rejecting mainstream values and civic participation. As noted by researchers, violent extremists often divide the world into in-groups and out-groups, with violent Islamist groups condemning Muslims that participate in mainstream Western activities or associating with non-Muslims, thus promoting social isolation from broader society to a specific group of Muslims (Moghaddam, 2005). CVE programs may aim to increase social participation though a range of activities, thus triggering a greater sense of connectedness to mainstream values and norms, and extending a sense of belonging. The outcome can be that individuals at risk of radicalisation will be less likely to see others (e.g., Westerners or non-Muslims, or immigrant groups, in the case of right wing extremism) as the enemy. CVE programs may aim to assess a client's changing sense of social participation through their willingness to engage in various neighbourhood and civic activities.

Indicator: Strong social skills, problem solving and conflict resolution skills

Strong social skills, problem-solving and conflict resolution skills comprise a range of interpersonal attributes linked to individual resilience to violent extremist influences. The broader literature identifies the ability to solve problems and manage conflict in a constructive and socially acceptable manner as a key skill required for young adults to gain and maintain employment and healthy relationships. Problem solving and conflict resolution are similar to the indicators of critical thinking and self-efficacy.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

The Social Problem-Solving Inventory – Revised (SPSI-R)

The SPSI-R can be used to determine an individual’s general problem-solving strengths. It has been administered to individuals aged 13 years and over, with longer and shorter versions of the inventory having been developed.¹ The instrument can be used in various environments and with different people to explore social problem-solving abilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example from the Social Problem-Solving Inventory – Revised: Short Form (SPSI-R:SF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I feel afraid when I have an important problem to solve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. When making decisions, I do not think carefully about my many options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I get nervous and unsure of myself when I have to make an important decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I give up quickly because finding a solution is too difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sometimes even difficult problems can have a way of moving my life forward in positive ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If I avoid problems, they will generally go away on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. When I cannot solve a problem, I get very frustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. If I am faced with a difficult problem, I probably will not be able to solve it on my own no matter how hard I try.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I try to do anything I can in order to avoid problems in my life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Difficult problems make me very upset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. When I have a decision to make, I take the time to try to predict the positive and negative consequences of each possible option before I act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. When problems occur in my life, I like to deal with them as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. When I am trying to solve a problem I go with the first good idea that comes to mind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I believe that I will be able to solve it on my own if I try hard enough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. When I have a problem to solve, one of the first things I do is get as many facts about the problem as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. When a problem happens in my life, I put off trying to solve it for as long as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I spend more time avoiding my problems than solving them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Before I try to solve a problem, I set a specific goal so that I know exactly what I want to accomplish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. When I have a decision to make, I do not take the time to consider the pros and cons of each option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. After carrying out a solution to a problem, I try to evaluate as carefully as possible how much the situation has changed for the better.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. I put off solving problems until it is too late to do anything about them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. When I am trying to solve a problem, I think of as many options as possible until I cannot come up with any more.

24. When making decisions, I go with my ‘gut feeling’ without thinking too much about the consequences of each option.

25. I am too impulsive when it comes to making decisions.

(Measured using a 5-point Likert scale where 1 – definitely true, 2 – true, 3 – tends to be true, 4 – tends not to be true, 5 – not true.)

(D'zurilla & Nezu, 1990; Sorsdahl et al., 2017)

**Strong social skills, problem-solving and conflict resolution skills, and their relevance to the CVE context**

The capacity to solve problems through non-conflictual means can be understood as a protective factor against violent extremism. The inability to identify options for managing an individual’s grievances can lead them to adopt solutions promoted by violent extremists or to gravitate towards violent extremist groups. Resisting such influences requires an individual to be able to weigh up the consequences of their decisions and actions, and identify non-violent alternative solutions to the problems they perceive in their lives, or the lack of identity and belonging they may feel. Hence, the capacity of CVE programs to promote problem-solving and conflict resolution can be an important program outcome, with different items in the Social Problem-Solving Inventory aiming to measure aspects of these indictors.

**Outcome 1.2 – Environment**

**Summary Table**

**Outcome 1.2 – Environment**

Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.

This outcome includes the following six indicators:

- Civic participation.
- Opportunities for education, training and employment.
- Engagement between communities and government.
- Sense of marginalisation.
- Experience of discrimination.
- Supportive social networks within the immediate community.
**Why measure?**
This outcome is concerned with the level of engagement, feelings of connectedness and commitment towards mainstream society and degree of social support an individual experiences. This outcome can also refer to a ‘lack of access’ to resources/opportunities that would allow people to participate fully in mainstream society. Subjectively, it can relate to whether people perceive themselves to experience this lack of access. Discrimination against minority groups may be associated with an increased risk of violence, extremism and terrorism. Marginalised individuals may be more likely to join violent groups. Social networks and connection to society can act as an important resource when individuals feel socially marginalised or isolated. When these networks are strong, they can act as a resource for those at risk of violent extremism by providing support in times of need. A lack of education, training and employment may exacerbate other risk factors for violent extremism.

**Ways of measuring**
A mix of quantitative and qualitative data could be used. For example, secondary or administrative data could be used to measure opportunities for education, training and employment (e.g., number of school/training programs, number of enrolments, unemployment rates and job vacancies). Qualitative data could measure opportunities for education, training and employment, and could be collected through interviews and focus groups with program participants. Data on community engagement could examine (1) types and levels of community engagement with government, (2) perceptions of and attitudes towards community engagement, (3) barriers to community engagement, (4) satisfaction with community engagement, and (5) perceived outcomes of community engagement. Levels of engagement can be quantified by tallying the number of government outreach activities that occur. The quality of the engagement and whether people think this makes a difference to their lives should be assessed.

**Indicator: Civic participation**
Assessments of levels of civic participation within particular communities have typically been based on aggregating from individual level activities. Civic participation can capture similar activities as the outcome indicators of social participation, engagement between communities and government and social cohesion. Opportunities for civic participation can encompass a range of activities. Civil participation is also referred to as civic engagement in the literature, and can refer to involvement in individual and/or group activities undertaken to improve or benefit a community, governance or democratic processes. This can include activities such as
voting, being a member of a civic organisation (e.g., a political party, trade union, environmental group or animal welfare group), being a member of a sporting club, volunteering or participating in rallies or demonstrations. Notably, in recent years, there has been an increase in online forms of civic participation (e.g., participating in online petitions, sharing and discussing political and societal content online), particularly among adolescents and young adults.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures
Some examples of measuring forms of civic participation include:

Online and Offline Civic Engagement among Adolescents and Young Adults
Jugert et al. (2013) adapted items from Lyons (2008) to create scales for online and offline civic engagement activities among adolescents and young adults. Each measures participation in civic activities in the last 12 months and intention to participate in these activities in the future, using a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., in the past 12-months have you participated in: ‘never’ to ‘very often’; in the future are you likely to participate in: ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’). Example items include:

Online Civic Engagement Scale
• Discuss societal or political content on the net (caution: this could capture engagement of on-line extremist content).
• Participate in an online-based petition, protest, or boycott.
• Visit a website of a political or civic organisation.

Offline Civic Engagement Scale
• Volunteer work.
• Taking part in a concert or fundraising event with a political or social cause.
• Distributing leaflets with political content.

Civic participation within the Active and Engaged Citizenship (AEC) measure
The Active and Engaged Citizenship (AEC) measure (Zaff et al., 2010) was developed for use with adolescents to assess four components of civic engagement: civic duty, civic skills, neighbourhood social connection and civic participation. The measure of civic participation includes eight questions and uses 5- and 6-point Likert scales (5-point scale: from ‘never’ to
‘very often’; 6-point scales: (1) from ‘never’ to ‘every day’ and (2) from ‘never’ to ‘five or more times’). Example items include:

- How often do you help out at your church, synagogue, or other place of worship?
- How often do you volunteer your time (at a hospital, day care centre, food bank, youth program, community service agency)?
- During the last 12 months, how many times have you been a leader in a group or organisation?

South Australian Community Health Unity Civic Participation Scale

The South Australian Community Health Unit developed an 11-item scale of civic participation (Hodgkin, 2011). In contrast to the two examples described above, which are targeted at adolescents and young adults, this measure has been used among a range of age groups (18 to 60+ years). The scale measures frequency of participation in a range of individual and group activities. Example items include asking how often in the last twelve months someone has:

- Signed a petition.
- Contacted a local councillor.
- Been involved in a campaign or action to improve social or environmental conditions.
- Been involved with a political party, trade union, or political campaign.

Civic participation and relevance to the CVE context

Civic participation can encourage feelings of connectedness and commitment towards mainstream society (Putman, 2001). Opportunities for civic participation can help individuals develop social and support networks that can act as important resources when they feel socially marginalised or isolated. Such experiences can make people vulnerable to becoming radicalised to violent extremism (Koehler, 2017). Individuals with higher levels of civic participation may also feel that they have more say in their community regarding issues that are important to them. CVE programs may aim to increase civic participation through a variety of initiatives, building a greater sense of involvement and connection through opportunities that allow individuals to raise and address issues of concern to them, e.g., through mainstream political processes. Measuring levels of civic participation can occur at the community or individual level. At the community level, this may involve quantifying the number and type of civic activities that exist in a certain area and the level of membership amongst a program’s target group. CVE programs aimed at the individual level may aim to increase a person’s willingness to engage in civic activities and assess if levels of participation change over time.
Indicator: Opportunities for education, training and employment

This indicator can encompass both objective and subjective dimensions. Objectively, it can relate to the availability of and access to educational institutions, training programs and jobs, as well as people's educational status and qualifications. Subjectively, it can relate to whether people believe work, training and educational opportunities are available to them and hence pursue these opportunities. If understood in this way then the indicator well-being is also relevant. There are no uniform or agreed measures relating to opportunities for education, training and employment.

Example questions or possible scenarios/potential existing measures

Secondary and administrative data

Secondary and administrative data could be used to objectively measure opportunities for education, training and employment. This could include gathering information regarding:

Opportunities for education
- Number of preschools within communities and surrounding areas to assess availability of preschool programs.
- Number of children within a community enrolled in and attending preschools to assess proportion of children within a community engaged in preschool programs.
- Number of schools (public and private) within communities and surrounding areas to assess availability of primary and secondary education.
- Number of students who complete senior years of high school to assess retention in secondary schooling.
- Number of tertiary educational institutions (e.g., universities, TAFEs) within communities and surrounding areas to assess availability and access to tertiary education.

Opportunities for training
- Number of trade apprenticeships available within communities and surrounding areas.
- Number of TAFEs and similar institutions within communities and surrounding areas.

Opportunities for employment
- Unemployment rates within communities and surrounding areas (including unemployment rates broken down by age group) to assess the rate of unemployment within particular communities.
• Job vacancies within communities and surrounding areas (such as data collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics or job sites) to assess opportunities for employment (both in regard to skill level/experience required and accessibility, i.e., distance to employment).
• Relevance of educational qualifications to current job opportunities to assess rates of underemployment within communities.

**Perceived opportunities for employment**
A variety of research has examined perceived opportunities for finding alternative employment among individuals who are already employed (see Steel & Griffeth, 1989). Peters et al. (1981) used a 3-item scale to measure expectations of finding alternative employment:
• It is possible for me to find a better job than the one I have now.
• Acceptable jobs can always be found.
• There is no doubt in my mind that I can find a job that is at least as good as the one I now have.
Each item was measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).

**Perceived educational and career barriers**
McWhirter (1997) developed a 24-item scale to measure perceived educational and career barriers for high school students in the USA. The scale consists of items relating to future job discrimination, barriers preventing college attendance, barriers respondents may encounter if they attend college, and general perceptions regarding future barriers. Each item was measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). Example items include:

*Future job discrimination:*
• In my future job, I will probably experience discrimination because of my ethnic/racial background.

*Perceived barriers to attending college:*
• If I didn’t go to college, it would be because of money problems.
• If I didn’t go to college, it would be because of not being smart enough.

*Perceived barriers anticipated in college:*
• If I do go to college, I will probably experience not fitting in with others.
**General perceptions of barriers:**

- In general, I think that there are many barriers that will make it difficult for me to achieve my career goals.
- In general, I think that I will be able to overcome any barriers that stand in the way of achieving my career goals.

**Qualitative data**

Qualitative data could also be used to measure opportunities for education, training and employment. This data could be collected through interviews and focus groups with program participants focusing on their perceptions of options for education, training and employment, including perceived barriers to such opportunities. Qualitative data could be collected from key agency informants (e.g., staff at educational institutions, job centres, service providers) to examine their perceptions of opportunities for education, training and employment within the community, whether program target groups are affording themselves such opportunities, and if not, why this may be occurring.

**Opportunities for education, training and employment and relevance to the CVE context**

The link between violent extremism and socio-economic status is weak, in that people who are employed and well educated still radicalise to violent extremism (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016; Porter & Kebbell, 2011); however, a lack of perceived opportunities for education, training and employment can certainly create a sense of marginalisation among some groups, particularly if they feel they are denied such opportunities despite having relevant skills and qualifications. In such situations, individuals may be attracted to violent extremist groups (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016). Another way to think about the relevance of this indicator is that opportunities for education, training and employment relate to the indicators wellbeing and social participation, in that they can have an impact on a person's quality of life (wellbeing) and the degree to which people have the resources to actively participate in their neighbourhood or community (social participation). The lack of opportunities for education, training and employment may exacerbate other risk factors for violent extremism (see indicators wellbeing and social participation), making people more vulnerable to extremist propaganda because they feel they have little stake in society (e.g., a job). Depending on the aims of a CVE intervention, evaluation plans may want to assess both the objective and subjective dimensions of opportunities for education, training and employment, and understand if a program influences both dimensions.
There are a variety of definitions of community engagement. Community engagement can refer to the processes by which governments and its entities connect with people during the process of policy development and implementation, particularly when they are putting in place initiatives that affect people’s neighbourhoods or communities. Engagement between communities and governments may also encompass the degree to which people access government services (e.g., Centrelink, Medicare, government-run health services, police), and participate in government-organised initiatives (e.g., facilitated workshops, forums, community cabinets, consultations). Levels of engagement between communities and governments can be quantified by tallying the number of government outreach activities in place. An important consideration is the quality of the engagement and whether people think it makes a difference to their lives. Importantly, it should be noted that superficial engagement without any real opportunity for people to have a say or influence an outcome could be judged as disingenuous, because it shows governments are not sincere about seeking community input and acting on any concerns or suggestions made (Cherney & Hartley, 2017). Therefore, any assessment of engagement between communities and governments would need to incorporate subjective measures to judge the quality of that engagement, as well as objective dimensions quantifying the number and types of outreach activities and services engaged (Goodman et al., 2017).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Secondary and administrative data**

Secondary and administrative data from governments could be used to measure engagement between communities and those governments. This could include gathering information regarding:

- Number of community forums and meetings within the last 12 months.
- Number of collaborative community–government initiatives being run within a community.
- Number of participants/attendees engaging with government initiatives/services within a community.

**Quantitative Community Engagement Measure**

Goodman et al. (2017) developed a quantitative measure of community engagement in the academic research context. The benefit of the Goodman et al. (2017) instrument is that it
attempts to quantify the perceived quality of engagement (see http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jcop.21828/full). It incorporates a range of questions that ask participants to rate how often an entity adopted a range of engagement practices based on a quantity (never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time, always) and quality rating (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent). (In the Goodman et al. (2017) study the entity was a research team.) The same questions are asked across both quantity and quality ratings. The questions could be easily adopted in reference to a state government department, service provider or program staff. Example items include asking how often participants think an agency/group/organisation does each of the following:

- Focus on issues important to my community.
- Show appreciation for community time and effort.
- Let community members know what is going on with the project.
- Empower community members with knowledge gained from a joint activity.
- Use the ideas and input of the community members.
- Seek community input and help at multiple stages of the process.
- Help community members gain important skills from involvement.
- Work with existing community networks.
- Foster collaborations within which community members are real partners.
- Enable all people involved to voice their views.
- Treat community members’ ideas with openness and respect.
- Include community members in plans for sharing findings.
- Make commitments to communities that are long-term.

**Qualitative data**

Qualitative data could be used as a subjective measure of community engagement. Data could be collected through key informant interviews or focus groups with individuals, leaders or representatives within a community. These interviews and focus groups could examine:

- Types and levels of community engagement with government.
- Perceptions of and attitudes towards community engagement.
- Barriers to community engagement.
- Satisfaction with community engagement.
- Perceived outcomes of community engagement.
**Engagement between communities and governments and relevance to the CVE context**

Engagement between communities and governments may lead to a number of potential benefits for citizens, including a sense of feeling heard and represented, and allowing community input into the development of appropriate initiatives and policies. Individuals who feel that they are heard, recognised and represented in their community are less likely to feel marginalised (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). This helps generate an environment in which community members feel a government has their interests at heart. Hence, engagement between communities and governments is related to the indicator *trust in government* (Fisk & Cherney, 2017). Effective engagement can lead to community members being more willing to cooperate with authorities in tackling terrorism and participating in CVE initiatives (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). A lack of cooperation and participation can be linked to the lack of quality engagement (e.g., input) around the aims of CVE programs and benefits to target groups, although framing community engagement around CVE may be unhelpful (Cherney, 2016). While quantifying if CVE programs have improved the levels of engagement between communities and governments and facilitated access to relevant services, the outcomes and quality of such engagements also needs to be considered. It may be unrealistic to assume that such engagements are able to satisfy the demands of all constituencies. Further, the nature of engagements may vary depending on the different community groups being consulted (e.g., non-English speaking background, immigrant) and what the aims of any particular CVE program might be. Likewise, assessments of engagement would need to consider whether the groups being engaged with are representative of the community and represent those most in need.

**Indicator: Sense of marginalisation**

Sense of marginalisation is closely aligned to other example indicators such as *social cohesion, social participation, sense of belonging* and *wellbeing* (Forrest & Kearns 2001). It often refers to a lack of access to resources and opportunities that would allow people to participate fully in mainstream society (Cruwys et al., 2013). Cruwys and colleagues (2013) identified five domains of disadvantage commonly linked with marginalisation: (1) social stigmatisation, (2) early-life disadvantage (often as a result of intergenerational transfer), (3) financial hardship, (4) poor health, and (5) social isolation. Marginalisation has been predominantly studied within health fields (e.g., psychology, public health), where the focus has largely been on indicators of ‘marginalisation’ (e.g., receipt of welfare payments, extended periods of unemployment) rather than on a ‘sense of marginalisation’ (i.e., self-reported subjective rating of marginalisation or perceived marginalisation).
**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

A number of studies have examined a sense or feelings of marginalisation or perceived marginalisation. Example questions and scales from some of these studies are outlined below:

**Ethnic marginalisation**

Ventura Miller, Barnes and Hartley (2011) used a 4-item scale to measure feelings of marginalisation among a sample of Hispanic adolescents in the American Southwest:

Has this happened to you in the past year (yes/no)?

- Seeing friends treated badly because they are [ethnicity]?  
- Being embarrassed that your parents have problems not speaking English well?  
- Being treated unfairly because you or a family member do not speak English well?  
- Being treated unfairly at school because you are [ethnicity]?  

**Intragroup Marginalization Inventory (IMI)**

Castillo, Conoley, Brossart and Quiros (2007) developed the Intragroup Marginalization Inventory (IMI) to measure perceived marginalisation from a range of sources (termed ‘intragroup marginalization’). This refers to the marginalisation or social exclusion of an individual from their family, friendship and cultural group, resulting in an individual adopting behaviours or attitudes in opposition to these groups, or that reflect the rejection of mainstream norms. The IMI consists of three different subscales, measuring marginalisation from family (12 items), friends (17 items) and ethnic group (13 items). Example items from each subscale are included below:

**Family:**

- My family has a hard time accepting my new values.  
- Family members criticise me because I don’t speak my ethnic group’s language well.

**Friends:**

- Friends of my ethnic group tease me because I don’t know how to speak my ethnic group’s language.  
- Friends of my ethnic group tell me that I am not really a member of my ethnic group because I don’t act like my ethnic group.

**Ethnic group:**

- People of my ethnic group tell me that I need to act more like them.  
- People of my ethnic group say that I have changed.
• People of my ethnic group laugh at me when I try to speak my ethnic group’s language.

Perceived marginalisation
Issmer and Wager (2015) measured perceived marginalisation among German adolescents of a low-educational background using a 4-item scale:
• People like me are worth less than others in [country] society.
• With my background, I will have problems when looking for work.
• For people like me, leading a normal life is made difficult.
• In our society, people like me are not offered any chances.
These items are measured using a 4-point Likert scale (from ‘do not agree at all’ to ‘fully agree’).

Sense of marginalisation and relevance to the CVE context
There is some evidence to indicate that marginalised individuals may be more likely to join violent groups (e.g., gangs and extremist groups) (Ferenczi et al., 2016; Issmer & Wagner, 2015; Ventura Miller et al., 2011); however, marginalisation does not only relate to material or economic marginalisation, but can be subjective in orientation. Communities that feel highly marginalised (termed ‘relative deprivation’) can feel they are not given the same opportunities as others and therefore may be attracted to violent extremist groups because they see them as providing answers to the perceived injustices they feel (e.g., see perceived marginalisation scale, above). In this context, people can be influenced by extremist groups to displace their aggression onto an ‘enemy’ (e.g., the West, non-Muslims, immigrant groups) (Koehler, 2017; Moghaddam, 2005). CVE programs may aim to influence objective (e.g., school participation, employment) and subjective (e.g., acceptance by friends, family, ethnic or religious group, broader society) marginalisation.

Indicator: Experience of discrimination
Discrimination is commonly defined as less favourable treatment of an individual or group on the basis of particular characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, gender, sexual orientation) that results in adverse or negative consequences (National Research Council, 2004). Discrimination may be direct or indirect (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.). There are a number of existing questions and scales that measure experiences of discrimination. It must be emphasised that studies have measured discrimination at the individual level with results aggregated to achieve population level estimates. Measures of discrimination have
predominantly been developed and used in health fields (e.g., psychology, public health, epidemiology). A handful of studies examining violent extremism have also developed measures of experiences of discrimination.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Some example measures of discrimination include:

**Everyday Discrimination Scale**

The Everyday Discrimination Scale (EDS) is one of the most widely used measures of discrimination in epidemiology and public health research. The EDS was designed to measure chronic, routine and relatively minor experiences of unfair treatment or discrimination. The scale comprises of nine items using a 6-point Likert scale (1 – never, 2 – less than once a year, 3 – a few times a year, 4 – a few times a month, 5 – at least once a week, 6 – almost every day). There exists a full scale (Williams, Yu, Jackson & Anderson, 1997) and a revised shorter scale (Stucky et al., 2011).

Example items from the EDS include:
- You are treated with less respect than others.
- People act as if they are afraid of you.
- You are called names and insulted.

**General Ethnic Discrimination Scale**

The General Ethnic Discrimination Scale (GEDS) was designed to measure perceived ethnic discrimination across a wide range of ethnic groups (Landrine et al., 2006). The GEDS comprises 18 items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (see Landrine et al. (2006) for full scale). These items measure both the frequency (last 12 months and lifetime) and subjective or perceived ethnic discrimination across a variety of contexts (e.g., discrimination from a stranger, discrimination from a public health professional, discrimination that led to a fight or argument). In contrast to the EDS, the GEDS focuses specifically on discrimination attributed by the respondent to their race or ethnic group. The GEDS has predominantly been used in health research in the US and with a number of ethnic groups. Example questions from the GEDS include:
- How often have you been treated unfairly by your employers, bosses and supervisors because of your race/ethnic group?
How often in the past year? (Response options: never, once in a while, sometimes, a lot, most of the time, almost all of the time.)
How often in your entire life? (Response options: never, once in a while, sometimes, a lot, most of the time, almost all of the time.)
- How often have you been accused or suspected of doing something wrong (such as stealing, cheating, not doing your share of the work or breaking the law) because of your race/ethnic group?
  - How often in the past year? (Response options: same as above)
  - How often in your entire life? (Response options: same as above)
  - How stressful was this for you? (Response options: same as above)
- How often have you been really angry about something racist that was done to you?
  - How often in the past year? (Response options: same as above)
  - How often in your entire life? (Response options: same as above)
  - How stressful was this for you? (Response options: same as above)

Perceived personal discrimination and perceived group discrimination
Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) developed scales for perceived personal discrimination and perceived group discrimination in a Dutch survey of attitudes towards extremism. Each scale is comprised of four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale.

Items from the perceived personal discrimination scale include:
- It makes me angry when I think of how I am treated in comparison to others.
- I think I am worse off than others in [country].
- I have the feeling of being discriminated.
- If I compare myself with others in [country] then I feel unfairly treated.

Items from perceived group discrimination scale include:
- I think the group to which I belong is worse off than other people in [country].
- It makes me angry when I think of how my group is treated in comparison to other groups in [country].
- I have the feeling that the group to which I belong is discriminated.
- If I compare the group to which I belong with other groups in [country], I think we are treated unfairly.
Experience of discrimination and relevance to the CVE context

Research suggests that discrimination against minority groups may be associated with an increased risk of violence, extremism and terrorism (Piazza, 2012). Discrimination can increase a person's perception that they are not seen as a valued member of society as it helps to reinforce beliefs that they do not belong, or are not afforded the same opportunities as others. Violent extremism may be seen as a solution to this discrimination, with extremist groups using messages about discrimination to promote their propaganda (e.g., that Muslims are not free to practice their religious beliefs). Measures such as those discussed above could be utilised or adapted for use in CVE evaluations to measure experiences of discrimination and assess if programs help reduce discrimination, or generate greater resilience among certain groups when they experience discriminatory behaviours. Based on program outcomes, it should be considered whether discrimination is measured at a personal or group level and whether the measure should examine discrimination broadly or explicitly in relation to particular characteristics (e.g., one’s ethnicity or religion).

Indicator: Supportive social networks within the immediate community

Social support is commonly defined as the existence or availability of support accessed through social ties to other individuals, groups and communities (Lin et al., 1979). It has close links to other outcome indicators such as social cohesion and social participation. The term ‘social support’ has a number of meanings in the literature and has mainly been measured at the neighbourhood level. Social support appears to have two key elements: (1) an individual’s belief that there is an adequate number of social supports available to them in times of need, and (2) how satisfied that individual is with the type of support available (Sarason et al., 1983). Trust is also a dimension of social support networks, in that a person must believe that the various social networks available have their interests at heart. If this is absent then a person is unlikely to defer to those networks. Research indicates that perceived social support is a protective factor against stress among individuals who have experienced traumatic events, disasters and terrorist attacks (Besser & Neria, 2012; Sarason et al., 1983). This indicator specifically relates to the existence of supportive social networks within the immediate community.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Neighbourhood Social Ties

Carpiano and Hystad (2011) use two items to measure the number and intensity of neighbourhood social ties:
• Would you say that you know most, many, a few or none of the people in your
neighbourhood?
• About how many people in your neighbourhood do you know well enough to ask for a
favour (none, 1-5, 6-10, or over 10)?

**Australian Community Capacity Study – Frequency of neighbouring**

The Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS) (Murphy et al., 2012) uses
a 3-item scale to measure incidents of reciprocal exchange among neighbours:

- How often do you and people in your community:
  - Do favours for each other?
  - Visit in each other’s homes or on the street?
  - Ask each other advice about personal things, such as child rearing or job openings?

Items are measured using a 4-point Likert scale (from ‘never’ to ‘often’).

**Australian Community Capacity Study – Social cohesion and trust**

The ACCS (Murphy et al., 2012) also uses a 4-item scale to measure a respondent’s perception that their community is socially cohesive and that people in their community can be trusted:

- People in this community are willing to help their neighbours.
- This is a close-knit community.
- People in this community can be trusted.
- People in this community do not share the same values.

Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).

**Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS)**

The MSPSS was designed by Zimet et al. (1988) for use in health research. The scale consists of 12 items measuring social support from family, friends and significant others using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘very strongly disagree’ to ‘very strongly agree’). Example items are listed below:

- There is a special person who is around when I am in need.
- I get the emotional help and support I need from my family.
- I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows.
Unlike the measures described above, this scale does not specifically refer to social support within the immediate community; however, the wording of the scale could be adapted (e.g., ‘There are people in my community who can assist me in a time of need’).

**Supportive social networks and relevance to the CVE context**

Violent extremist groups operate via family, friendship and community networks (Day & Kleinmann, 2017). Family and community support for non-violence can act as a protective factor against violent extremism (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). It is in this context that supportive social networks against violent extremism can help build feelings of belonging and trust among community members. When these networks are strong, they can act as a resource for those at risk of violent extremism by providing support in times of need. Evaluating supportive social networks that are the target of a CVE program will overlap with other indicators such as *social participation, wellbeing* and *social cohesion*. The suggested measures set out above do capture elements of these indicators. CVE programs can potentially aim to leverage existing social support networks and also build new social networks. The measures outlined here aim to assess the level of existing social support networks within a community, rather than on specific programmatic outcomes, such as whether an initiative helped to build supportive social networks. Measures could be taken prior to and following an intervention to examine if existing support networks improved over time. Caution would need to be followed when inferring a causal link between the two.

**Outcome 1.3 – Communities**

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This outcome includes the following nine indicators:

- Awareness and understanding of violent extremism.
- Trust in government.
- Perceived community safety.
- Social cohesion.
- Perception of community harmony.
- Inter-communal tensions.
- Positive perception of Australia.
• Identify as Australian.
• Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis.

Why measure?
This outcome is concerned with building resilience and capacity within a community around issues relevant to CVE. Measuring perceptions of extremism and radicalisation can highlight the extent to which they are visible issues, and provides a focus for program developers. The assumption is that cohesive communities are resilient against violent extremist influences, whereby people within these communities feel a greater sense of belonging and acceptance. Low levels of trust in government can see people becoming disengaged. The existence of inter-communal tensions can potentially lead to the emergence of violent extremist groups and help facilitate membership. If people have a positive perception of the country in which they reside they are more likely to feel a sense of belonging and inclusion. CVE programs can work both directly and indirectly to develop a more positive perception of Australia amongst community members. Greater identification with the values and beliefs of the mainstream culture can affect a sense of belonging and integration and ensure a person does not develop an ‘us and them’ mentality, which is a key characteristic of extremist groups.

Ways of measuring
CVE programs may be aimed at an individual or at certain population groups and neighbourhoods to build social cohesion or community capacity. An individual’s participation/level of engagement in a CVE program can be measured qualitatively through interviews or focus groups with program participants to gauge their views about various aspects of the program. Data could be collected to examine community awareness of violent extremism and inter-communal tensions and its causes; this would encompass both objective and subjective dimensions. Various tools to measure these indicators are suggested (e.g., Community Safety Scale, Scanlon-Monash Index of Social Cohesion, Australian Community Capacity Study, AMES Australia: Citizens’ Trust in Government Organisations, Survey of Migrants Perceptions of Australia – Past, Present and Future; Community Assessment of Resilience Toolkit). Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly.

Indicator: Awareness and understanding of violent extremism
This indicator can encompass a range of issues. It can span community understanding of the scale and prevalence of violent extremism compared to other forms of criminality, the causes of violent extremism including the role of ideological motivations, awareness of the risk factors
for radicalisation and the vulnerability of certain groups to extremist influences, support for CVE-related programs and the roles of different agencies and individuals in the prevention of radicalisation. This indicator overlaps with Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator *community awareness of violent extremism and related issues*, Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support, indicator *community awareness of violent extremism* and indicator *community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism*.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Quantitative data**

Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community awareness of violent extremism.

**Evaluation of the Extreme Dialogue project**

One initiative that specifically aims to assess understanding and awareness of violent extremism is the Extreme Dialogue project, a preventative educational program aimed at building resilience to radicalisation among young people (Extreme Dialogue, 2017). The educational resources available through the project have been designed to develop young people’s psychological and social understanding of violent extremism by increasing their knowledge of violent extremism and its roots, including associated ideologies (European Forum for Urban Security, 2016). Participants were asked to rate a number of items from 1 - 10 where 1 – not at all/strongly disagree, 5 – average/neither good nor bad, 10 – completely/strongly agree. Questions were asked pre- and post-implementation and included:

- I understand what violent extremism is.
- I am aware of what radicalisation is.

For such questions to be meaningful, it would be necessary to have further follow-up questions relating to the grounds or evidence people use to make these assessments and whether they have a good or poor understanding of violent extremism.

**Qualitative data**

Some existing studies have aimed to gauge community awareness and understanding of violent extremism. For example, Tahiri and Grossman (2013) conducted a study in Australia examining community perceptions of radicalisation and extremism. This involved semi-structured interviews, focus groups and written submissions comprising a sample of 542 respondents spanning government stakeholders, community leaders and members from a variety of religious and ethnic groups. Questions asked respondents what they understood the
terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to mean. The precise wording of the questions contained in the interview schedule is not listed in the 2013 report.

Qualitative data could also be collected to examine community awareness of violent extremism and its causes. The latter is particularly important, for if awareness and understanding are based on stereotypes or misperceptions then perceptions of the threat of violent extremism may be misguided. Further, poor awareness means people do not know how they might contribute to stopping violent extremism. Hence, improving knowledge and understanding can help ensure community members reduce the incidence of individuals within the community becoming involved in violent extremism. Qualitative data collection may focus on exploring:

- Community members’ perceptions of their levels of violent extremism and what groups are most at risk.
- What people regard as the causes of violent extremism.
- Understanding the sources of information influencing people’s opinions.
- How perceptions of the threat of violent extremism influence how people behave (e.g., reporting people at risk), or how they help to collaborate in CVE efforts.

**Awareness and understanding of violent extremism and relevance to the CVE context**

CVE programs targeted at the general population can aim to increase awareness and understanding of violent extremism (e.g., media campaigns) (see Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies, indicator recall of media campaigns). Increasing people’s awareness and understanding can help to equip communities with the skills to both detect radicalisation and work together to prevent violent extremism by understanding what factors place particular individuals at risk (see also Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator community awareness of violent extremism and related issues, Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support, indicator community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism). Greater knowledge about violent extremism can act as a protective factor against radicalisation. Likewise, a realistic understanding of the prevalence of violent extremism and the threat it poses can also be relevant to ensuring people are not overly fearful or single out certain groups as posing a threat. Recognising a lack of understanding about violent extremism within particular at-risk communities or populations can also provide evidence of where further targeted interventions should be focused. Assessing understanding would also need to capture a range of dimensions relating to risk factors for radicalisation, the vulnerability of certain groups, stereotypes informing particular beliefs and knowledge of CVE programs (see also Outcome 2.2 –
Community-led support, indicator *community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism*. Evaluating any changes in awareness would require a baseline measure of knowledge about violent extremism so a meaningful assessment could be made on whether it improves over time.

**Indicator: Trust in government**

Trust in government has been conceptualised across a range of fields as comprising beliefs in the legitimacy of prevailing political institutions and processes (e.g., Beetham, 2013). It can comprise appraisals that the government and key institutions will make decisions based on the principles of fairness, transparency and distributive justice (Blind, 2006). Low levels of trust in government can lead individuals to disengage from society and withdraw their support for key institutions. It can create resistance to institutional authorities and is linked to behavioural outcomes such as non-compliance, a lack of cooperation and disengagement with authorities (Fisk & Cherney, 2017).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

There is considerable debate over how best to measure trust in government, with many measures proposed within the literature. Examples include:

**US National Election Study**

This measure comprises the following items:

- How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? (Scale of ‘just about always’, ‘most of the time’, ‘some of the time’. ‘Never’ is not a response option but is recorded if the participant voluntarily offers it.)
- Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people? (Response options: ‘few big interests’, ‘benefits of all’.)
- Do you think that the people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? (Response options: ‘a lot’, ‘some’, ‘not very much’).
- Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? (Response options: ‘quite a few’, ‘not many’, ‘hardly any’.)
The European Social Survey

This measure asks participants to rate seven institutions on a scale of trust using the following question:

- Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust the following institutions (where 0 – no trust at all, 10 – complete trust): ‘[country’s] parliament, the legal system, the police, political parties, the European Parliament, the United Nations?’

Building a New Life in Australia: Longitudinal Study of Humanitarian Migrants (Australian Institute of Family Studies)

This study samples individuals or families who were granted their permanent visa through Australia’s ‘offshore’ and ‘onshore’ humanitarian programs. Participants are asked to rate their level of trust in different community groups and organisations. Trust in government is worded in the following way:

- How much do you trust the following groups of people? (a) government (b) people in the wider Australian community. (Response options: ‘a lot’, ‘some’, ‘a little’, ‘not at all’.)

Australian Election Study

This study aims to provide a long-term perspective on political attitudes and behaviours of the Australian electorate. The study has been conducted since 1987. Trust in government measures include:

- ‘In general, do you feel that the people in government are too often interested in looking after themselves, or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing nearly all the time?’
- ‘In general, do you feel that people in government are only interested in looking after themselves or do you feel they can be trusted to do the right thing?’

(Scale: ‘usually look after themselves’, ‘sometimes look after themselves’, ‘sometimes can be trusted to do the right thing’, ‘usually can be trusted to do the right thing’) (Bean, 2001; AES, 2017).


This measure presents nine items measuring three dimensions of political trust, these being perceived competence, benevolence and integrity. The nine items are presented on a 5-point
Likert scale of 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – neutral, 4 – agree, 5 – strongly agree.
The items are as follows:

- When it concerns [policy area]…
  - [the government organisation] is capable.
  - [the government organisation] is expert.
  - [the government organisation] carries out its duty very well.
  - If citizens need help [the government organisation] will do its best to help them.
  - [the government organisation] acts in the interest of citizens.
  - [the government organisation] is genuinely interested in the wellbeing of citizens.
  - [the government organisation] approaches citizens in a sincere way.
  - [the government organisation] is sincere.
  - [the government organisation] is honest.

**Trust in government and relevance to the CVE context**

Research indicates that low levels of trust in institutional authorities can create conditions conducive to the emergence of extremist groups and can lead communities to provide both passive and active support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2017; Littler, 2017). Low trust in government is identified as a characteristic of violent extremist groups who tend to reject the legitimacy of mainstream political institutions and believe that governments conspire against them (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2016). At the community level, trust in government leads people to see authorities as legitimate and ensures people cooperate with them. Thus, building trust in government can be a CVE program outcome and can have a bearing on the degree to which groups see government responses to violent extremism as legitimate. Trust in government can be measured at the program level when focused on assessing an individual’s participation in a CVE program and their changing levels of trust towards various institutional authorities. The indicator can also be measured at the community level by assessing changes in trust perceptions amongst communities that can provide the conditions under which the ideology and grievances of violent extremists can gain traction.

**Indicator: Perceived community safety**

Perceived community safety may be understood as encompassing individual or community perceptions of the physical and social incivilities within an area. Physical incivilities cover the physical environment such as abandoned buildings, refuse and graffiti and a lack of parkland and communal facilities. Social incivilities include the threat of violence a person perceives in their environment from others and encompasses visible criminal activity, gangs and disorderly
conduct within public spaces (Anderson & Kidd, 2014; Worrall, 2006). Perceptions of community safety may be influenced by a range of factors, including levels of violence, physical signs of crime, ethnic diversity, gender, socioeconomic status, residential stability and confidence in the police.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Many measures of perceived community safety exist within the literature, with various approaches to measurement taken. One example is the Community Safety Scale (CSS), which measures the perceived characteristics of a person's environment that can contribute to feelings of insecurity (Shoffner & Vacc, 2002). The scale consists of 15 items using a 5-point Likert-type response option (from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). Some example items include:

- There are places in my neighbourhood community where people do not feel safe.
- People in my neighbourhood community try to stop vandalism when they see it happening.
- People help each other in my neighbourhood community.
- Drug dealing is a problem in my neighbourhood community.
- A lot of things get stolen in my neighbourhood community.
- People take pride in the appearance of my neighbourhood community.
- Gangs are a problem in my neighbourhood community.
- Fighting is a way some problems are solved in my neighbourhood community.
- My neighbourhood community is well lighted for afternoon and evening activities.
- There are empty and uncared-for homes and apartments in my neighbourhood community.
- People in my neighbourhood community use drugs.
- It would not be hard to get drugs in my neighbourhood community.
- It would not be hard to get a job in my neighbourhood community.

**Perceived community safety and relevance to the CVE context**

Measuring perceived community safety in the context of CVE program evaluation can serve the purpose of gauging the extent of general criminality in a community, which can act as a potential risk factor for radicalisation and extremism (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). Elements associated with general criminality such as unemployment, vandalism, drug use or poor housing can potentially create the social conditions for radicalisation and extremism (Day & Kleinmann, 2017). Measuring perceptions of whether extremism and radicalisation are a problem for a community can highlight the extent to which it is perceived as a visible issue,
and provides a focus for program developers when designing and implementing CVE programs aimed at the broader population. Example questions could be designed drawing on several of the items of the CSS. For example, questions could directly measure a community’s perception of the extent of the problem of extremism or radicalisation. These could include:

- Extremism/radicalisation is a problem in my neighbourhood community.
- People in my neighbourhood community show signs of extremism/radicalisation.
- People in this neighbourhood community work together to try to stop extremism/radicalisation.

Other questions could be designed to measure the perceived threat of general criminality in a community.

**Indicator: Social cohesion**

The concept of social cohesion is multi-dimensional and there are variations in how it is understood across different policy and research fields (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). It is closely aligned to other example indicators such as *sense of belonging*, *civic participation*, *marginalisation*, *community harmony*, *trust in government*, *social participation*, *positive perception of Australia* and *inter-communal tensions*. Different measures of social cohesion tend to capture these indicators as well. Social cohesion can be understood as the bonds and relationships people have with their family, friends and the wider community. Day-to-day interactions between people in a community build trust and reciprocity, and contribute to cohesion (Berger-Schmitt & Noll, 2000; Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Where social cohesion is evident, it is said that there are more likely to be shared values, high levels of trust, perceptions of being part of a common enterprise and facing shared challenges, social inclusion, demographic stability and less inequalities in wealth and income (Duhaime et al., 2004; Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Maxwell, 1996).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Social cohesion has been measured in a range of ways:

**The Scanlon-Monash Index of Social Cohesion**

The Scanlon Foundation has developed a social cohesion index based on five domains of Belonging, Social Justice and Equity, Participation, Acceptance and Rejection, and Legitimacy and Worth (Scanlon-Monash, see http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/). Associated measures include the following:
• Belonging: Indication of pride in the Australian way of life and culture; sense of belonging; importance of maintaining the Australian way of life and culture.
• Worth: Satisfaction with one's present financial situation and indication of happiness over the last year.
• Social Justice and Equity: Views on the adequacy of financial support for people on low incomes; the gap between high and low incomes; Australia as a land of economic opportunity; trust in the Australian government.
• Participation (political): Voted in an election; signed a petition; contacted a Member of Parliament; participated in a boycott; attended a protest.
• Acceptance, Rejection and Legitimacy: The scale measures rejection, indicated by a negative view of immigration from different countries; reported experience of discrimination in the last 12 months; disagreement with government support of ethnic minorities; feeling that life is getting worse.

Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS)
This is a longitudinal study conducted across Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney and examines a range of issues relating to crime and community safety (see https://accs.project.uq.edu.au/content/front-page). Social cohesion is measured on the belief that one’s community is socially cohesive and that people in the community can be trusted (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2012). The following four items measuring social cohesion are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree:
• People in this community are willing to help their neighbours.
• This is a close-knit community.
• People in this community can be trusted.
• People in this community do not share the same values.

Social cohesion and relevance to the CVE context
Social cohesion is typically regarded as essential to CVE (Husband & Alam, 2011); however, it is an amorphous concept and can be hard to quantify (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). The assumption is that cohesive communities are resilient against violent extremist influences, with people feeling a greater sense of belonging and acceptance (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). This means they are less likely to be attracted to the sense of grievance and injustice that violent extremists propagate to attract and recruit people to their cause. The relevance of social cohesion mirrors those of other example indicators, such as sense of belonging and trust in government, as they
contribute to building an environment that makes individuals less vulnerable to radicalising to violent extremism. CVE programs may aim to build social cohesion within certain population groups or neighbourhoods as opposed to assisting specific individuals identified as at risk of radicalising to violent extremism.

**Indicator: Perception of community harmony**

Perception of community harmony is a multi-dimensional indicator. It can be understood as the extent to which individuals perceive a level of accordance within their local neighbourhood. Alternatively, community harmony can be said to exist where there is peaceful order and respect for diversity among citizens (Bell & Mo, 2014). Community harmony is closely aligned with the indicator *social cohesion*. It can be closely linked to elements such as neighbouring or the psychological sense of community, both of which are elements of social cohesion. It is also related to the indicators *inter-communal tensions, civic participation* and *supportive social networks within the immediate community* (Grossman et al., 2016).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

While direct measures of community harmony are rare, indirect measurements of community harmony could be drawn from broader social cohesion measures. Some examples of social cohesion measurements have been provided in this document. Buckner (1988) developed the Neighbourhood Cohesion Instrument, based on three interconnected factors: attraction-to-locale, neighbouring and sense of community. Example items include:

- I visit with my neighbours in their homes.
- If I needed advice about something, I could go to someone in my neighbourhood.
- I borrow things and exchange favours with my neighbours.
- I rarely have neighbours over to my house to visit.
- I regularly stop and talk with people in my neighbourhood.
- The friendships and associations I have with other people in my neighbourhood mean a lot to me.
- I think I agree with most people in my neighbourhood about what is important in life.
- I feel loyal to the people in my neighbourhood.
- I would be willing to work together with others on something to improve my neighbourhood.
- I like to think of myself as similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood.
- A feeling of fellowship runs deep between me and other people in this neighbourhood.
• Living in this neighbourhood gives me a sense of community.

Items were presented on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 4 – disagree, 5 – strongly disagree.

**Australian Community Capacity Study**

This study also provides measures relating to community harmony. A component of the study asks about the frequency of neighbouring, aiming to capture the incidence of reciprocal exchange among neighbours (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2012). This closely aligns with a measure of community harmony. Example items can be found under the indicators *social cohesion* and *supportive social networks*.

If perceptions of community harmony are understood to constitute respect for diversity, various measures have been used to assess this element. For example, this includes the International Study of Attitudes to Immigration and Settlement (Berry, Bourhis & Kalin, 1999; adapted to Australia by Pe-Pua, 2001; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010). This survey includes items that assess a range of attitudes toward different elements of immigration and ethnic groups. Of most relevance are the questions relating to multiculturalism and diversity (referred to as Multicultural Ideology and Social Equality Beliefs). The Multicultural Ideology scale consists of 10 items designed to assess attitudes toward cultural diversity. An example item includes: ‘Australians should recognise that cultural and racial diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Australian society’. The Social Equality scale consists of 11 items designed to measure social equality beliefs (i.e., tolerance and social dominance). An example item includes: ‘It is good to have people from different ethnic groups living in the same country’. All items are assessed on a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’) (see Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010).

**Perception of community harmony and relevance to the CVE context**

Like the indicator *social cohesion*, community harmony, or a lack thereof, is regarded as providing the social conditions for violent extremism (Grossman et al., 2016). For example, if certain groups feel other community members regard them with suspicion due to their ethnicity or religious beliefs, this can create a sense of siege and make them feel under threat (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). Likewise, individuals who have animosity towards ethnic or religious groups can similarly feel under threat. These conditions are disruptive to community harmony because they perpetuate a sense of victimhood, allow conspiracy theories to flourish, can create defensiveness and suspicion towards authorities and perpetuate conflict between groups. This
provides fertile ground for violent extremism to emerge (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reicher, 2013; Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Noor et al., 2012); however, it has been noted that while promoting social/community harmony might be a laudable goal, it can be unrealistic in a highly diverse country like Australia. Perhaps a more realistic goal is for CVE programs to build the capacity of groups to respond to the challenge of community conflict and differences in a respectful way (Grossman et al., 2016). While CVE programs may aim to improve perceptions of community harmony, thus potentially measuring it through the indicators outlined above, how people actually act towards others can be just as important. This may require more qualitative measurements that understand how perceptions of community harmony are linked to particular behaviours (e.g., if people interact with other racial or ethnic groups). CVE programs may want to capture both in their assessments of community harmony.

Indicator: Inter-communal tensions

Inter-communal tensions comprise subjective and objective dimensions, and are evidenced by conflict, animosity and suspicion between groups of individuals who differ in racial, ethnic or national origin, culture or religion. They can arise from perceptions that other groups present a threat to the perceived safety and security of others, which can be exacerbated by the racial, ethnic or religious distinctions people make between groups and a sense people feel of not living in harmony with those others (Bar-Tal, 2007; Grossman et al., 2016; Institute of Community Cohesion, 2010). Low levels of trust between community members can be an outcome of inter-communal tensions, with such tensions acting as a precursor to disorder, criminality and inter-communal violence. The impact of the existence of inter-communal tensions is division, segregation and discrimination (Bar-Tal, 2007). Inter-communal tensions can be considered alongside the example indicator perceptions of community harmony; that is, inter-communal tensions will erode community harmony. It is also applicable to the example indicator social cohesion, with inter-communal tensions undermining social cohesion.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Oldham Council’s You and Your Community Survey, 2013 (Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014)

The Oldham Council’s You and Your Community Survey comprises a longitudinal study of residents of Oldham in Greater Manchester in the UK to assess community cohesion, engagement and residents’ satisfaction with services. Particular survey items aimed to capture inter-communal tensions and include such examples as:

1. In your neighbourhood, how much tension would you say there is between people…?
a. from different age groups?
b. from different social backgrounds?
c. from different ethnic groups?

(Response options: a great deal, a fair amount, a little, none at all, don’t know.)

2. To what extent do you agree or disagree that your neighbourhood is a place where people…?
   a. of different ages get on well together?
   b. from different social backgrounds get on well together?
   c. from different ethnic groups get on well together?

(Response options: definitely agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to disagree, definitely disagree, don’t know, too few people in the local area, all the same background. See
https://www.oldham.gov.uk/downloads/file/4013/you_and_your_community_survey.)

Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion national survey
The 2015 and 2016 iteration of Scanlon (see http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/) included questions about people's local neighbourhoods, one of which is relevant to understanding perceptions of inter-communal tensions: ‘My local area is a place where people from different national or ethnic backgrounds get on well together’. This is assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).

A proposed way of measuring inter-communal tensions has been developed by the Institute for Community Cohesion (2010) in the UK. This guidance provides details on what is termed ‘tension monitoring’ (see Institute of Community Cohesion 2010). The guidance examines communal tensions across a range of dimensions and outlines how it should be assessed on a scale of ‘imminent’ to ‘normal’. These tension-monitoring measures draw on a range of qualitative or quantitative data to evaluate subjective aspects of inter-communal tensions (e.g., voiced levels of alarm, fear and anxiety, perceived levels of tensions), as well as secondary or administrative data for objective measures (e.g., media scanning, police reports on hate crimes, incidents of racial abuse). The monitoring of community tensions requires the sourcing of existing data from police, government bodies, community service providers and community organisations. Qualitative approaches, such as focus groups with community members, are also proposed as a way to assess perceptions, drivers and dynamics of inter-communal tensions and determine solutions to these tensions.
Inter-communal tensions and relevance to the CVE context

The existence of inter-communal tensions can potentially lead to the emergence of violent extremist groups and help facilitate their membership (Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Grossman et al., 2016). Similar to the indicators social cohesion and community harmony, these tensions provide the social conditions for extremist narratives to take hold, with violent extremists exploiting and feeding off their existence. It is relevant to the ability of people to respond to a crisis with it undermining the ability of community members to act collectively (Norris et al., 2008; Kaniasty & Norris, 2004). Similar to the indicators social harmony and social cohesion, inter-communal tensions encompass both objective and subjective dimensions. CVE evaluation may want to assess both these features by collecting data from target groups who are the subject of an intervention to gauge how they perceive any tensions, as well as data on incidents that indicate a rise in inter-communal tensions (e.g., hate crimes, racial abuse) within particular areas.

Indicator: Positive perception of Australia

A positive perception of Australia can cover a range of areas, including socio-economic conditions such as employment prospects, living standards, income levels, perceptions of the quality of government social services such as education, health or housing, community safety, crime levels, recreational opportunities and ethnic and cultural diversity. Positive perception of Australia can relate to the indicators perceptions of community harmony, sense of belonging, civic participation, inter-communal tensions and opportunities for education, training and employment. Understanding people’s perceptions of Australia can provide insights into the level of self-determination they may feel when engaging in the Australian community, which can be linked to the indicator self-efficacy. This is particularly true for communities where there is a higher population of migrant, refugee or asylum seekers. If pre-settlement expectations of Australia as a place to live do not match reality, more negative perceptions of Australia may develop which may lead to disappointment and disillusionment, and ultimately disengagement from the Australian way of life.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

AMES Australia: Survey of Migrants’ Perceptions of Australia – Past, Present and Future

AMES (Adult Migrant English Service – see https://www.ames.net.au/) is one of Australia’s largest migration settlement agencies covering services for refugees and migrants, such as on-arrival settlement support, English language and literacy training, vocational training and employment services. The AMES survey was conducted in 2014 amongst a sample of students
in English language classes provided by AMES in Victoria. Example questions to assess positive perceptions of Australia include:

- Australia is safe and secure.
- Australian people are welcoming, warm and friendly.
- Finding a good job in Australia that pays well is difficult.
- My standard of living will be/is better in Australia.
- My family will have/has a better life.
- Australia is a democratic country that allows freedom of speech.
- Australia has a good health care system.
- People treat each other equally and fairly.

(Response options: agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, don’t know.)

The AMES survey was mainly focused on assessing pre- and post-migration perceptions of Australia. The issues canvassed by the measures outlined above can also be relevant to non-immigrant populations, who may feel, for example, that they have few opportunities in Australia and see ethnic and religious groups as having (negatively) changed the Australian way of life. Thus, measures as outlined in the indicator *perceptions of community harmony* can also be relevant to this indicator.

**Australia @ 2015 Scanlon Foundation Survey**

This is a large-scale study of the Australian population that aims to further understand the perceptions of Australia of both recent immigrant arrivals and people born in the country. Included in the study are survey questions relating to positive and negative perceptions of a respondent’s life in Australia, such as:

1. How satisfied are you with life in Australia? (Response options: very satisfied, satisfied, neither, dissatisfied, strongly dissatisfied, don’t know.)

2. What do you most like/least like about Australia?
   - ‘Most liked’ attributes were: weather/climate, lifestyle/Australian way of life, beauty of the country/of the land, freedom and democracy, people are kind and friendly, clean environment, the standard of living, education system/opportunity for children, friends and family are close by, cultural diversity and multiculturalism.
   - ‘Least liked’ attributes were: weather/climate, cost of living/housing, high unemployment, hard to find a job in profession, taxes are too high, racism/discrimination, inadequate public transport, family and friends are not here, no
opportunity to have a say on issues of importance, there is corruption, there are too many immigrants, Australians are not friendly.

Positive perception of Australia and relevance to the CVE context

If people have a positive perception of the country in which they reside they are more likely to feel a sense of belonging and inclusion (Grossman et al., 2016). Extremist groups seek to recruit individuals to their cause by exploiting a perceived common ‘bond’ of hatred and rejection of the positive elements of the dominant mainstream culture. They portray the prevailing social and economic order as privileging certain groups and discriminating against others (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2016, 2017). If people have a positive perception of the country in which they live they will potentially be less vulnerable to such messaging or influences. In this regard, an individual is less likely to see him or herself as an outsider or feel that he or she is denied similar opportunities as others (known as relative deprivation, Moghaddam, 2005). CVE programs can both directly and indirectly work to develop a more positive perception of Australia amongst community members, directly through specific initiatives such as intercultural dialogue or exposure to the positive attributes of living in a multicultural society (Grossman et al., 2016), or indirectly as the result of services and/or support (e.g., education and employment assistance) that may be provided as part of an intervention. Positive perceptions of Australia can be measured quantitatively through the different measures listed above by targeting certain communities or neighbourhoods. It can also be measured qualitatively through interviews with program participants to gauge their views about Australia (e.g., those attributes listed in Scanlon) and identify if this changes over time when involved in an intervention. Again, assuming causation would need to be done with caution.

Indicator: Identify as Australian

The concept of ‘identity’ can be understood as recognising shared characteristics with another person or group. It is closely aligned with the indicator sense of belonging, because to identify as part of a group is to feel a sense of belonging, to experience security and to share values (i.e., a sense of ‘we’ as opposed to ‘they’). In this instance, to identify as Australian means to feel part of an Australian community and support its values and ideals. What these values and ideals constitute is not the subject of widespread agreement.
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS)

As mentioned for the indicator social cohesion, the ACCS is a longitudinal study conducted across Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney that examines a range of issues relating to crime and community safety (see https://accs.project.uq.edu.au/content/front-page). A component of the ACCS includes an ethnic minority sample to measure feelings of identity with the wider Australian community. This was assessed via four items measured on a scale of 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. The four items are:

- I see myself first and mainly as a member of the Australian community.
- It is important for me to be seen by others to be a member of the Australian community.
- I am proud to be an Australian.
- What Australia stands for is important to me.

Australia @ 2015 Scanlon Foundation Survey

This is a large-scale study of the Australian population aimed at understanding perceptions of recent immigrants and those born in Australia. An Australian Identity Scale within the study comprises nine questions:

1. To what extent do you have a sense of belonging in Australia? (Response options: great extent, moderate extent, only slightly, not at all.)

2. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?

   - I see myself as an Australian.
   - I see myself as part of my local community in Australia.
   - I feel as if I belong to Australia.
   - When I discuss Australia I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’.
   - I identify with Australians.
   - I feel I am committed to Australia.
   - I feel a bond with Australians.
   - I see myself as Australian.

(Response options: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.)
Identify as Australian and relevance to the CVE context

A sense of identity features in discussions of the causes of terrorism and radicalisation. For instance, it has been argued that Muslims in the West can experience identity conflict, whereby they are caught between their own religious and cultural identity and their sense of identification with the country in which they reside (e.g., young Australian Muslims) (Cherney & Murphy, 2017). Studies have found that when Muslims living in the West feel disconnected from broader society they are more likely to develop extremist beliefs and empathise with the grievances propagated by terrorists (e.g., Doosje, Loseman & van den Bos, 2013). Greater identification with the values and beliefs of the mainstream culture can affect a sense of belonging and integration and ensure a person does not develop an ‘us and them’ mentality, which is a key characteristic of extremist groups (Cherney & Murphy, 2017; Koehler, 2017). Thus, identifying as an Australian is important because a person will be less likely to see the dominant culture as the enemy. This does not mean the other identities a person may have (e.g., as a Muslim) must become subordinate to the dominant cultural identity. Rather, they should be equally valued along mainstream social identities. Furthermore, the indicator of identifying as Australian closely mirrors the indicator of sense of belonging; accordingly, the relevance to the CVE context is similar. CVE programs aimed at the community and individual level could measure the extent to which individuals within a community identify as Australian, and work to implement activities and strategies aimed at enhancing this component of self-identification while acknowledging existing ethnic, racial or religious identities that an individual may have.

Indicator: Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis

This indicator covers a range of components. Firstly, community capacity to respond to a crisis is influenced by a community having the networks, resources and skills to react when experiencing some type of crisis. This can include physical capacity, such as local infrastructure, such as utilities (water, electricity, gas), food services, health services (e.g., hospitals), transportation, communication and banking operating at the required level during a crisis to ensure individuals and groups survive and recover (McAslan, 2011). This also includes the operational capacities of local emergency and health services, volunteers and warning systems, communication systems and transportation infrastructure. Capacity to respond to a crisis includes having the required operational practices in place and ensuring that risk assessments have been carried out. This can be referred to as procedural capacity. Responsiveness to a crisis includes elements of community cohesion and civic participation that relate to supporting individuals during a crisis, with these influenced by values and beliefs shared amongst community members. Hence, capacity to respond to a crisis relates to the
ability of residents to act collectively and come together for a common purpose (e.g., supporting those in need) (Norris et al., 2008). This can be referred to as social capacity.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Given the complexity of this indicator, a number of possible measures could provide insight into a community’s capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis. The way this indicator is defined and what a CVE program aims to achieve will determine how this indicator will be assessed. Program developers and policy-makers may need to use existing measures outlined in this document, including those listed under Outcome 1.1 – Individuals and Outcome 1.2 – Environment. Data on capacity to respond to a crisis may also be held by other agencies.

**Community Assessment of Resilience Toolkit (CART)**

CART is a community intervention for assessing and building community resilience to disasters (Pfefferbaum et al., 2013a). The toolkit aims to assess four domains of community responses to disasters – connection and caring, resources, transformative potential and disaster management – which mirror the components of physical, procedural and social capacities to respond to a crisis, as discussed above. CART involves an assessment process whereby stakeholders are brought together to address community issues through assessment, feedback, planning and actions (Pfefferbaum et al., 2013b). The toolkit includes a survey questionnaire, a focus group script and other assessment and analytical instruments that can be used to assess a community’s capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis. This includes key informant interviews with relevant agencies, focus groups with community groups to identify knowledge about local capacity and the willingness of people to work together, mapping the existence of neighbourhood infrastructure to identify gaps and the development of maps to identify the partnerships and connections across individuals, groups and organisations within a community (for more details see: https://www.oumedicine.com/docs/ad-psychiatry-workfiles/cart_online-final_042012.pdf).

The interview and focus group schedule canvasses the following topics: community resilience, connection and caring, resources, transformative potential, disaster management, terrorism preparedness and public engagement (see Pfefferbaum et al., 2011). Some examples of the focus group/interview questions relating to terrorism preparedness include:

- What is your community doing to establish terrorism response capability?
- Who will be served? Will individuals or groups be neglected? If so, why?
- Are improvements necessary? If so, what are they?
Would these changes address the needs of under-served individuals or groups?
If not, how could under-served individuals or groups be better served?
What would be required to make the recommended improvements?
What is your community doing to establish terrorism recovery capability?
Who will be served? Will individuals or groups be neglected? If so, why?
How might recovery capacity be improved?
Would these changes address the needs of under-served individuals or groups?
If not, how could under-served individuals or groups be better served?
What would be required to make the recommended improvements?

The CART survey questionnaire has been adapted depending on the community context (Pfefferbaum et al., 2015). The foundational questionnaire includes the following 21 items:

- People in my community feel like they belong to the community.
- People in my community are committed to the wellbeing of the community.
- People in my community have hope about the future.
- People in my community help each other.
- My community treats people fairly no matter what their background is.
- My community supports programs for children and families.
- My community has resources it needs to take care of community problems (resources include, for example, money, information, technology, tools, raw materials, and services).
- My community has effective leaders.
- People in my community are able to get the services they need.
- People in my community know where to go to get things done.
- My community works with organisations and agencies outside the community to get things done.
- People in my community communicate with leaders who can help improve the community.
- People in my community work together to improve the community.
- My community looks at its successes and failures so it can learn from the past.
- My community develops skills and finds resources to solve its problems and reach its goals.
- My community has priorities and sets goals for the future.
- My community tries to prevent disasters.
- My community actively prepares for future disasters.
- My community can provide emergency services during a disaster.
• My community has services and programs to help people after a disaster.
(Response options range from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree, with a midpoint of 3 – neither disagree nor agree.)

**Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis and relevance to the CVE context**

The relevance of community capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis relates to understanding how resilient and responsive a community will be when there are incidents of violent extremism. In such situations, resources will need to be redirected to ensure an appropriate response occurs. Further, it encompasses elements of the indicators of **coping skills, social cohesion, social and civic participation, identify as Australian and supportive social networks within the immediate community**. These will influence the level of collective mobilisation amongst neighbours, their ability to ‘pull together’ and whether they scapegoat others as to blame for extremist acts (Norris et al., 2008; Kaniasty & Norris, 2004). If community groups scapegoat others, this will have an impact on their capacity to act collectively in the interests of all community members. CVE programs may aim to build physical, procedural and social capacities to respond to a crisis. Evaluating this indicator may need to be focused at these three levels.

**Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies**

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This outcome includes the following four indicators:

- Recall of CVE-related media campaigns.
- Exposure to extremist messaging.
- Media discussion of inter-communal relations.
- Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes.

**Why measure?**

Programs may aim to address the ideologies that underpin the propaganda, anti-Western rhetoric and messaging and narratives that violent extremist groups use to justify their actions. They may also aim to address broader social issues such as poor inter-communal relations, or negative racial or other stereotypes, both of which may be pre-conditions for radicalisation. Extremist messaging can come from a number of sources, including social media.
Ways of measuring

Qualitative and quantitative approaches could be utilised to assess these indicators. For example, data on the recall of CVE-related media campaigns could encompass the recollection and recognition of key messages and the impact on knowledge, attitudes and behaviours. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews with at-risk individuals exploring exposure to extremist messaging. Data from community members could assess the nature and impact of media presentations of racial and other stereotypes.

Indicator: Recall of CVE-related media campaigns

Recall of CVE-related media campaigns could encompass the recollection and recognition of key messages and other elements from a media campaign, where the campaign was seen and what impact the campaign had on knowledge, attitudes and behaviours in respect to CVE-related issues (Sixsmith et al., 2014). Evaluations of media campaigns in the public health area have been carried out extensively and can provide guidance on evaluating CVE-related media campaigns. CVE-related media campaigns could include providing counter-narratives to extremist propaganda, or radio and television campaigns to promote social cohesion, or improve the reporting of suspicious activities by the public to the police (Living Safe Together, n.d).

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Recall of ‘Foolsspeed’ Campaign (Stead et al., 2002)

‘Foolsspeed’ was a five-year road safety initiative in Scotland designed to tackle speeding. The evaluation of the campaign included a three-year longitudinal survey of drivers in the target age group, including a baseline survey prior to the campaign being launched, and then three follow-up surveys following the launch. Each wave of the survey assessed attitudes, norms, intentions and behaviours over the period of the campaign, with the follow-up survey including specific questions on the campaign to assess unprompted and prompted awareness, attitudes to and recall of key messages. Those related to the recall of the campaign included the following suite of questions:

- Measure of spontaneous awareness (the extent to which a campaign is front of mind amongst the target population):
  - Respondents were asked to recall and describe, unprompted, ‘any advertising or publicity which they had seen recently on road safety’. This measure also gathers
mentions of where the campaign was seen, i.e., on television, posters/billboards, in newspapers/magazines.

- Measure of prompted awareness:
  - Respondents were asked whether they had heard of the five speeding-related campaigns and slogans, and were shown a visual of each of the campaigns. Again, this measure included asking respondents about the medium through which they saw the campaign.

- Unprompted reactions to campaign advertisements:
  - Respondents were asked to describe what ‘thoughts and feelings’ occurred to them on seeing the advertisement (open-ended question).
  - Respondents were asked to describe in their own words ‘what the advertisement is trying to say’ (open-ended question).

- Prompted response to campaign advertisements:
  - For some components of the campaign, respondents were asked to rate the advertisement in terms of a series of characteristics on a scale of 1-9. The characteristics included: difficult/easy to understand, talks down/does not talk down to you, like/dislike of ad, made me/did not make me think of how a passenger would view my driving, made me/did not make me think about my own driving, is not/is for people like me.
  - Prompted level of agreement or disagreement (on a scale of strongly agree, agree, neither, disagree, strongly disagree) with seven statements relating to the potential message of each of the particular advertisements. Examples of the statements included:
    - This ad is trying to say that some ways of driving are foolish.
    - This ad is trying to tell drivers to be more considerate.
    - This ad is trying to make people drive more slowly.

While these are a ‘typical’ suite of questions asked in media campaign evaluations, any evaluation of a media campaign needs to be designed with consideration of the campaign target behaviour and audience, the main campaign message, the approach used to convey the message, the campaign duration and intensity, the different types of media used and any activities or enforcement accompanying the campaign (Wundersitz & Hutchinson, 2011). The design of any data collection technique to measure this indicator would need to take these factors into account. For example, assessing the recollection of a social media campaign that targets particular at-risk groups (e.g., young people) would be different to a mass media campaign used to educate the wider community.
Recall of CVE-related media campaigns and relevance to the CVE context

Public health and crime prevention research does show that media campaigns can be effective (Sutton, Cherney & White, 2013). Given the expense of media campaigns, it is important to understand their effectiveness and if there are any unintended side effects (e.g., people become more curious about the problem being addressed) (Cho & Salmon, 2007). Recall of particular media campaigns is important to assess because it helps identify if a campaign’s message resonates with its target group. If it does not, then people are less likely to take notice of it.

Recollection of a campaign will not provide insight into its effectiveness. Recall could be related to other aspects of the advertisement that may have been judged as funny, ridiculous, over-the-top and/or offensive. Recall does not necessarily mean the message is seen as legitimate or persuasive. Within the CVE field, recall of a media campaign could be related to the perceived legitimacy of the source of the message compared to the content of the message itself (Cherney, 2016). Hence, measuring recall of CVE media campaigns needs to take into account a number of issues so as to determine whether a particular campaign was effective.

Indicator: Exposure to extremist messaging

Extremist groups aim to recruit and attract vulnerable individuals to their cause through the spread of extremist ideological propaganda, anti-Western rhetoric and messaging, and narratives that justify violence. Extremist messaging can come from a number of sources. The other indicators listed in Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies make specific reference to the media and its relationship to violent extremism. The indicator exposure to extremist messaging is understood as related to exposure via social media or extremist/terrorist websites. Accessing the level of exposure can be a challenge, given that individuals subject to an intervention could be reluctant to talk about their social media viewing habits, and that messaging can occur across a range of platforms, with extremist groups easily able to establish new forums once original forums and platforms are shut down or disrupted.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

A number of approaches using both objective and subjective data as well as qualitative and quantitative approaches could be utilised to assess this outcome.
Social media analysis

Social media analysis can potentially be useful for identifying individuals, groups, subcultures, networks, online communities and specific types of content and language that encourage and inspire violence on behalf of a cause (Abdo, 2014; Waldman & Verga, 2016). Qualitative analysis of website and social media content can look for indications of political, economic, social or cultural factors which have been identified as risk factors for violent extremism. These may include collective narratives of grievance, de-legitimisations of the state and radicalising ideologies that glamorise or offer rewards for violence (Abdo, 2014; Waldman & Verga, 2016). Determining the number of followers of known extremists on social media, or the number of visits to particular websites known to promote terrorist or extremist propaganda is another way that this indicator could be measured. More sophisticated analytical tools and techniques, such as the ‘big data analytics’ of Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), could also be used to assess levels of exposure to extremist messaging and if patterns of exposure change over time (Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 2016; O’Halloran et al., 2016). (The details of various SOCMINT techniques are available at https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf.)

Social media analysis would need to be developed in conjunction with other stakeholders, such as intelligence agencies, who will have knowledge of known extremists and their social media reach, along with details of known websites where extremist propaganda is promoted.

Social Network Analysis

Exposure to extremist messaging could also be evaluated through Social Network Analysis (SNA), which can help to identify and understand online (or offline) social networks that promote and encourage violent extremist elements. SNA aims to measure, map, model, and/or describe the nature, intensity and frequency of social networks. SNA can be conducted on data sets of online activities including readership or participation in blogs, news stories, discussion boards or social media sites. Data on site content, links or usage can be used to reveal the number of people in an online social network and how and what information flows among them. It can thereby help to explain how messaging spreads amongst online networks and how this may change over time (see Abdo, 2014; Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 2016). SNA requires a high degree of technical skill and knowledge of relevant SNA tools to implement successfully.
Qualitative

Interviews or focus groups with at-risk individuals could provide an assessment of the existence and nature of any exposure to extremist messaging; however, as previously mentioned, people may be reluctant to openly discuss their social media habits. Nonetheless, this approach could be useful for any counter-narrative campaign that tries to influence exposure to extremist content by challenging either emotively or factually the arguments and rationalisations underpinning extremist messaging. If this is effective, people will be less likely to actively view extremist content because they do not see it as legitimate, thus limiting their exposure. Asking target groups about how their social media habits have changed following an intervention could therefore be useful.

Exposure to extremist messaging and relevance to the CVE context

Social media is used by extremist groups to publicise their activities and views to supporters and attract new recruits (Waldman & Verga, 2016). Social media allows for the development of personal connections that give potential recruits who might be experiencing social alienation a ‘sense of communal belonging’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 2016). Extremist messaging and propaganda via social media channels can offer narratives that justify violent extremism and also create social forums in which such narratives are reinforced (Ducol et al., 2016). While social media is a central means by which vulnerable individuals may be exposed and influenced by violent extremist messaging, such exposure can also come from other sources, including within the community via existing peer or social networks. Exposure to extremist messaging via a variety of sources, social media in particular, increases the risk of an individual radicalising to violent extremism (Waldman & Verga, 2016; Ducol et al., 2016). Thus, the identification of the extent, nature and frequency of exposure to extremist messaging via social media and other sources is relevant to the CVE context, particularly in informing the development of CVE interventions aimed at neutralising the influence of such messaging.

Indicator: Media discussion of inter-communal relations

The term ‘inter-communal relations’ overlaps with indicator inter-communal tensions. It can refer to the level of conflict, animosity and suspicion between groups of individuals who differ in racial, ethnic or national origin, culture or religion. Evidence of the quality of inter-communal relations can include expressions of the degree of social participation and interactions between members of different racial, ethnic and religious groups (for example, see also indicator social participation and indicator perception of community harmony). Poor inter-communal relations can be evidenced by hate crimes, incidents of racial abuse and expressions
of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment. Discussions in the media could include coverage and opinions (including the nature, medium and frequency of this coverage and opinions) in media outlets, including television, newspapers, magazines and radio, as well as social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or various political or community blogs.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

The primary source of data for assessing media discussions of inter-communal relations can be through media monitoring. A range of media monitoring companies exist, such as Isentia, Streem, Media Monitors and the Meltwater Group, which offer subscription-based services that allow users to monitor the output of print, online, broadcast and social media. Other free media monitoring tools exist such as Google Alerts. The CSIRO also offers a suite of software tools to track information on social media. (For further details see https://www.csiro.au/en/Research/D61/Areas/Data-for-decisions/Social-media.)

**Media Monitoring Project: A Baseline Description of How the Australian Media Report and Portray Suicide and Mental Health and Illness** (Pirkis et al., 2001).

This project is an example of how media discussion on issues of public concern can be assessed. The Pirkis et al. (2001) report included a series of studies that aimed to assess the extent and nature of the reporting and portrayal of suicide, mental health and illness. It included a quantitative component examining the amount of reporting of these subjects in the media, as well as a qualitative study that analysed the content of the material reported and how it was framed (e.g., positively, negatively, stereotypically). Both the quantitative and qualitative study used data gathered from the media retrieval service Media Monitors. Media Monitors retrieved content relating to suicide, mental health and illness from all national daily newspapers and Victorian suburban and regional papers, as well news and current affairs items. These source materials were then coded and analysed. (For further details of these studies see: http://www.mindframe-media.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/5168/Pirkis,Blood,Francis,etal.-The-media-monitoring-project_baseline.pdf).

**Media discussion of inter-communal relations and relevance to the CVE context**

Monitoring media discussion of inter-communal relations can offer a proxy measure on the level of social harmony in a community and whether groups are accepting of one another. A lack of acceptance for diversity and for different religious or cultural practices is a key
characteristic of violent extremist groups (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2016; Simi et al., 2017). Poor inter-communal relations are likely to fuel levels of community fear and anxiety. Such anxiety can create further division and provide a fertile environment for violent extremist narratives to take hold. It must be noted that any fluctuations in the intensity of media discussion on the quality of inter-communal relations could arise for a number of reasons, such as the saliency of other issues being discussed in the public and political domains. CVE programs that aim to influence the content of media discussions would need to take this into account and also choose a mix of data collection methods and various media sources through which to gauge the quality of inter-communal relations.

**Indicator: Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes**

Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes recognises the complex relationship between the media and public perceptions (Brooks & Hebert, 2006). There are some similarities to the indicator media discussion of inter-communal relations. Media presentations of racial and other stereotypes are shaped by pre-existing public misperceptions about ethnic groups and religions that are held by members of the public. Media presentations themselves can reinforce and perpetuate these existing negative biases and attitudes, which are connected to the construction of such stereotypes (Gilens, 1996; Maher, 2009). Stereotypes can be understood as representations of a group and its members and are closely linked to discrimination and prejudice (Augoustinos & Walker, 1998). The media presentation of racial and other stereotypes could include coverage and opinions (including the nature, medium and frequency of this coverage and opinions) of racial and other stereotypes in news outlets such as television, newspapers, magazines and radio, and could include news coverage, commentary, debate, editorials, columns, articles, readers’ letters, cartoons and headlines, as well as reports of events (Runnymede Trust, 1997). It could also include the presentation of stereotypes such as those based on race, ethnicity and gender in film, television and music, as well as on social media.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

In measuring the media presentation of racial and other stereotypes, it is necessary to identify what constitutes a ‘stereotype’. To date, there does not appear to be any standardised measure that sets out criteria to assess whether something is a stereotypical representation of a specific group. One way to set these parameters is to conduct a review of current literature that covers stereotypical representations of specific groups and create a classification of those representations. This classification or categorisation could then be used to check media coverage to identify whether those stereotypes appear in particular stories.
Once the parameters are set to determine whether something is considered a stereotypical representation of a particular race or group, an assessment of the extent of these media presentations can be carried out. A way to assess media presentations of racial and other stereotypes is through media monitoring. Details of the various approaches to media monitoring, including the types of products and services that exist and how they can be used, is discussed under the previous indicators of exposure to extremist messaging and media discussions of inter-communal relations.

Qualitative data could also be collected via interviews or focus groups with community members to assess the nature and impact of the media presentation of racial and other stereotypes. Interviews and focus groups could be used to understand the sorts of stereotypical representations that are obvious to community members, perceptions towards the pervasiveness of stereotypical media presentations and their impact on behaviour or attitudes.

**Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes and relevance to the CVE context**

If the media portray particular groups in a stereotypical way this can reinforce prejudices towards such groups. A negative or inflammatory media presentation of racial and other stereotypes can have a significant impact on community perceptions by increasing levels of community fear, anxiety and alarm, and exaggerating the threat posed by particular groups. It is consistently argued that media portrayals of Muslims reinforce the view that Islam is a religion of violence and that Muslims present a national security threat (Ewart, Cherney & Murphy, 2017). These portrayals can strengthen ideological convictions among the broader community that Muslims should be despised, which for some can justify their harassment and exclusion.

**Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment**

**Summary Table**

**Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment**

Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.

This outcome includes the following two indicators:

- Intentions of joining a violent extremist group.
- Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups.

Why measure?
The intentions of an individual to join a violent extremist group can include a range of cognitive and behavioural indicators. Understanding intentions of joining a violent extremist group can provide insight into the tipping point towards radicalisation. Estimated membership includes the approximate numbers of individuals who, through indications or intelligence, appear to be members of an extremist organisation or group. Having an understanding of the estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups will help to give an indication of their appeal and subsequent group membership.

**Ways of measuring**

A variety of quantitative and qualitative measures can be used to assess these indicators. For example, tools have been proposed that measure risk-taking behaviours that might assist in the identification of individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism (e.g., Identifying Vulnerable People Guidance by Egan et al., 2016), intent to join a violent extremist group (e.g., Self-Sacrifice Scale by Bélanger, 2014) or passive support for terrorism (e.g., Cherney & Murphy 2017). Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly. Qualitative interviews or a quantitative survey of at-risk individuals could assess their level of support and sympathy for or intent to join an extremist group; however, such approaches are inherently problematic. Data on extremist group membership could be gathered from police-related intelligence. Secondary data sources such as internet searches of previously identified extremist organisations and groups could also be used to gather membership information.

**Indicator: Intentions of joining a violent extremist group**

The intentions of an individual to join a violent extremist group can potentially include a range of cognitive and behavioural indicators. These can include stated intentions of becoming an actively engaged member of a known extremist group. These can also be signified by passive support for terrorism, including sympathising with the ideological justifications used by extremist groups or expressing sympathy for acts of terrorism (Paul, 2010). Such intentions could be shown through objective measures such as psychological or mental health indicators, general criminality or associating with known extremists. Hence, intentions can incorporate subjective and objective measures.
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) Guidance (Egan et al., 2016)

IVP Guidance provides a checklist of key risk-taking behaviours that might assist in the identification of individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism, or contributing to such activity. The 16 IVP checklist items are:

1. Cultural and religious isolation.
2. Isolation from family.
4. Sudden change in religious practice.
5. Violent rhetoric.
6. Negative peer influences.
7. Isolated from peer group.
8. Hate rhetoric.
9. Political activism.
10. Basic paramilitary training.
11. Travel/residence abroad.
12. Death rhetoric (increased salience of).
13. Extremist group membership (increased salience of).
14. Contact with known recruiters and extremists (increased salience of).
15. Advanced paramilitary training (increased salience of).
16. Overseas combat (increased salience of).

Known extremists (identified from Google searches and using other open-source intelligence) were classified with persons being rated for each of the 16 criteria as 0 – no record/not known, 1 – low evidence, 2 – medium evidence, 3 – good evidence.

Self-Sacrifice Scale (Bélanger, 2014)

This scale could be used as indirect measure of intent to join a violent extremist group or commit an act of violent extremism. The scale includes 10 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘strongly agree’). These 10 items were:

1. It is senseless to sacrifice one's life for a cause (reverse coded).
2. I would defend a cause to which I am truly committed even if my loved ones rejected me.
3. I would be prepared to endure intense suffering if it meant defending an important cause.
4. I would not risk my life for a highly important cause (reverse coded).
5. There is a limit to what one can sacrifice for an important cause (reverse coded).
6. My life is more important than any cause (reverse coded).
7. I would be ready to give my life for a cause that is extremely dear to me.
8. I would be willing to give away all my belongings to support an important cause.
9. I would not be ready to give my life away for an important cause (reverse coded).
10. I would be ready to give up all my personal wealth for a highly important cause.

Passive support for terrorism
A study by Cherney and Murphy (2017) used survey data collected from 800 Muslims living in Australia to assess factors that lead to passive support for terrorism. Passive support for terrorism was measured through the statement: ‘Terrorists sometimes have valid grievances’ (measured on a Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Factors examined included beliefs in jihad (e.g., jihad justifies the use of violence as a means to an end, measured on a Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). This is an indirect measure (i.e., proxy) of support for terrorist groups with a sense of grievance an important way by which extremist groups attract members.

An additional approach could be to interview at-risk individuals (either qualitatively through face-to-face in-depth interviews or quantitatively through a survey) on their level of support and sympathy for, or intent to join, an extremist group. There are inherent problems with this approach due to social desirability biases and the willingness of people to openly admit they have such sympathies or intentions. Thus, proxy measures, or indirect measurements of an individual’s intent to join an extremist group, such as those mentioned above, may be the best approach.

**Intentions of joining a violent extremist group and relevance to the CVE context**
Understanding intentions of joining a violent extremist group can provide insight into the tipping point towards radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). It can also provide evidence as to where CVE policy-makers and program designers need to direct their resources to deter individuals from being recruited. It must be emphasised that there is a difference between a stated intention to join and whether a person actually follows through with this plan. Take for example proxy methods that assess an intention to join, such as a measure of passive support for terrorist grievances or self-reported intentions to self-sacrifice for a cause. These can be more effective methods of gauging attitudes towards extremism, with people more honest in their answers compared to being asked if they support specific groups like ISIS.
(Cherney & Murphy, 2017); however, sympathy may not mean someone is then motivated to commit an act of terrorism. Gauging intentions does raise the risk of false positives; that is, a measure of intention is so general that it leads to the incorrect assessment that someone possesses a risk of radicalising to violent extremism when in actual fact they do not (Sarma, 2017). Hence, assessments of intentions to join will need to use a variety of measures to accurately assess how these motivations change and if they represent as issue of ongoing concern for program staff.

**Indicator: Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups**

Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups include approximate numbers of individuals who, through indications or intelligence, appear to be members of an extremist organisation or group. What constitutes an extremist organisation or group would need to be defined to ensure this count was accurate; that is, they are defined by pursuing political, ideological or religious goals through the unlawful use of violence.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Identifications of extremist organisations and groups and their subsequent membership numbers could come from police-related intelligence. Police or other agencies at the local, state and national levels gather details on extremist organisations and groups and their estimated membership (e.g., through social media monitoring), including details of a group’s composition, levels of online support and if people have multiple forms of membership. Such measures could also come from secondary data sources such as Internet searches for extremist organisations and groups that have been identified in academic literature, the media and other sources. Particular non-governmental organisations may also track membership of extremist groups. For example, in the USA, the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) monitors hate groups and other extremist organisations, including membership numbers. The list of hate groups is compiled using group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources and news reports (Southern Poverty Law Centre, see [https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map](https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map)). Koehler (2017) used secondary data from authorities in Germany to assess the impact of de-radicalisation in that country. This included data collected on the number of right-wing extremists in Germany, websites and posts on social media and right-wing extremist concerts, periodicals and demonstrations. Social media scanning of known extremist organisations and groups, and individuals who follow the beliefs of such groups, could also provide a proxy measure of membership, and whether membership is
increasing or decreasing. Techniques for social media scanning have been provided in the indicators exposure to extremist messaging and media discussion of inter-communal relations.

**Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups and relevance to the CVE context**

Having an understanding of the estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups will help to give an indication of the appeal and subsequent group membership; however, accurate data may be difficult to identify, collect and access. Further, high membership does not necessarily translate to the group being very active, although it can indicate a level of tacit support for the grievances or goals it promotes. In order to assess if a CVE program has an impact on membership, a baseline measure of the size of the group would need to be collected and then membership monitored over time; however, establishing causation between a program and declining membership may be difficult to demonstrate and would need to tap into decisions about whether to join a group. Koehler (2017) illustrated a declining number of right-wing extremist groups in Germany since 2000 when de-radicalisation programs became active in Germany; however, he cautions against assuming there is a direct relationship between this decline and the number of programs in operation.
Outcome 2 – Individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists divert and do not engage in violence

Outcome 2.1 – Identification

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This outcome includes the following two indicators:

- Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues.
- Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns.

Why measure?
To ensure individuals at risk of radicalising to violent extremism are diverted and do not engage in violence, it is necessary for the community to be equipped to have both the capacity and motivation to identify and report individuals at risk. To be able to do this, the community needs to be aware of violent extremism and related issues, and be willing to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns.

Ways of measuring
These indicators could be measured through a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches. For example, tools for measuring awareness of risk factors for radicalisation have been proposed (e.g., Egan et al., 2016). Williams et al. (2016) proposes a way of measuring levels of concern if a friend engaged in specific activities, which can act as a proxy for levels of awareness. There are proposed ways of measuring willingness to report suspicious terrorist related behaviour (e.g., Murphy, Cherney & Barkworth, 2015). The Peer-Assistance Barometer (Williams et al., 2016) has items which can be applicable to measuring willingness in the community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns. Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews exploring knowledge regarding causes of violent extremism, awareness of risk factors and most vulnerable groups. Such data can also be collected to examine willingness to report suspicious behaviour as well as thresholds and barriers for sharing information with authorities.
Indicator: Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues

This indicator can encompass a range of different topics. Given Outcome 2.1 refers to identification, it is understood here as relating specifically to identifying individuals and groups at risk of radicalising to violent extremism. This may relate to community awareness of the causes of violent extremism, risk factors for radicalisation and the vulnerability of certain groups to extremist influences. This indicator does share some similarities with Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support, indicator awareness and understanding of violent extremism and Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE, indicator understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

**Quantitative data**

*Awareness of risk factors for radicalisation*

To date, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure designed to assess community awareness of risk factors for radicalisation; however, survey questions could be developed that draw on existing related measures. Egan et al. (2016) developed a 16-item screening tool to be used by frontline workers (e.g., school teachers, healthcare professionals, police) as a checklist of key behaviours for identifying individuals potentially at risk of becoming involved with violent extremism. Example items include:

- Cultural and religious isolation.
- Political activism.
- Sudden change in religious practice.

Williams et al. (2016) developed an adapted grievance, activism and radicalism scale, which uses eight items to measure how concerned the respondent would be if their best friend engaged in a number of activities. Measures of concern can be understood as a proxy for levels of awareness because concern requires a certain level of attentiveness towards the expression of certain behaviours and their consequences. Example activities include:

- Joining an organisation that fights for their group’s political and legal rights.
- Participating in a public protest against oppression of their group if they thought the protest might turn violent.
- Attacking police or security forces if they saw them beating members of their groups.

Items from these scales could be adapted to develop a measure assessing community awareness of risk factors for radicalisation. For example, respondents could be asked to rate how concerned they would be if someone they knew was displaying a set of listed behaviours.
Qualitative data

Qualitative data could be collected to measure community awareness of violent extremism and related issues. Data could be collected through interviews or focus groups. Interviews and/or focus groups could explore:

- Knowledge regarding causes of violent extremism.
- Awareness of risk factors for radicalisation.
- Knowledge regarding groups most vulnerable to extremist influences.

Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring community awareness of violent extremism and related issues. Descriptions of individuals at risk of becoming engaged in violent extremism could be used as a stimulus to explore community members’ awareness of risk factors for violent extremism. This strategy has been used to examine the community reporting of violent extremism to authorities (see Grossman, 2015; Thomas et al., 2017).

Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and relevance to the CVE context

Increasing community awareness of violent extremism and related issues is important in strengthening the capacity of community members to identify individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation. Further, it can be used to equip communities to be able to work together to prevent violent extremism. Measuring awareness of violent extremism and related issues may also be useful in identifying communities that have a low understanding of this problem and could benefit from CVE interventions or efforts to help build their knowledge on violent extremism and how it can be tackled. It must be acknowledged that an increased awareness of violent extremism and related issues may not necessarily translate into a willingness to take action against violent extremism, report individuals of concern to authorities or assist those at risk. Evaluations of community awareness would need to take into account factors influencing awareness and how a program could address these issues to improve knowledge deficits.

Indicator: Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns

This indicator can encompass the reporting of behaviour and concerns to family and friends, community leaders, religious leaders, police or other government departments and authorities.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Willingness to report terrorism-related information
Murphy, Cherney and Barkworth (2015) developed a scale to measure willingness to report terrorism-related information to police. The scale consists of seven items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’):

- If you saw or heard about the following, how likely would you be to report it to police?
  - A person saying he or she had joined a group you consider politically radical.
  - A person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack.
  - A person visiting internet chat rooms or websites in which there is material posted that supports al-Qaeda.
  - A person reading religious literature you believe to be extremist.
  - A person giving money to organisations that people say are associated with terrorists.
  - A person talking about travelling overseas to fight for Muslims.
  - A person distributing material expressing support for al-Qaeda.

Peer-Assistance Barometer

Williams et al. (2016) developed an 8-item measure designed to assess an individual’s willingness to engage with and assist a peer who might be experiencing a personal crisis. Example items from this measure that can be applicable to measuring willingness in the community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns include:

- Thinking now about your friends, imagine if one of them started to say or do things that made you think they were thinking about committing violence against someone else. What (if anything) do you think you would say or do in response to that friend?
  - I would talk to another friend or family member about what to do.
  - I would talk to someone I trust, outside of my friends and family (e.g., a religious official, or a counsellor) about what to do.
  - I would contact the police.

Qualitative data

Qualitative data can also be used to examine willingness within communities to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns, as well as thresholds and barriers for sharing information with authorities. Grossman (2015) and Thomas et al. (2017) conducted qualitative studies in Australia and the UK examining thresholds in community reporting of suspected violent extremist activity. These studies involved interviews with community members and government stakeholders, with questions covering:
- Potential motivations for Muslim community members and leaders to share concerns regarding individuals in their community they believe may be involved in violent extremist activity.
- Factors that may encourage individuals to disclose their concerns.
- Barrier to willingness to report suspicious activities/behaviour.
- Expectations regarding support individuals may need or want throughout the reporting process and after they make a report.
- Expectations regarding the outcomes of the reporting process.
- Concerns and fears relating to reporting and the potential impact (personal, family, and community) of reporting.
- Strategies for increasing community awareness of and knowledge regarding reporting suspicious behaviour to authorities (e.g., police).

Both of these studies developed a number of hypothetical scenarios regarding individuals planning involvement in violent extremism. These scenarios were presented to interview participants to stimulate discussion about reporting behaviour without requiring participants to disclose information regarding people they knew.

**Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns and relevance to the CVE context**

It is unanimously recognised that tackling violent extremism requires cooperation from community members (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). This cooperation is essential given friends, family and community members are often the first people to suspect or know about an individual developing interest or becoming involved in violent extremism (Thomas et al., 2017). Studies on reporting behaviour indicate that a range of factors influence the willingness of people to report extremist-related activities or people suspected as at risk of radicalisation (see Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Thomas et al., 2017). This can relate to perceptions of police treatment or fear of the repercussions for reporting, particularly if it involves a loved one. Hence, willingness to report is not just about quantifying the levels of reporting that occur, but also factors that motivate and prevent people from reporting suspicious behaviour and to whom they are more likely to report that behaviour. Assessing whether CVE programs improve reporting behaviours needs to take account of these various issues to capture a comprehensive understanding of willingness to report and voice concerns about violent extremism.
Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support

Summary Table

Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support

Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.

This outcome includes the following four indicators:

- Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues.
- Willingness to challenge radical extremist views.
- Willingness to support diversity within the community.
- Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism.

Why measure?

An awareness and knowledge of violent extremism and CVE-related programs is relevant to ensure community members know how they can best assist in tackling violent extremism. A willingness to challenge radical extremist views is important, which is linked to a willingness to support diversity within a community. Measuring levels of awareness can be useful in identifying where resources should be directed. Willingness to challenge radical extremist views and support diversity can provide relevant information to program designers.

Ways of measuring

Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used to measure these indicators. For example, survey questions could be designed to measure willingness to challenge radical extremist views in various contexts (see Zick, Kupper & Hoverman, 2011). There are tools that provide proxy measures of willingness to support diversity within the community. Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly. Measures of community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism could include the number of referrals/enquiries that come from community sources (e.g., total number of calls made to CVE telephone counselling services or helplines) or surveying community members on their knowledge of such initiatives and their attitudes towards CVE programs. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews exploring elements related to each indicator.

Indicator: Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues

This indicator overlaps with indicators listed in Outcome 1.3 – Awareness and understanding of violent extremism, Outcome 2.1 – Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues, Outcome 2.2 – Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism and Outcome 4.1 – Understanding of violent extremism issues and strategies to
address violent extremism. Readers should also consult the indicators under these outcomes as some of the proposed issues and methods related to their assessment are applicable to this indicator.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**
Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community awareness of violent extremism. Ways of assessing this indicator are canvassed in other sections; this indicator is specifically listed under community-led support and suggestions have been made with this specific task in mind.

Qualitative data could be collected to examine community awareness and its impact on people’s willingness and capacity to support CVE initiatives. Interviews and focus groups could explore:

- Community members’ perceptions of their level of awareness and understanding of violent extremism.
- Community members’ attitudes and beliefs regarding their potential role in supporting CVE.
- Community members’ perceptions on how CVE should be tackled.

Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring community awareness of violent extremism and related issues (see Outcome 2.1 – Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues).

**Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and relevance to the CVE context**
See also Outcome 1.3 – Awareness and understanding of violent extremism, Outcome 2.1 – Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and Outcome 2.2 – Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism. Some community members will be best placed to help people at risk of radicalising to violent extremism. These can include family members, friends, acquaintances, community leaders and mentors, teachers, civil society groups and community-based service providers. In order for them to know how they can best assist, they need to have an awareness of violent extremism. This includes awareness of its prevalence, causes and risk factors, how it can and is being tackled and the various responsibilities of different agencies. Measuring community awareness would require not only quantifying levels of understanding, but also how this influences the willingness of relevant
communities to help and refer people to CVE initiatives. Any attempt to improve knowledge about violent extremism would require an assessment on whether it has improved over time.

**Indicator: Willingness to challenge radical extremist views**

Willingness to challenge radical extremist views would include an assessment of both attitudes and behaviours. This could include overall attitudes towards the views propagated by violent extremists. (See also the discussion on tacit support in Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment, indicator *intentions of joining a violent extremist group.* ) More specifically, it can include self-reported readiness to challenge extremist views when they are encountered, a willingness to speak up when someone expresses radical extremist views online or in public, and can include behavioural indicators such as whether a person participates in rallies and protests against extremism or engages with community groups (including religious groups) to help communicate an anti-extremist message. This indicator also overlaps with the indicator *willingness to support diversity within the community.*

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Quantitative data**

Currently, there does not appear to be any published measure of willingness to challenge radical extremist views. Survey questions could be developed to measure this indicator in a range of different contexts (e.g., willingness to challenge radical views expressed by a family member or expressed in a private or public setting by an acquaintance or member of the public). It could include questions about a willingness to challenge views online. Such questions could include:

- How likely would you be to challenge the views of a family member who stated that immigrants living here threaten our way of life and our values? (This question is adapted from Zick, Kupper & Hovermann, 2011. The term ‘family member’ could be substituted with ‘acquaintance’ or ‘member of the public’. The question could be reworded to: ‘How likely would you be to challenge the views of someone online who stated that immigrants living here threaten our way of life and our values?’)

- How likely would you be to challenge the views of a member of the public who stated Muslims are all terrorists? (Authors’ own wording.)

- How likely would you be to challenge the views of someone that said the term ‘jihad’ justifies the use of violence against non-Muslims? (Authors’ own wording.)
• How likely would you be to challenge the views of someone online that posted a message in support of a group that promoted hatred against Muslims and immigrants? (Authors’ own wording.)
These items could be measured using a Likert scale (e.g., from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’).

Qualitative data
Willingness to challenge radical extremist views could be measured through the use of qualitative data. One-on-one interviews or focus groups could be conducted with community members to explore:
• Attitudes regarding their willingness to challenge radical extremist views when confronted with them.
• Under what circumstances and in what contexts participants would be willing to challenge radical extremist views.
• In what ways participants would challenge radical extremist views and the types of responses they would provide.
• Apprehensions about challenging radical extremist views in different contexts and perceived fears about the repercussions of doing so.
• What resources or support participants might need to be better equip them to challenge radical extremist views.
Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring the circumstances and contexts in which people may be willing to challenge radical extremist views.

Willingness to challenge radical extremist views and relevance to the CVE context
It is generally recognised that tacit support for extremists and the grievances they promote can generate empathy and/or even indifference towards these groups and their underlying ideology (Cherney & Murphy, 2017). A willingness to challenge radical extremist views is an important part of tackling this empathy or indifference, with it being essential to undermining the legitimacy of extremist groups. It is important to recognise that willingness to challenge radical extremist views does refer to intentions rather than actual behaviour and may not reflect what occurs in real life situations. That is, people might report a willingness to challenge radical extremist views but whether this translates into action may not be the case. Hence, attempts to evaluate levels of willingness would need to adopt a range of measures (quantitative and qualitative) to assess readiness to challenge extremist views under certain circumstances.
Evaluation would need to focus on the types of resources and support necessary for people to feel confident about challenging extremist views and if these are helpful.

Indicator: Willingness to support diversity within the community

This is a broad indicator that may be related to a number of different factors. These could include attitudes toward particular minority groups, the level of community diversity and whether people support the notion of multiculturalism. Further, willingness to support diversity may also be reflected in a variety of actions and behaviours, such as acceptance of minority groups in day-to-day community life, support for diversity in employment and the workplace and provision of community services for minority groups. This indicator is relevant to Outcome 1.3 – Awareness and understanding of violent extremism, indicators social cohesion and positive perception of Australia. Acceptance of diversity can be a marker of social cohesion and is influenced by the perceptions people have of living in Australia.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

There does not appear to be any existing published measure of willingness to support diversity within the community; however, there are a number of related measures that could be adapted or used as proxies for this indicator:

Attitudes towards community diversity

Attitudes towards community diversity are likely to be linked with willingness to support diversity within the community. Murphy et al. (2012) and Mazerolle et al. (2012) used four items to measure attitudes towards community diversity. Each item was measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’):

- People in this community would prefer it if residents in this area were mostly Anglo-Saxon.
- People in this community do not like having members of other ethnic groups as next door neighbours.
- People in this community are comfortable with the current levels of ethnic diversity here.
- Some people in this community have been excluded from social events because of their skin colour, ethnicity, race or religion.

Discrimination

Discrimination against minority groups could also be used as a proxy measure for lack of willingness to support diversity within the community. Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) developed
an 8-item scale to measure discrimination against Muslims. Each item of the scale is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘never’ to ‘all of the time’). Example items include:

- Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your religion?
- Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your cultural background?

These items could be adapted to ask respondents to think specifically about incidents of discrimination that have occurred in their community against certain groups.

**Qualitative data**

Qualitative data could be used to measure willingness to support diversity within the community. In particular, qualitative data could explore:

- Perceived current levels of diversity within the community. (This could then be compared to collected data on levels of community diversity, e.g., ABS data, to examine how accurate these perceptions are.)
- Attitudes towards the existence of different religious, ethnic and cultural groups within the community and what contribution they make to Australian society.
- Willingness to support diversity within the community and participate in activities that celebrate this diversity.

This information could be collected through one-on-one interviews or focus groups with community members.

**Willingness to support diversity within the community and relevance to the CVE context**

As stated in the indicators *social cohesion, perception of community harmony, inter-communal tensions* and *positive perception of Australia*, the acceptance of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity is relevant to tackling violent extremism because it can provide the social conditions that undermine and thwart support for extremist groups (Grossman et al., 2016). Extremist groups (e.g., far right and white supremacists) attack ethnic, religious and cultural diversity as a threat to the maintenance of the dominant culture or their ‘white’ identity (Ebner, 2017). Attacks on the notions of multiculturalism are common (Adams & Roscigno, 2005) and acceptance of diversity is an important factor in the rejection of the grievances that some extremist groups propagate. Further, minority groups who feel supported within their communities are less likely to feel marginalised and may be more willing to engage with relevant services in relation to issues of radicalisation and violent extremism. Gauging willingness to support diversity has to capture both attitudes (levels of acceptance) and
behaviour (actions to support diversity) in order to provide an accurate assessment. Evaluations of particular CVE programs would need to examine both in order to see how any changes in attitudes towards diversity translate into actual action; however, while measuring judgements about the acceptance of diversity may be adequate from an evaluation point of view, attributing levels of support for diversity to an intervention would need to be done with caution. Any attempt to shape and evaluate support for diversity must also take account of the methods through which the attempt is promoted and if it was specifically effective (e.g., see also Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies, indicator recall of media campaigns and indicators listed under Outcome 2.1 – Identification and Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support).

Indicator: Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism

Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism may encompass a number of different elements, including knowledge of existing programs, understanding of the roles of agencies in these programs and awareness of different services and interventions that are delivered as part of these initiatives. Assessing awareness overlaps with Outcome 1.3 – Communities, indicator community awareness and understanding of violent extremism and Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator community awareness of violent extremism and related issues. Readers may want to refer to those relevant sections.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Quantitative data

Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community awareness of CVE programs. One measure could be the level of demand for these initiatives. This could include the number of referrals that come from community sources or the number of enquiries made. For example, telephone counselling services or helplines to counter violent extremism have been implemented here in Australia (e.g., NSW Step Together helpline) and overseas (Koehler, 2017). The total calls made to such initiatives can be a measure of awareness. The number of referrals and enquiries made by non-government organisations to specific interventions can also be a possible measure of awareness.

Survey questions could also be used to measure community awareness of government initiatives. This could be approached in a number of ways. Community members could be presented with a list of initiatives and asked to indicate those of which they are aware. Further questions could be asked regarding how much respondents know about specific programs using Likert-scale response options (e.g., from ‘am not aware of this program/have never heard of
this program’ to ‘very familiar with this program’). It would also be important to measure community support for these initiatives. Questions could be developed to measure respondents’ attitudes regarding:

- General support for government CVE initiatives.
- The usefulness or effectiveness of government CVE initiatives.
- The perceived appropriateness of government-run initiatives for CVE, particularly in relation to cultural or religious issues.

**Qualitative data**

Qualitative data, collected through one-on-one interviews or focus groups, could be used to measure community awareness. This could examine:

- Awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism.
- Support for government initiatives to counter violent extremism.
- Perceived barriers to community support for these initiatives.
- Opportunities for community engagement or partnership with these initiatives.

**Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism and relevance to the CVE context**

A key strategy of improving community support for CVE efforts involves increasing awareness of those initiatives and their aims and benefits. This is relevant to ensuring they are seen as legitimate and beneficial, which can influence the degree to which community members refer people to those initiatives or seek advice or assistance themselves. The same argument applies for community-based service providers. Awareness of government initiatives is particularly relevant given community members are often among the first people to suspect or become aware that an individual may be radicalising to violent extremism (Thomas et al., 2017). Assessing community awareness can comprise a range of data sources. Assessing if awareness of government initiatives has changed would require an extended period of assessment because it can take time for community members to become aware of government programs. This will be influenced by the methods through which the programs are promoted (see also indicator *recall of media campaigns*).
Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support

**Summary Table**

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This outcome includes the following two indicators:

- Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services.
- Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs.

**Why measure?**

Understanding the types of diversion-related services available, where they are located and at which groups they are targeted is important in identifying if there are gaps in the provision of support for individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation. Measuring referrals provides an assessment of the level of demand, as well as an indicator of public awareness. Diversion-related services may include a variety of government and non-government programs. Referrals/willingness to refer to government-led intervention programs encompasses measures of the number, source and eligibility of referrals. Referrals could come from a range of sources.

**Ways of measuring**

Quantitative and qualitative methods could be adopted to measure these indicators. For example, quantitative data could include a count of the number of agencies/groups that provide diversion-related services, including geographic coverage, target groups and the needs being addressed, or a count of referrals to government-led intervention programs using administrative data. Qualitative data could be gathered from community members and organisations through focus groups or interviews exploring awareness of government-led interventions, thresholds for referrals, apprehensions about referring individuals and expectations of such programs.

**Indicator: Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services**

Diversion-related services are those aimed at diverting vulnerable individuals who are at risk of radicalisation away from violent extremist pathways and engaging them in meaningful activities. The aim of diversion-related services is to provide vulnerable individuals with alternatives to prosecution, such as reintegration and rehabilitation, and can be part of broader government-led early intervention and prevention approaches to countering violent extremism. This indicator does overlap with Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists, indicator
number of intervention programs; however, we interpret this indicator as more focused on the community or pre-custody context.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

Diversion-related services could encompass a number of different activities. They could include services provided by government-designed diversion programs, government-funded initiatives within the community or in schools and services provided by NGOs or volunteer groups. They could include counselling, mentoring and mental health support, employment services and sport and recreational activities. They could also encompass both CVE-specific initiatives and non-CVE-labelled services. In measuring the number and coverage of diversion-related services (government or non-government), it will be necessary to identify the level of service delivery, which involves distinguishing between services that exist at each of the following levels:

- State police.
- Local government.
- State government.
- Federal government.
- NGOs/community-based service providers.

This will include not only quantifying the number of service providers that exist across each area, but also the geographical location of these services and which particular target groups (e.g., young people) and needs they are addressing. Data on geography, target groups and needs is relevant to assessing the level of coverage of diversion-related services.

**Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services and relevance to the CVE context**

Understanding the types of diversion-related services that are on offer, within which geographic location they exist, for what specific needs they provide and which groups they target is important in identifying if there are any gaps in the range of diversion options available and if they target or overlook particular at-risk individuals. Though similar to other indicators that are concerned with quantifying the level of service provision, such an assessment does not provide any insight into the quality of the services on offer, or whether they are effective. While a CVE strategy might lead to an increase in the availability of the number of diversion-related services or help to facilitate access to existing initiatives, this does not equate to an indicator of the effectiveness of these services.
Indicator: Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs

Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs encompasses measures on both the number and source of referrals as well as the eligibility of people subject to a referral. Referrals could come from a range of sources (e.g., family and friends, civil society actors, schools or government service providers). The number of referrals and the willingness to refer will be affected by awareness among community members and organisations about the existence and purpose of government-led intervention programs. It should be noted that the number of referrals does not necessarily indicate that appropriate or eligible individuals are being referred into a program. For example, some people may be referred who are not assessed at being at risk of violent extremism; however, it would still be important to include them as part of any measure of willingness to refer.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Administrative data
A direct measure of referrals to government-led intervention programs could include administrative data, such as the total numbers of referrals and details of whether these referrals were assessed as eligible for assistance or as meeting the required risk assessment to be included in the program. Such data could be collected pre- and post-implementation of a program aimed at increasing the number and eligibility of referrals.

Other quantitative measures
A further proxy measure of willingness of community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs is the Peer-Assistance Barometer (described under Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns). This provides an assessment of an individual’s willingness to assist a peer who might be experiencing a personal crisis, but could also be applicable to willingness to seek assistance for a peer, such as referring them to a government-led intervention program.
Qualitative measures

Qualitative measures could also be used to assess willingness of community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs, as well as thresholds and barriers to referring individuals. Focus groups or interviews could be conducted with community members and organisations exploring:

- Awareness and sources of information on government-led intervention programs.
- Under what circumstances community members and agencies may be willing to refer individuals to government-led intervention programs. (See also Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator *willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns.*)
- Apprehensions about referring individuals to government-led intervention programs (e.g., exposure to risk, rejection by fellow community members and questions over the legitimacy of government-led CVE programs).
- Expectations of government-led intervention programs and their outcomes for referred individuals.

*Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context*

A measure of referrals provides an assessment of the level of demand for both the number and nature of government-led CVE intervention programs. Any increase in the number of referrals to an intervention program could indicate an improved awareness about such an initiative among community members; however, this does not necessarily translate into a greater demand for those services because violent extremism is becoming more prevalent.

**Outcome 2.4 – Government-led intervention/diversion**

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<td>- Commitment to participation in program</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Service providers delivering intervention services and their capabilities/number of VE initiatives.</td>
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<td><strong>Why measure?</strong></td>
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Commitment to participate in a CVE program covers participation and completion rates as well as the nature of that participation (e.g., highly engaged vs passive). It can be influenced by a range of factors. Service providers also need to be able to deliver an appropriate level of service provision. Intervention services could include a range of assistance, some of which could be labelled as CVE-specific, while other services may be more generic and part of a mix of approaches. Capabilities to deliver interventions cover funding, staffing levels, current demands for existing services and the skills and experience of staff.

**Ways of measuring**
Quantitative and qualitative methods could be adopted to measure these indicators. Methods could include collecting data on the proportion of individuals who consent to attending a program, to those who do attend and complete a program, including the overall number of sessions completed using administrative data. Similar methods, as suggested in relation to Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support, are relevant. Service mapping could be undertaken. Interviews with program participants, significant others and program staff could be conducted.

**Indicator: Commitment to participation in program**
This indicator covers similar elements to those covered in the indicator willing participants of intervention programs (see Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists). Intervention/diversion programs may be voluntary or mandatory and hence this will dictate what is considered ‘commitment to participate’. Given there are no mandatory CVE programs in Australia, only commitment to participation in voluntary intervention/diversion programs will be covered. This constitutes participation and completion rates as well the nature of that participation (e.g., highly engaged or passive participation). Commitment to an intervention/diversion program will be influenced by a range of factors, such as the trust clients place in program staff and the relationships they develop with staff members, as well as the perceived relevance of and benefits arising from participation. Willingness to participate can potentially be determined by how staff promote the aims and outcomes of a program to a client and his or her significant others (family and friends), which can determine consent to participate.
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

To measure this indicator, similar sources of data to those described in the indicator willing participants of intervention programs (see Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists), are relevant. These data sources include:

Administrative data
Commitment to participation in a program could be measured through the proportion of individuals who consent to attending a program, and those who do attend and complete a program. This can include the overall number of sessions completed. Such measures of compliance are limited as they only consider outputs. Case notes could also be used to examine how engaged and active a client is when attending a program, and whether there have been any observed behavioural changes as a result of participation.

Qualitative data
Assessment of commitment to a program could be derived from interviews with participants, significant others, program staff or service providers contracted to deliver interventions. Such interviews could capture observations of the degree of engagement in a program among participants and whether clients are receptive to the assistance being provided. One would assume that if a person were committed then the latter would be the case. Program staff or service providers could be asked to give a rating of commitment as it pertains to particular individuals who are referred to an intervention. This could include the levels of engagement in the program in terms of an individual’s self-reported or observed enthusiasm and motivation to attend and actively contribute to particular sessions. Assessing the level of engagement would be important in any assessment of a client’s commitment. As stated above, looking at outputs (number of sessions attended) will not provide a reliable assessment of commitment. Understanding any barriers to commitment to participate could also be gathered from similar sources, such as in cases where an individual may have not completed an intervention/diversion program, when discussions with the individual and other stakeholders (e.g., family members, case workers) could provide some insight into why the program was not effective in keeping them engaged and committed.

Commitment to participation in programs and relevance to the CVE context
The level of commitment an individual possesses towards participating in a CVE intervention will influence the impact it has on their pathway away from radicalisation. This commitment will not simply be influenced by the content of the intervention, but also their understanding
of its aims and benefits. Explaining the aims and benefits in the CVE context is particularly important given the apprehension that may arise about participating in a CVE intervention, what this means for how an individual is judged by others and the fact that consent to participate must be voluntary. While self-interest might influence commitment, this does not mean a CVE intervention will have no effect on ways of thinking and behaving (see also Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists, indicator willing participants of intervention programs). Understanding the various dimensions of commitment to participate in an intervention or diversion program involves examining the issue from a range of perspectives and through different sources of data. It is important that any qualitative source is cross-referenced against another so as to guard against any bias regarding assessed levels of commitment.

Indicator: Service providers delivering intervention services and their capabilities/number of VE initiatives

The effective provision of CVE intervention services relates to the number of services available and the capabilities of providers to deliver an appropriate level of service provision. Intervention could include family and youth counselling, youth mentoring, mental health and cross-cultural mental health services, religious guidance, employment and housing assistance, and the provision of sport and recreational activities. Some services might be labelled as CVE-specific. Others could involve non-government actors working in partnership with authorities as part of a case management approach, while others could involve community-based agencies operating independently of any government program, initiating their own processes to attract clients and provide support (Cherney et al., 2017b). Hence, there could exist formal intervention services and also informal assistance provided by civil society (e.g., social and family support provided through Mosques). The relevant service could be one among many an agency delivers to a wide range of target groups. Capabilities to deliver intervention services cover such considerations as funding and staffing levels, current demands for existing services, and the knowledge, skills and experience of staff. It relates to the existence of formalised referral and assessment processes and risk mitigation strategies. Identifying the groups and clients who are the targets of assistance will also be of relevance to assessing service capabilities.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

Ways of gathering information on the number and capabilities of CVE-related service provision are similar to those discussed under Outcome 2.3 – Number and coverage of diversion-related services and Outcome 3.1 – Number of intervention programs. Numerical
data needs to be gathered on the number of CVE-related initiatives within a particular area as well as the focus of the service provision (i.e., service mapping). In order to do this, a distinction will need to be made between formal and informal services. Ways of assessing capabilities are also outlined under Outcome 4.1 – Understanding of violent extremism issues and strategies to address violent extremism, Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and evaluation, Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and collaboration and Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities. Additional information could be gathered from administrative data that an organisation collects on their service provision and demand, and supplemented by interviews with key staff. To accompany this type of data, there is also a need to assess if agencies regard their service provision as relevant to CVE, where they think they can best add value to CVE interventions, and if they are able to cope with any future increase in demand for their services. Interviews with staff would help to provide insight into these issues.

**Service providers delivering intervention services and their capabilities/number of VE initiatives and relevance to the CVE context**

Assessments of whether intervention services have the capabilities to deliver appropriate assistance to individuals at risk of radicalisation provides evidence of where capacity building should be targeted. Tackling violent extremism is not just concerned with addressing ideological influences, but also risk factors that create vulnerabilities to radicalisation (e.g., mental health, wellbeing, sense of belonging and identity, school failure and family functioning). These risk factors will vary across individuals (see indicators listed under Outcome 4 – Capability to deliver effective CVE programs is strengthened [system enabling outcomes]). Hence, the breadth of service providers will be relevant to addressing different needs. Assessing the adequacy of this service provision requires one to understand the number and nature of service provisions, as well as existing capabilities, so responses are appropriate and effective. A baseline assessment of intervention services and their capabilities can be undertaken prior to strategy implementation and assessed overtime to observe if it improves in response to any capacity building efforts, and through developing familiarity and experience with assisting individuals at risk.
Outcome 3 – Violent extremists are rehabilitated and reintegrated when possible

Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists

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<tr>
<td>- Number of intervention programs.</td>
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<td>- Willing participants of intervention programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why measure?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs targeting convicted terrorists or radicalised offenders should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate this cohort. Services can be provided in custody and in the community. Programs may be both CVE-specific and non-CVE specific. Tallying the number of intervention programs must occur in consideration of these various contexts. Willing participation in intervention programs is essential to their success, with rehabilitation and reintegration encompassing a number of measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ways of measuring</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data could be collected via a range of means and from different sources. This could include a count of the number of custody- and community-based intervention programs. Willing participation could be gauged through quantitative (e.g., a count of the number of eligible individuals who consent to participate in a program) and qualitative (e.g., interviews with program participants and staff) measures. Proposed recommendations for measuring rehabilitation vary, with a range of tools suggested. Some have and have not been used with convicted terrorists. Qualitative data could also be useful for measuring rehabilitation, such as program or community supervision case notes or interviews. Measures to assess reintegration need to encompass behavioural and attitudinal changes that can act as markers for reintegration.</td>
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</table>

**Indicator: Number of intervention programs**

Rehabilitation of violent extremists is not only about ensuring that they have moved away from their violent extremist beliefs, but is also about assisting them in their reintegration when released from prison (e.g., education, reconnecting with family, employment, mental health, housing). Consequently, intervention programs for violent extremists will include both CVE-
specific initiatives as well as other related programs that address the needs of violent extremists, but may not be labelled as CVE-specific. This could constitute a suite of services provided to offenders when released from prison that are part of a service provider’s mainstream service delivery (e.g., employment services). It must be noted that intervention programs may occur in different contexts (e.g., within custody or in the community) and may be coordinated at different levels and by different agencies (e.g., police-led, local government, state government, NGOs). Tallying the number of intervention programs must occur in consideration of the various contexts in which intervention programs may be delivered (custody or community) and also the various types of services that help to rehabilitate offenders when in custody and assist in their reintegration once released.

*Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures*

To measure the number of intervention programs for rehabilitating violent extremists, it is necessary to identify relevant programs occurring at a number of different levels, including:

- Police-led programs.
- Local government programs.
- State government programs.
- Programs run by NGOs/community service providers.

As noted above, these programs may occur both within custody and in the community and may or may not be explicitly labelled as CVE programs.

*Number of intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context*

Quantifying the number of intervention programs can provide insight into the levels of assistance available to individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism. It can help identify where funding is targeted, map service provision and help identify where gaps in assistance may exist; however, identifying the number of intervention services can only quantify outputs, and it must be noted that while a CVE strategy might lead to an increase in the number of intervention programs or facilitate access to existing services, this does not equate to an indicator of effectiveness.

**Indicator: Willing participants of intervention programs**

For voluntary intervention programs, willing participants may refer to individuals eligible for a program who consent to participate. For mandatory programs, willing participants may refer to those individuals who actively engage in a program. Willingness to participate in an
intervention may be influenced by a number of factors, including the perceived relevance of the program to the individual and whether they think participation will have positive or negative consequences. This indicator overlaps with Outcome 2.4 – Government-led intervention/diversion, indicator *commitment to participate in programs*. The willingness of participants also relates to the perceived level of coercion that may affect decisions about participation.

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Administrative data**

Willingness to participate in an intervention may be measured through the percentage of eligible individuals who: (1) consent to participate in a program, (2) attend program activities, and (3) complete a program. Case notes could also be used to examine how engaged and active a client is when attending a program, and whether any behavioural changes have been observed as a result of participation. One could assume willing participation is reflected in a person being receptive to an intervention and the assistance it provides; however, while they may turn up consistently, a person may not necessarily be taking on board the required behaviour changes.

**Qualitative data**

Interviews could be conducted with individuals eligible for a program who declined to participate and those who consented to examine factors related to their decisions to participate. Understanding potential barriers to participation may help program staff to develop strategies to increase participation. Interviews could also be conducted with program staff (e.g., case workers) to capture their observations on the degree of engagement in a program among participants and whether clients are receptive to the assistance being provided.

**Willing participants of intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context**

It is important that individuals willingly (i.e., voluntarily) participate in a CVE intervention. This will influence how responsive they are to any assistance being provided and their receptiveness to program staff. Generating willing participation may be challenging for some groups. For example, Muslims have suspicion towards CVE more generally, with Muslim extremists tending to be anti-authoritarian, often having a high distrust of government and institutional authorities (Koehler, 2017; Pressman & Flockton, 2012); this may influence their willing participation in an official intervention. Hence, assessing willing participation in an intervention may need to capture a range of dimensions. While quantifying rates of attendance and program completion is relevant, consideration also needs to be given to assessing why
people are, or are not, participating. This will require more qualitative measures. While individuals might be willingly participating in a CVE intervention through self-interest, thinking they will accrue some individual benefit (e.g., an extremist offender participating in a custody-based intervention to secure parole), this does not mean it will not trigger the required self-reflection to help facilitate rehabilitation. Gauging willing participation as an aim of CVE evaluation is important because it will ultimately affect the achievement of program outcomes.

**Indicator: Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs**

Most assessments of rehabilitation programs regard recidivism (i.e., reoffending) as an important measure of success (Craig, Gannon & Dixon, 2013). Rehabilitation is also concerned with reintegration, which encompasses a range of indicators such as whether an offender is engaged in employment, continuing their education, is drug-free and building meaningful relations with family and/or their spouse and disengaging from criminal associates. Rehabilitation is concerned with ensuring an offender has the capacity and motivation to engage meaningfully in mainstream society. ‘Desistance’ is another term associated with rehabilitation that refers to the process of an offender moving away from criminal activity and adopting a pro-social identity (Farrall & Calverley, 2005).

**Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures**

**Attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups**

Given the ideological motivations underpinning violent extremism (Dawson, 2017), attempts have been made to develop measures that aim to assess the degree of affiliation with features of an extremist ideology. Only a handful of studies have empirically assessed ideological change in the context of terrorist rehabilitation programs (e.g., Webber et al., 2017b). To measure changing attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups, it would be necessary to collect matching data regarding these attitudes prior to and after completion of an intervention. Attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups have been measured in a number of ways. Some examples include:

**Islamic extremism**

Webber et al. (2017a) designed an 11-item scale to measure Islamic extremism. This was used in the context of assessing Islamic extremism among a sample of Filipino prisoners. Each item is measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items include:

- Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deed by God.
• Armed jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today.
• True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran.
• Islam should be practiced in the strictest way, regardless of situations or circumstance.

Use of violence
Given violence is often seen as a means to an end by extremists, attitudes towards the use of violence may also be applicable to rehabilitation. One example includes the violent intention scale developed by Doojse, Loseman and van den Bos (2013) to assess the radicalisation of Islamic youth in the Netherlands. This was not used in a correctional or program context. Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’). An example item is: ‘I am prepared to use violence against other people in order to achieve something I consider very important’.

Support for right-wing extremism
Degrees of support for right-wing or far right extremism have been assessed through a range of measures relating to attitudes towards immigration, racist beliefs, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment, homophobic attitudes, political affiliations, cognitive closure, willingness to use violence, authoritarianism, group dominance and a desire to exclude immigrants and ethnic groups (see Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011). The authors were unable to locate a discreet measure of far right attitudes.

VERA-2 was developed to assess convicted and suspected offenders’ overall levels of risk of radicalisation and/or recidivism. The tool is designed to be used by trained professionals who monitor and manage individuals suspected or convicted of terrorism offences (e.g., law enforcement staff, corrections staff, intelligence, security and military personnel). The revised VERA-2R consists of 67 items assessed using a Structured Professional Judgement approach in combination with range of data sources (e.g., intelligence and police data, criminal or mental health history). The tool covers the following areas:
• Beliefs, attitudes and ideology.
• Social context and intention.
• History, action and capacity.
• Commitment and motivation.
• Protective factors.
• Additional indicators.

Example indicators include:

• Commitment to ideology justifying violence (low/moderate/high).
• Personal contact with violent extremists (low/moderate/high).
• Prior criminal history of violence (low/moderate/high).
• Involvement in de-radicalisation, offence-related programs (low/moderate/high).
• Criminal history (criminal justice data).

VERA-2R is used in a number of countries including Australia. Pressman (2016) argues that it provides a tool to assess the rehabilitation of extremist offenders.

Qualitative data

To gauge successful rehabilitation, interviews can be conducted with program participants to gauge how their reintegration is progressing. This could include canvassing such issues as:

• Reflecting on how a program has assisted them and any gaps in program delivery.
• Engagement in work and education, including opportunities and barriers.
• Changes in their mental health and outlook on life.
• Lifestyle changes that may have occurred.
• Their attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups.
• Engagement with community members and leaders.
• Their relationship with their family and partners.
• Their experiences while on parole, including any challenges they face in regards to completing parole.
• Changes in their social networks, including whether they continue to associate with known violent extremists.

The evidence derived from the questions above will be subjective, and caution will need to be adopted in assuming a causal link between an intervention program and what an individual might state about how a program has benefitted them. Such interviews will provide evidence of how an extremist offender or person identified as at risk of radicalisation is actively navigating a pathway away from extremism.

Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context

Interventions aiming to rehabilitate known violent extremists will need to focus on a number of different objectives, including engaging participants in meaningful work and education, improvements in mental health, lifestyle changes, religious education and mentoring, changing
attitudes towards extremist groups, re-engaging with family, successful completion of parole and disassociating from known extremists. Gauging whether individuals have been successfully rehabilitated will therefore require measures that capture a variety of activities and outcomes. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that studies on pathways away from violent extremism look at a variety of indicators beyond ideological and religious re-orientations. For example, Webber et al.’s (2017a, 2017b) study of terrorist rehabilitation also examined psychological and emotional states related to shame, humiliation and sense of insignificance, as well as whether individuals believed the rehabilitation program helped them and improved their lives (see also Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). Given the rarity of terrorism compared to other types of crime, a reduction in recidivism, while important, may not be a useful measure to assess the success of intervention programs targeting known extremists. Finally, how best to measure de-radicalisation, which represents a cognitive shift away from an extremist ideology, is less than clear, with disengagement from violent extremism arguably a more realistic goal of rehabilitation programs (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The priority given to such outcomes will dictate the types of measures adopted to assess this indicator.

Outcome 3.2 – Post-release disengagement from radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration

**Summary Table**

**Outcome 3.2 – Post-release disengagement from radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration**

Do not read or use this content in isolation from the main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This outcome includes the indicator:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from corrections.</td>
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**Why measure?**

Extremist offenders released into the community can include individuals who have been charged for a terrorist offence, or have been identified as at risk of radicalisation due to certain behaviours or associates. Peers and associates can have a negative influence on their behaviour when released from prison, helping to reinforce personal grievances and an extremist ideology. Measuring and monitoring re-offending and/or associations with violent extremist groups is relevant to address the reintegration needs of extremist offenders when transitioning from prison into the community.
Ways of measuring

A range of data could provide measurements for this indicator relating to monitoring the absence of criminal reoffending or anti-social/extremist-related behaviour, evidence of breaking off from previous associates, compliance to parole conditions, improvements in family/partner relationships, family providing pro-social support to an offender, engagement in work or education and monitoring of mobile devices and email accounts. Data sources could include administrative data (e.g., case notes from parole officers), interviews with offenders, family members, service providers, police or intervention coordinators.

Indicator: Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from corrections

Radicalised offenders released into the community can encompass three groups: (1) individuals who have been released after serving a period of incarceration for a terrorism-related offence, (2) individuals who have exhibited extremist views and/or behaviours while in prison but may not have committed a terrorist offence, and (3) individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation due to an association with known extremists. Reoffending for this cohort includes both the commission of extremist-related offences and other criminal acts. A risk factor for mainstream offenders reoffending when released from prison is any interaction with previous or new criminal associates and individuals (e.g., partners, friends, relatives) who continue to engage in an antisocial and criminal lifestyle (Whited et al., 2017). For extremist offenders, this could include co-offenders, peers and family members who support extremist views, suspected extremists or leaders of extremist groups. Engagement with these associates could occur face-to-face and online.

Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures

We have taken this indicator as referring to the release of an extremist offender on a parole order following a period of incarceration. This provides the capacity to examine a number of measures relevant to reoffending and associations, including:

- Monitoring the absence of criminal reoffending or anti-social/extremist related behaviour.
- Evidence relating to breaking off from previous associates.
- Compliance to parole conditions.
- Stable and improving family and partner relationships.
- Offender's family works to provide pro-social, economic, welfare and emotional support to parolee.
- Engagement in work and/or education.
Monitoring of mobile devices and email accounts.

This evidence will form the content of standard case notes recorded by community corrections officers as part of their role. It could be collected via interviews with offenders during their regular supervision appointments, case planning reviews and engagement in various structured intervention activities. Evidence can be collected from family members during parole home visits and through engagement with partners or family members during supervision appointments. Evidence of engagement with associates would need to be sourced from police. If the surrender and regular searching of all personal mobile devices form part of an offender's parole order, this will need to be undertaken by relevant police authorities with the technical capacity to conduct regular checks and monitoring. If an offender has been referred to a CVE intervention as part of their parole conditions (e.g., police-coordinated Diversion Program), relevant data could also be collected from program managers or intervention coordinators relating to progress on an intervention plan and any known engagement with extremist associates. If released straight from prison without any parole conditions, correctional authorities and police would need to share information on past and ongoing associations, and monitor for any future criminal charges. Intervention coordinators or service providers could also be additional sources of data if an offender is referred to these bodies when released from prison.

**Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from corrections and relevance to the CVE context**

Existing evidence indicates that convicted terrorists have low rates of reoffending. For example, Silke (2014, 111) claims that ‘terrorist prisoners have very low reconviction rates’. Silke bases this assertion on research examining the prior criminal records of terrorists to see if they have a history of terrorism-related offences. Silke (2014), referring to UK data on prisoners convicted for terrorism between 2001 and 2008, estimates that less than five per cent of released terrorist prisoners will be reconvicted for another terrorist-related offence; however, there is evidence to show that offenders who radicalise in prison do commit future acts of terrorism and crime (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017; Kepel, 2017). Severing negative social ties that may influence such future acts should be a focus of the community supervision of extremist offenders relating to addressing their criminogenic needs and dynamic risk factors. For convicted terrorists and radicalised offenders, this can be particularly important, given that peers and associates have been shown to play key roles in the radicalisation process, helping reinforce personal grievances and the jihadist ideology, providing the intent and capability to
commit acts of terrorism (Harris-Hogan, 2014; Sageman, 2011). Monitoring any reoffending and associates is relevant to tackling the reintegration needs of extremist offenders when transitioning from prison into the community.
Outcome 4 – Capability to deliver effective CVE programs is strengthened (system enabling outcomes)

This outcome is concerned with program design, delivery and implementation. It encompasses what could be known as ‘process evaluation’, as compared to ‘impact evaluation’. Process evaluation is focused on assessing the task of implementation (e.g., whether program activities have been completed and relevant agencies have the capacity to deliver the required intervention), while impact evaluation is about understanding whether a program reduced the problem it was aiming to influence, that being violent extremism.

Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE

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<td>Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>This outcome includes the following nine indicators:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE.</td>
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<td>• Understand that VE is motivated and enabled by multiple factors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understand that VE tends to be partly driven by grievances.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understand that there is no standard pathway to VE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understand that physical responses and messaging are important.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understand that civil society actors have an important CVE role.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of security force excesses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of stereotyping.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Understand the legal framework in the relevant location.</td>
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**Why measure?**

This outcome is concerned with program design and implementation, encompassing organisational capacity to deliver CVE programs and gauging knowledge bases (understanding) on violent extremism and associated responses. How violent extremism and CVE are understood within an agency will have an impact upon the commitment and capacity to deliver initiatives. It is important that agencies understand the various drivers of violent extremism to ensure that their service addresses a mix of risk factors for radicalising to extremism. Agencies may be dealing with clients with multiple risk factors across a range of interventions and service providers, so agencies will need to understand how they ‘value-add’ to an overall response or strategy. CVE programs can have the potential to be...
Ways of measuring

Gauging organisational capacity and knowledge could involve the following activities: (1) interviews, (2) focus groups, and (3) workshops. At the beginning of a program, during planning or pre-implementation stage, it will be important to establish a knowledge baseline. For example, interviews or focus groups could be conducted with agencies to comprehend their understanding of CVE. During the program, workshops could be run to enhance knowledge deficits. Interviews and focus groups could also be undertaken to identify how agencies incorporate these indicator statements in their decision-making and policies. Unlike previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure for these indicators (i.e., a quantifiable metric).

The following set of indicators constitutes a series of statements relating to knowledge bases surrounding the design and implementation of CVE-related initiatives. While the following set of statements may be experienced as an outcome of a program (i.e., there are improvements in knowledge bases), they may not be the primary objective as it relates to a program's target group. These statements relate to how programs operate, rather than to how target groups (e.g., clients) respond to those programs. Unlike the previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone measure for each discrete statement (i.e., a quantifiable metric). Assessment may need to be based on gauging perceptions, rather than on actual behavioural changes, which introduces the risk of bias into the data and means caution must be followed when making claims about causation (i.e., improvements in understanding were the direct result of an intervention). The following describes why each statement is important to understand and then outlines some generic suggestions for how these statements could be assessed.

Indicator: Understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE

This indicator can encompass a range of issues. These can include staff understanding how clients (or their families) might react to being part of a CVE initiative, which could impact on program participation and engagement. For example, the Muslim community regards the term ‘CVE’ as stigmatising and hence may react negatively to the use of this terminology (see Cherney, 2016; Thomas, 2012). How violent extremism and CVE are defined and understood within an agency will have an impact upon the commitment and capacity of that agency to...
deliver initiatives to certain populations. For example, responses to CVE by a community-based agency will be influenced by their service provision philosophy. This will influence how the agency thinks the problem should be addressed, the resources that should be allocated to it and if they see training for frontline staff as appropriate (Cherney et al., 2017b). It is also important that agencies are aware of the range of strategies that can be adopted to address violent extremism, as this will help them to understand what approaches they can consider implementing in their own programs and whether these responses are relevant to tackling violent extremism.

**Indicator: Understand that VE is motivated and enabled by multiple factors**

It is important that agencies understand the various drivers of violent extremism to ensure that their service addresses one or more of these risk factors and, therefore, has an impact. A greater understanding of the range of motivations or factors influencing violent extremism can help agencies identify how to adapt their programs to address more than one motivating factor, thereby increasing their potential effectiveness (Cherney et al., 2017b).

**Indicator: Understand that VE tends to be partly driven by grievances**

Compared to conventional crime, violent extremism can be strongly ideologically-motivated, which is arguably linked to grievances held by particular individuals and groups (Dawson, 2017). It is important for agencies to understand the content and context of these grievances when they are delivering a CVE program because individuals radicalised to violent extremism may be quite different to their usual clients. Further, it is important they comprehend the content and basis of various grievances that influence violent extremism so that they understand how certain clients may react to a program and its staff. It may be necessary for some third parties to tackle these grievances in certain circumstances, particularly if they influence the level of program participation among client groups.

**Indicator: Understand that there is no standard pathway to VE**

When it comes to working with individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism, agencies may be dealing with people who are not part of their typical client group. For example, individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism present with multiple risk factors that need to be addressed through a range of interventions and service providers (Koehler, 2017). Hence, particular agencies will need to address one of many risk factors and recognise that a one-size-fits-all approach will not always work. In such circumstances, agencies may need to
understand how they ‘value-add’ to an overall response. Agencies and departments will need to acknowledge that they can be one partner amongst many contributing to an intervention, all aiming to address a range of factors that lead people to radicalise to violent extremism.

**Indicator: Understand that physical responses and messaging are important**

It is important that agencies not only focus on outputs (initiatives) but also are aware of their messaging surrounding their programs. As outlined in Statement 1 (indicator *understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE*), CVE programs can have the potential to be stigmatising, with clients and families reacting negatively to the use of the CVE label. Thus, messaging surrounding the purpose and benefits of the program can be important to their operation because it will influence whether target groups and the broader community regard them as warranted (i.e., legitimate) and can influence the level of participation in a program (Cherney, 2016). Working on the messaging surrounding a program can be just as important as designing the content of the program itself. This indicator is also linked to Outcome 4.5 – Coordinated public CVE messaging, indicator *inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE messaging*.

**Indicator: Understand that civil society actors have an important CVE role**

CVE is not just a law-and-order or government-led responsibility. As noted in Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator *willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns*, friends, family, and community members can be the first people to become aware of a person radicalising to violent extremism. The same argument applies here to civil society actors, such as NGOs, volunteer or religious groups, mentors and leaders, who, through their engagement with community members, can become aware of people at risk. Likewise, agencies involved in the delivery of CVE programs need to recognise that civil society groups have an important role to play in addressing risk factors for violent extremism, and may act as a credible source through which to deliver a program (Cherney, 2016; Grossman et al., 2016; Koehler, 2017). Agencies and departments involved in the delivery of a CVE initiative must recognise that civil society actors need to be part of a case management approach and have methods of outreach to ensure they can be leveraged to assist target groups.
Indicator: Acknowledge the potential negative effects of security force excesses

It must be acknowledged that counter-terrorism policies and laws can have unintended consequences, such as generating community push-back/backlash. For example, legal responses that focus on the pre-emption and disruption of terrorism have shown to generate backlash from Muslims, with the perception being that counter-terrorism policing unfairly targets Muslim communities (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). The consequences of this must be considered when implementing programs because they could affect how clients and/or communities react to and willingly participate in CVE programs. The excessive use of security forces has also been shown to create greater sympathy for the causes violent extremist groups claim to defend, thus generating both active and passive support for such groups (LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009). Excessive policing can lead people to withdraw their cooperation and create resistance against legal authorities (Sherman, 1993).

Indicator: Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of stereotyping

It is important that a CVE intervention does not do more harm than good. CVE programs can negatively label individuals and/or communities a security threat (Murphy et al., 2015), which can lead those individuals and communities to feel under siege from mainstream society and authorities. Consequentially, they may feel they are being unfairly singled out. Interventions aimed at assisting individuals assessed as ‘at risk’ can lead to those individuals being negatively labelled as potential extremists. Labelling can also reinforce broader social stereotypes against certain groups. Such labelling can backfire and have the opposite effect than what was intended, with individuals or groups acting out and confirming that label (Cherney, 2016).

Indicator: Understand the legal framework in the relevant location

Agencies will need to have a full understanding of the legalities of their work and the role they play within the CVE field. There will be concerns relating to legal requirements, which may be in direct conflict with agency goals relating to the maintenance of client relationships. For example, agency-client relationship building, establishing and maintaining trust, and open communication may be inconsistent with requirements to report potential or suspicious violent behaviour/attitudes to authorities. There are additional concerns relating to the provision of voluntary consent to participate in a program, particularly if a person is under the age of 18. There may be legal issues surrounding national security clearances and client privacy, which can have an impact on the sharing of information between agencies.
How to measure

As previously mentioned, these indicators constitute a series of statements relating to the existence of particular knowledge bases related to the design and implementation of CVE-related initiatives. To assess the strength of these knowledge bases and if they have been enhanced, the following activities could be undertaken:

1. Interviews.
2. Focus groups.
3. Workshops.

At the beginning of a program, during the planning or pre-implementation stage, it will be important to establish some type of baseline knowledge in relation to the above indicators. This baseline can be established through interviews or focus groups with agencies to gauge their comprehension of the indicator statements. During the duration of a program and on an ongoing basis, workshops could be run with agencies to address knowledge deficits relating to any one of the indicators above (previously identified via interviews and focus groups) and to update partners on new research and developments from the CVE field. Workshops can be used to canvass one or more issues and identify knowledge gaps; these can then be addressed with targeted information, and ongoing feedback provided to agencies to improve their capacity to deliver CVE-relevant programs. Interviews and focus groups could also be undertaken to identify how agencies incorporate or take account of these indicator statements in their decision-making, and any resulting initiatives.

Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and evaluation

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This outcome includes the following two indicators:

- Number of evidence-informed CVE initiatives.
- Number of CVE programs evaluated.

Why measure?

These two indicators relate to assessing the total number of CVE programs based on key principles of evidence-based policy and practice. This includes (1) using research evidence
to inform policy and practice within an organisation, (2) including stakeholder perspectives in decision-making, (3) understanding ‘what works’ for your service users/program target groups (e.g., evaluating programs/services), and (4) utilising research evidence related to the delivery of initiatives to similar target groups.

### Ways of measuring

An attribute of evidence-informed practice involves ensuring that initiatives are subject to an evaluation of their implementation and impact. Evidence-informed CVE initiatives and programs should be assessed using the following principles: (1) program data is systematically collected, (2) personnel with skills in data and policy analysis are employed, (3) the capacity to provide performance-related information and policy options exists, and (4) evaluation and review processes are established. Unlike previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure for these indicators (i.e., a quantifiable metric).

The following two indicators relate to the total number of CVE programs based on key principles of evidence-informed practices and the number of initiatives that have been evaluated. We have grouped these two indicators in Table 1, below. We have done this given both indicators overlap, with evaluation being a key attribute of evidence-informed practice.

#### Indicator: Number of evidence-informed CVE initiatives

In order to identify whether CVE initiatives are evidence-informed, a determination needs to be made on the degree to which their development and implementation reflect key attributes of evidence-informed policy and practice. This requires an assessment of the ways agencies operate when developing and delivering CVE initiatives. It must be acknowledged that there is no agreed definition of what constitutes evidence-informed policy and practice. As a term, it is regarded as broader than the phrase ‘evidence-based policy and practice’, recognising that ‘evidence’ on program design and best practice can come from a range of sources and be informed by different levels of evidence. Attributes of evidence-informed policy and practice include:

- Using research evidence to inform policy and practice within an organisation.
- Including stakeholder perspectives in decision-making.
- Understanding ‘what works’ for your service users/program target groups (e.g., evaluating programs/services).
- Utilising research evidence related to the delivery of initiatives to similar target groups.
• Examining and utilising broad research evidence as part of decision-making processes. (Head, 2014; PART, n.d).

Table 1 reflects what are regarded as standard features of evidence-informed policy and service delivery that can be used to assess how closely agencies reflect these attributes (Head, 2014). For each feature, a series of questions is posed that can be used to inform assessments of whether CVE initiatives are evidence-informed. These questions are general in their focus and are applicable to a broad range of government and non-government agencies/actors that may be involved in developing and implementing CVE initiatives.

**Indicator: Number of CVE programs evaluated**

An attribute of evidence-informed practice involves ensuring that initiatives are subject to an evaluation of their implementation and impact; however, it must be noted that the rigour of these evaluations may vary. While randomised control trials (RCTs) might be regarded as the gold standard in evaluation design (having treatment and control groups), it may not be possible to conduct RCTs for some CVE programs. This can be due to the low number of clients referred to or participating in a program, which is pertinent given the small number of people convicted for terrorism or extremist-related offences compared to conventional crime, therefore making it difficult to secure an adequate control group. Further, there could be security- and/or ethical-related concerns about using RCTs in the CVE space, particularly with convicted terrorists. Simpler evaluations may be necessary, such as non-experimental designs that undertake a ‘before’ and ‘after’ comparison; however, attributing any outcomes or behavioural changes to a program needs to be done with caution when using non-experimental designs. Although having a well-developed theory of change to interpret and explain outcomes helps to address this problem, so does tracking the program over an extended period of time. A numerical count of the number of CVE programs evaluated will help to assess if evaluation practices are being followed. It would also be worthwhile recording the type of evaluation methods that are used so people can make an informed judgement about the validity of the evaluation.

**Table 1 – Features of evidence-informed policy and service delivery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Features</th>
<th>Series of questions/indicators of strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program data systematically collected</td>
<td>• Do agencies collect program data?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the scope, coverage of the data collected?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Personnel with skills in data and policy analysis | Is there any level of investment in data collection and management?  
Are relevant Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) in place relating to data collection requirements and sensitivities regarding data-sharing and confidentiality issues?  
Are there management and governance structures for the collection, analysis and sharing of program data?  
Are there staff with specialist data collection and analysis roles?  
Are staff trained in research and evaluation and/or do they already have relevant experience/knowledge?  
Do staff have policy-analytical capacities e.g., awareness of CVE programs & contingencies surrounding their implementation?  
Is there ongoing training for staff?  
Are there processes in place for the sharing of developments in research and evaluation methodologies/studies from relevant policy fields? |
| --- | --- |
| Capacity to provide performance-related information and policy options | Does the agency draw on a wide range of expertise and does it seek the perspectives of stakeholders?  
Does an agency have a stakeholder management and communication plan?  
What evidence is there to support whether the agency has a process for stakeholders to provide feedback on initiatives and programs?  
Have benchmarks been established for targeted improvements in program outcomes?  
What evidence is there to indicate that results from data and policy analysis inform program design and implementation? |
| Evaluation and review processes | - Are there systems in place that allow for the reporting and dissemination of program milestones?  
- Do agencies have evaluation guidelines and are they updated?  
- Have ex-ante analysis and post-implementation reviews of programs been conducted?  
- Have programs been subject to impact evaluation?  
- Have agencies used external experts as part of their review/evaluation process?  
- Are evaluations from other jurisdictions used to inform program design and review?  
- Have agencies established protocols so evaluation methods are built into program design and delivery?  
- What proportion of funds has been invested in evaluation (at least 1%)?  
- Are there common and defensible standards of evidence that are used to identify ‘what works’?  
- Are evaluation results made available to other parties and disseminated through relevant networks? |

(Adapted from Head, 2014: 51 and Results For America, *Federal Invest in What Works Index*, 2017.)

**Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and collaboration**

| Summary Table |  
| **Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and collaboration** |  
| Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. |  
| This outcome includes the following four indicators: |  
| - Data-sharing and cooperation among CVE agencies within jurisdictions, and across jurisdictions and countries. |  
| - Research and evaluation findings shared among agencies. |  
| - Interaction between the policy and expert CVE communities. |  
|
• Interactions among CVE program designers to share experiences and knowledge.

Why measure?
This outcome relates to the capacity of agencies to collaborate and share information and knowledge. This includes ‘opportunities’ for knowledge sharing between policy-makers and external experts (e.g., facilitating forums, workshops, seminars, conferences) and knowledge infrastructure that makes research and evaluation reports available via research databases. In order to strengthen effective data-sharing and cooperation, MOUs should be established between agencies to facilitate this exchange; however, there may be legal and organisational sensitivities that may prohibit the sharing of data. An important assessment of impact would involve identifying the type of outcomes that are achieved. For instance, has the sharing of data led to the identification of particular individuals at risk and/or their referral to relevant service providers?

Ways of measuring
Engagement between agencies around the sharing of data, intelligence, research, knowledge and experience can occur at a formal level via specific forums or databases, as well as informally through personal networks. Any assessment would need to take account of the types of interactions, the mechanisms and infrastructure in place to facilitate these interactions, the frequency at which they occur and the content and usefulness of the experiences and knowledge shared. This will enable an assessment of both the frequency of the interactions and how beneficial they are. The collection of both quantitative and qualitative data would be required for an assessment of these indicators. Unlike previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure for these indicators (i.e., a quantifiable metric).

The following set of indicators relates to the capacity of agencies to collaborate and share information. These indicators are not unique to the CVE field, but are applicable to other policy domains. The following section describes each indicator and explains how each could be measured. It must be recognised there are no validated metrics by which to assess the level of information sharing and collaboration between agencies. Further, while one might be able to count the number of forums in place to facilitate information sharing (e.g., the Australian and New Zealand Counter-terrorism Committee), any assessment would also need to interview members of these forums to see if information sharing is actually occurring and what barriers to information sharing exist. Furthermore, engagement between agencies around the sharing of
data, intelligence, research, knowledge and experience can occur at a formal level via specific forums or databases, as well as informally through personal networks.

**Indicator: Data-sharing and cooperation among CVE agencies within jurisdictions, and across jurisdictions and countries**

In order to strengthen effective data-sharing and cooperation, MOUs must be in place, as well as forums to facilitate this exchange. The content of these agreements needs to be assessed to ensure they tackle legal and organisational sensitivities that may prohibit the sharing of agency data. Agency representatives would need to be interviewed to identify if the MOUs are honoured and if forum members willingly share data and work together. The number of domestic and international members should be quantified and their contribution gauged. An important assessment of impact would involve identifying the type of outcomes that are achieved. For instance, has the sharing of data led to the identification of particular individuals at risk and/or their referral to relevant service providers? Has it led to international collaborations to tackle issues of mutual concern, such as returning foreign fighters?

**Indicator: Research and evaluation findings shared among agencies**

This indicator relates to assessing the level of knowledge exchange across agencies. This requires identifying and examining the existence of mechanisms to support the process of dissemination. Such mechanisms can include the existence of seminars, workshops and conferences and knowledge infrastructure that make research and evaluation reports available. The latter would include databases that provide access to reports. There may be dedicated or informal ‘knowledge brokers’ that help to disseminate research and evaluation findings to interested parties. It must be acknowledged that there may be circumstances in which it is not feasible or practical to share evaluation findings due to sensitivities surrounding results, which can be particularly applicable to the CVE field. In the academic study of research utilisation, measures have been developed that aim to assess the degree to which agency personnel are able to access research findings. These could be used as a proxy of the extent to which research and evaluation findings are shared among agency staff (e.g., Cherney et al., 2015). Examples include:

- I have access to research and evaluation reports that are relevant to my work (adapted from Head et al., 2013).
- I participate in meetings that discuss research and evaluation relevant to my work (adapted from Head et al., 2013).
These can be measured on a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Another example question requiring a yes/no answer includes:

- Do you have access to electronic databases from which to download, read and print research and evaluation reports (A following question could then ask: ‘How frequently do you access these databases?’ Responses could include: weekly, monthly, etc).

It must be acknowledged that while research and evaluation findings might be shared, this does not mean they are being used in policy decision-making. This would require a measure of research impact (see Cherney et al., 2012, 2015).

**Indicator: Interaction between the policy and expert CVE communities**

Similar to the indicators above, the interaction between policy and expert CVE communities relates to the types of linkage and exchange mechanisms that exist to facilitate opportunities for knowledge sharing between policy-makers and external experts (e.g., academics, think tanks, civil society actors). This can include the existence of forums and workshops that bring these parties together. It can also include the degree to which agencies contract external experts to research and evaluate CVE programs. While interactions can be facilitated through formal mechanisms, they can also occur through informal networks (Cherney et al., 2015). A measure of the level of interactions would need to take account of both formal and informal collaborations.

Some measures exist that aim to assess interactions between policy-makers and external experts. One example includes measures that rate opportunities for collaboration between policy-makers and academics (Head et al., 2013). This can include questioning policy-makers about opportunities to build links with external experts and the level of importance they place on information from these experts. For example:

- I have few opportunities to build relationships with researchers outside my organisation. (Measured on 5-point Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The term ‘researcher’ could be substituted with another name of an external third party.) (Adapted from Cherney et al., 2017a.)

- What level of importance do you place on the information available from each of the sources listed below? (Measured on 5-point Likert scale from ‘very unimportant’ to ‘very important’. The list could include specific reference to different CVE expert entities.) (Adapted from Cherney et al., 2017a.)
Similar to the previous indicator, while interactions between policy and expert CVE communities might occur regularly, it does not necessarily mean they will help to inform policy-decision making.

**Indicator: Interactions among CVE program designers to share experiences and knowledge**

This indicator overlaps with the previous and relates to linkage and exchange mechanisms that facilitate opportunities for knowledge sharing between policy-makers. These can include interactions across local, state, national and international jurisdictions and can involve the existence of forums and workshops that bring these parties together and can include both formal and informal processes. Any assessment would need to take account of both the types of interactions that occur (formal and informal), the mechanisms and infrastructure in place to facilitate these interactions, the frequency at which they occur and the content and usefulness of the experiences and knowledge that is shared. This will enable an assessment both of the frequency of the interactions and how beneficial they are. The collection of both quantitative and qualitative data would be required for an assessment of this indicator.

**Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Summary Table</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>This outcome includes the following two indicators:</strong></td>
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<td>• Number of community partnerships.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Range of communities with CVE related partnerships.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Why measure?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These outcomes relate to networks, agencies and stakeholders working together to build government and community capacities to deliver CVE programs. There is no agreed upon or tested metric to assess the robustness and quality of interactions between partners or the breadth and representation of the partnerships that exist. Assessments would need to consider whether relevant communities are included and participating as part of a CVE-relevant strategy, and whether they are truly representative of the communities they profess to represent (e.g., hard-to-reach or underrepresented groups). CVE interventions rely on partnership approaches because no one agency or group will be able to address the causes of violent extremism on their own. Hence, robust networks and partnerships are relevant to the capacity to tackle violent extremism. Assessing the range of communities with CVE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
partnerships requires both a numerical count of the breadth of participation, as well as an assessment of the representativeness of the groups involved.

**Ways of measuring**

Undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships would require capturing a range of interventions or initiatives that involves different partners that may or may not be clearly defined as CVE-specific, as well as other related programs that may not be labelled as such, but could have an impact on violent extremism (e.g., social cohesion programs). Caution should be used when undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships, as this will not give any indication of the quality of the partnership, and may not capture those informal partnerships that contribute positively to CVE.

The following two indicators are interrelated. They both relate to networks and agencies/stakeholders working together to build capacity between government and communities to deliver CVE programs. It must be recognised that, unlike other indicators, there is no agreed upon or tested metric to assess the robustness and quality of the interactions between partners. This is not the same as Social Network Analysis that looks at the connections across different stakeholders within a network. We have set out to specify the types of issues that would need to be considered in any such assessment.

**Indicator: Number of community partnerships**

Measuring this indicator would involve undertaking a numerical count of existing community partnerships. In doing so, the following issues need to be considered. Community partnerships can include initiatives that are clearly defined as CVE-specific, as well as other related programs that may not be labelled as such, but could have an impact on violent extremism (e.g., programs aimed at social cohesion or media campaigns promoting the positive attributes of multiculturalism). Undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships would require capturing a range of interventions or initiatives involving different partners. This could include police-led intervention programs that partner with community-based service providers or Mosques, local government programs targeting social cohesion that engage volunteer groups or NGOs, state government programs that draw on civil society actors, initiatives by NGOs that work together to provide services to youth at risk, and civil society actors partnering with religious leaders to address, for example, youth alienation and identity. It must be recognised that any attempt to tally the number of community partnerships will need to consider the varying contexts in which programs operate and the various types of partnerships that exist.
(whether officially defined as CVE-specific or informally operating with CVE-related benefits). Further, while quantifying the number of partnerships may provide insight into levels of activities, it does not give any indication of the quality of the partnership (e.g., highlighting the difference between active and passive partners) and may not capture those informal partnerships that contribute positively to CVE. A simple count of these programs will not take account of what they may or may not be achieving.

**Indicator: Range of communities with CVE-related partnerships**

This indicator differs from the above indicator (number of community partnerships) in that it is concerned with assessing the breadth and representation of the existing partnerships. Breadth relates to assessing if relevant communities are included and participating as part of a CVE-relevant strategy. Further, partners should be representative of the communities they profess to represent. While certain partners may claim to be community leaders, it is important that membership among any hard-to-reach or underrepresented groups is included as part of any assessment (e.g., young people or women). Identifying whether a partnership is poorly constituted can help identify gaps in participation that must be addressed. In acknowledging that there is no standard pathway into violent extremism (see Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE), it is important that a CVE intervention relies on partnership approaches because no one agency or group will be able to address the causes of violent extremism on their own. Robust networks and partnerships are relevant to the capacity to tackle violent extremism. Assessing the range of communities with CVE partnerships requires both a numerical count of the breadth of participation, as well as an assessment of the representativeness of the groups involved; however, as for the previous indicator, this will not assess how well these partnerships are working.

**Outcome 4.5 – Coordinated public CVE messaging**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Summary Table</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 4.5 – Coordinated public CVE messaging</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This outcome includes the following three indicators:

- Inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE messaging.
- Range of media forms through which CVE messaging is delivered.
- Reach of CVE messaging across communities.
Why measure?

These indicators are relevant to the capacity of agencies to deliver a clear and consistent message around CVE policy. Agencies working in partnership to counter violent extremism need to communicate a clear and consistent message about their programmatic responses. In order to reach the greatest number of people, agencies should deliver their messages across a range of platforms. For CVE messaging to have an influence, the mode of message delivery must be relevant both in language and content to the target audience.

Ways of measuring

It is recommended that participating agencies establish standards for CVE messaging, which can then be used to assess its coherency and delivery. Standards can be measured by assessing the level of compliance. Additionally, a numerical count could be conducted of the media platforms being used; however, it would be important to ensure that this is matched by an assessment of whether these platforms are appropriate to the program's target group.

These indicators are relevant to the capacity of agencies to deliver a clear and consistent message around CVE policy. Validated metrics to evaluate the level of coordination relating to public messaging surrounding particular social policy problems do not exist. As in the previous sections, we have explained the relevance of each of the indicators. Broad ways of measuring each indicator are then proposed.

Indicator: Inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE messaging

Agencies working in partnership to counter violent extremism must communicate a clear and consistent message about their programmatic responses. This is important so that the messaging of one agency does not conflict or undermine the messaging or work of another. To ensure that a coordinated multi-agency message is communicated to key stakeholders, it is recommended that agencies participating in a program/initiative establish standards for CVE messaging. These can then be used to assess its coherency and delivery.

How to measure

All relevant stakeholders must agree to standards regarding CVE messaging. Standards can be measured by assessing the level of compliance. Table 2 outlines some basis standards for CVE messaging and then presents questions that can be used to assess compliance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ways of measuring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Consistent messaging for all communication  | • Has a consistent and coherent CVE message been agreed upon?  
• Does all communication follow the agreed format and content?  
• Is CVE messaging approved (signed-off) by personnel with the appropriate authority, who ensures all protocols have been followed? |
| Message content                              | • Have clear definitions and rules around appropriate and inappropriate language and terms been established?  
• Is the content of the message accessible to the target population and/or general population?  
• Does all messaging make clear statements around agency responsibilities?  
• Does the content of the messaging avoid complicating key information (inaccessible to the target population) and being too simplistic (thus reinforcing stereotypes)? |
| Authority to speak                           | • Who has the authorisation to communicate the CVE message?  
• Who is the head/primary spokesperson?  
• Do key spokespeople have the authority/legitimacy to speak on behalf of their respective agencies?  
• Are key spokespeople aware of the community sensitivities surrounding CVE messaging? |
| Appropriateness of platform                  | • Have agencies agreed as to which platforms are appropriate to use for CVE messaging? |
| Risk Management                              | • Have the individual agencies and the inter-agency working groups established a Risk Management/Mitigation Plan to address the following?  
  o Protocols for messaging when a violent extremist or terrorism-related incident occurs.  
  o Messaging to address community backlash against perceived/actual targeting of community by the media and security agencies. |
Messaging around key responsibilities relating to responding to violent extremism.

- Protocols for messaging around system deficits (real or imagined) that failed to detect a violent extremist or prevent an act of violent extremism.
- Messaging around the actions or inactions of agencies/community service providers and/or groups who have responsibilities in CVE.

**Indicator: Range of media forms through which CVE messaging is delivered**

In order to reach the greatest number of people, agencies should ensure that they have not invested all their CVE messaging in one type of communication method (e.g., social media). Agencies should deliver their messages across a range of platforms, while acknowledging some communities may not have access to certain media platforms.

**How to measure**

A range of media forms through which CVE messaging may be delivered can be measured through a numerical count of the media platforms used. These include, for example, traditional media forms such as newspapers, television and radio, and non-traditional media forms such as Twitter and Facebook. It would be prudent to ensure that this count is matched by an assessment of whether these platforms are appropriate to the program's target group and their usage patterns when it comes to engaging certain communication platforms (i.e., the reach of certain communication platforms; see below). Any measurement of the range of media forms would need to include an assessment of the number utilised and their appropriateness.

**Indicator: Reach of CVE messaging across communities**

This indicator overlaps with the above indicator; however, the difference is that the reach of messaging is not about the number of media platforms delivering key messages, but is focused on knowing if campaigns are being delivered to their target audience. (See also Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies, indicator *recall of CVE-related media campaigns*, for relevant material.) For CVE messaging to have an influence, the mode of delivery of that message must be relevant both in language and content to the target audience. Further, as indicated above, the mode of delivery must match the media and communication platforms used by target groups.
How to measure

Table 3 outlines some proposed standards that could be used to assess how target groups engage with certain CVE messaging, thus giving insight into its reach. The table covers CVE messaging in forums and discussions, specific CVE communication campaigns, responses to (and requests for) communication from target groups and risk management protocols to address CVE miscommunication.

Table 3 – Reach of CVE Messaging

| Forums and discussion boards          | - Number of members of a group or forum.  
|                                     | - Number of subscribers to a newsletter or other communication forum.  
|                                     | - Number of ‘likes’, ‘retweets’, ‘referrals’ or ‘followers’.  
|                                     | - Duration of time spent at site, length of engagement with site or online resource.  
| Communication campaigns              | - Number of reviews, comments or length of reviews or feedback.  
|                                     | - Number of references to reviews on other sites.  
|                                     | - Number of references to a specific project or initiative in other media forums (e.g., newspapers).  
|                                     | - Duration of time spent at site, length of engagement with site or online resource.  
| Communication requests               | - Number of responses to surveys, polls or requests for information or feedback.  
| Risk Management                      | - Monitoring use of language.  
|                                     | - Monitoring comments made in response to CVE messaging.  
|                                     | - Be prepared to react when problems occur.  
|                                     | - Have a clear message prepared to address community concerns and any false or misleading posts.  

References


AMES Australia: Survey of Migrants’ Perceptions of Australia – Past, Present and Future. AMES (Adult Migrant English Service – see [https://www.ames.net.au/](https://www.ames.net.au/)).


Lyons, E. (2008). *Political trust and political participation amongst young people from ethnic minorities in the NIS and EU: A social psychological investigation.* Final Report. Queen’s University, Belfast, NI.


Appendix A – Identification and Review of Existing Guides, Toolkits and Metrics

Overview of CVE Guides and Toolkits

The nine guides and toolkits identified herein were published between 2010 and 2017 in a range of formats (e.g., journal articles, policy reports, technical reports, interactive website) and covered a variety of information regarding CVE program evaluation. A brief overview of the guides and toolkits is listed in Table 1, below, with further information provided on the content covered in each guide and toolkit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guide/Toolkit</th>
<th>Year Published</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Evaluation methods and associated tools/approaches discussed</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| From input to impact: Evaluating terrorism prevention programs | 2012           | Policy report | • Content analysis  
• Evaluability assessment  
• Focus groups  
• Formative evaluations  
• Horizontal evaluations  
• Interviews  
• Logic model  
• Multidimensional evaluations  
• Summative evaluations  
• Surveys  
• Theory of Change  
| Evaluating countering violent extremism: Practice and progress | 2013           | Policy report | • Horizontal evaluations  
• Multidimensional evaluations  
| A utilisation-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk    | 2014           | Journal article | • Logic model  
• Quasi-experimental designs  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guide/Toolkit</th>
<th>Year Published</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Evaluation methods and associated tools/approaches discussed</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</table>
| Learning and adapting: The use of monitoring and evaluation in countering violent extremism: A handbook for practitioners | 2014           | Handbook | • Theory of Change  
| Countering violent extremism and Risk reduction: A guide to programme design and evaluation | 2016           | Guide    | • Contribution analysis  
• Cost-benefit analysis  
• Delphi survey  
• Formative evaluations  
• Horizontal evaluations  
• Logic model  
• Multidimensional evaluations  
• Online surveys  
• Peer-group review  
• Process-mapping  
• Summative evaluations  
• SWOT analysis  
• Theory of Change  
| Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program | 2016 | Technical report | • Focus groups  
• Grounded theory approach  
• Multi-method evaluation design  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guide/Toolkit</th>
<th>Year Published</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Evaluation methods and associated tools/approaches discussed</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</table>
| RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism | 2017 | Electronic/paper copy toolkit | • Interrupted time-series analysis  
• Logic model  
• Outcome evaluation  
• Retrospective pre-post-intervention evaluation  
• Pre-/post-intervention evaluation  
• Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with a comparison group  
• Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with a control group  
• Process evaluation  
| Impact Europe Interactive Online Evaluation Guide | 2017 | Interactive website | • Contribution analysis  
• Cost-benefit analysis  
• Cost-effectiveness analysis  
• Cross-sectional data analysis  
• Data mining  
• Economic evaluation  
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<td></td>
<td>• Impact evaluation</td>
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<td>• Logic model</td>
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<td>• Mechanism evaluation</td>
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<td>• Network analysis</td>
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<td>• Objective and options analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Observation techniques/ethnography</td>
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<td>• Policy scientific approach</td>
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<td>• Process evaluation</td>
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<td>• Qualitative data analysis</td>
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<td>• Quasi-experimental designs</td>
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<td>• Realist evaluation</td>
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<td>• Randomised control trials</td>
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<td>• Stakeholder analysis</td>
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<td>• Surveys</td>
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<td>• Theory of Change</td>
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Rehabilitating the terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs

Horgan and Braddock’s (2010) article proposes Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT), also known as Multi-Attribute Evaluation (ME), as a strategy for both guiding the development of de-radicalisation programs and evaluating these initiatives. MAUT is used to (a) facilitate the identification and relative weighting of key stakeholders’ goals and objectives, and (b) assess the effectiveness of a program in meeting those goals and objectives, and is best used for comparative assessment of programs (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). There are six fundamental, underlying assumptions:

1. Evaluations are most effective when they are used to assess and compare common elements across a range of programs.
2. Any given program will have a range of stakeholders who have a vested interest in the development of the program.
3. Any given program will have a number of different objectives, which likely are of differing importance/significance.
4. Program evaluations must make judgements.
5. Judgements made during program evaluations (e.g., which methodology to use) should be evidence-based.
6. Program evaluations should be directly relevant to policy decisions.

The article proposes that the MAUT evaluation method allows the user to ‘draw general conclusions regarding (a) which goals are important, (b) the relative difficulty in achieving certain goals, (c) where efforts should be focused to develop a successful de-radicalization initiative, and (d) the differences in the priorities of the initiatives’ (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). This article presents relatively little information as to how a MAUT evaluation is conducted. Further, this approach does not tackle some of the key barriers to evaluating CVE programs outlined by Horgan and Braddock (2010), including the lack of explicit criteria for evaluating success.

From input to impact: Evaluating terrorism prevention programs

This policy report discusses the evaluation of terrorism prevention programs, drawing on a range of resources, including discussions with academics, policy-makers and practitioners during the Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism Programming, held in Ottawa, Canada in 2012 (Romaniuk & Fink, 2012). The report outlines a number of key steps
for designing an evaluation, including: establishing the purpose or objective of an evaluation, selecting an appropriate type of evaluation, defining the scope of an evaluation, determining the most appropriate method of data collection, identifying an evaluator, and identifying available resources for the evaluation. The report focuses on three types of evaluations commonly used with CVE programs:

- **Multidimensional evaluations**: Evaluations based on a framework that considers multiple levels of evaluation, sometimes in a hierarchical manner. Well suited to evaluations assessing a wide variety of programs.
- **Vertical evaluations**: Evaluations used to assess a specific program from its inception through to the final outcome.
- **Horizontal evaluations**: Evaluations used to assess initiatives or programs undertaken by a range of agencies, bodies or organisations that fall under a particular action plan or strategy.

Lastly, the report also highlights two key considerations for CVE program evaluations: (1) the timing of data collection (e.g., will baseline data be collected prior to the implementation of the initiative to allow for before-and-after comparisons?), and (2) how much involvement stakeholders will have in the evaluation process.

**Evaluating countering violent extremism: Practice and progress**

This report was developed out of the international symposium of the Global Counterterrorism Forum Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism, which focused on measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming and which was held in Ottawa, Canada in 2013 (Fink et al., 2013). This symposium built on the 2012 colloquium, which was the basis for the report by Romaniuk and Fink (2012), discussed above. The report provides an overview of the key steps of an evaluation (i.e., establishing a clear understanding of the purpose or objectives of the evaluation in order to determine an appropriate methodology; establishing whether the evaluation is vertical, horizontal, or multidimensional; identifying an appropriate evaluator; confirming that the program being evaluated qualifies as CVE; and developing indicators/measures of success). The report also provides an overview of experiences of CVE evaluation from attendees of the symposium. Specifically, four cases studies are provided, detailing CVE evaluations conducted in Canada, Denmark, East Africa and Germany, and the lessons learnt from these case studies are discussed.
A utilisation-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk reduction program evaluations

In this article, Williams and Kleinman (2014) present a utilisation-focused evaluation perspective as a method for conducting impact evaluations of terrorism risk reduction initiatives. Utilisation-focused evaluations are based on the principle that evaluations should be assessed on the basis of their usefulness to their intended users (Williams & Kleinman, 2014). Key stakeholders play a crucial role in utilisation-focused evaluations, including in determining how the success of the program should be measured. To guide the reader through the process of undertaking a utilisation-focused impact evaluation, the authors outline a number of key steps, and also provide a process checklist for an impact analysis of terrorism risk reduction initiatives. A self-assessment for evaluations of terrorism risk reduction initiatives are appendices to the article.

Learning and adapting: The use of monitoring and evaluation in countering violent extremism: A handbook for practitioners

In this handbook, Dawson et al. (2014) aim to support policy-makers and practitioners in implementing the monitoring and evaluation of CVE initiatives. The handbook covers a range of information, including: (1) an overview of violent extremism (including radicalisation and CVE), (2) a brief overview of the basic tenets of evaluation, (3) an outline of key evaluation types, tools and technologies, (4) an overview of previous lessons drawn from evaluations in the fields of crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peace-building projects, and (5) an overview of a number of CVE initiatives implemented in different countries. Chapter 3 describes a range of types of evaluations, data collection tools and technologies.

Countering violent extremism and risk reduction: A guide to programme design and evaluation

This report by Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) aims to provide guidance to policy-makers and practitioners implementing CVE programs focusing on risk reduction (also referred to as de-radicalisation). The report focuses on key concepts (e.g., violent extremism, CVE, risk reduction), the variety of actors involved in violent extremism (e.g., perpetrators, supporters, and advocates), drivers of violent extremism, issues of causality, conducting research in challenging environments, designing CVE and risk reduction programs, and evaluation considerations. While the report touches on CVE program evaluation, a relatively narrow focus is taken; however, useful information is provided regarding key questions that should be
considered by evaluators and practitioners, as well as impact and outcome indicators for CVE initiatives.

**Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program**

This technical report by Williams et al. (2016) overviews an evaluation of a portfolio of programs run by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), a community-based, Muslim-led organisation in the USA that provides CVE initiatives. This technical report is a useful example of an evaluation of a CVE initiative. This report is particularly useful for the suite of 12 freely licensed measures developed and compiled by the authors for the assessment of CVE programs. These measures examine a range of social circumstances, psychological processes, motivations and states, including: resiliency and coping; historical loss; emotional stability; racism; grievance, activism and radicalism; religiosity; social support; program commitment; volunteer program outcomes; peer-assistance; and trust in police. These scales do not explicitly measure violent extremism, but were selected by Williams et al. (2016) on the basis of theoretical and empirical evidence regarding predictors or correlates of violent extremism. As noted by Williams et al. (2016), these variables are likely most useful as statistical control variables, though they may also be suitable for use as dependent/outcome variables in some cases.

**RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism**

The RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism aims to help community-based organisations implementing CVE initiatives to design an evaluation based on the type of program and available resources and expertise (Helmus et al., 2017). The toolkit is adapted from the RAND Suicide Prevention Program Evaluation Toolkit. Four core phases of evaluation are covered by the toolkit: (1) identifying the core components of a program and creating a logic model, (2) designing the evaluation, (3) selecting evaluations measures, and (4) using evaluation data to improve the program. Throughout these sections, the toolkit utilises a number of worksheets, templates and checklists for the user to complete in order to help them move through the process. Additionally, the toolkit also includes three appendices that focus on how to create a survey, how to use social media metrics in evaluations and a basic introduction to analysing evaluation data.
Impact Europe Interactive Online Evaluation Guide

Impact Europe’s Evaluation Guide is an interactive online guide for designing and conducting CVE evaluations (Impact Europe, n.d.). The guide comprises two main sections, which focus on (1) how to plan an evaluation, and (2) how to conduct an evaluation. Broadly, information covered by the toolkit includes:

- Ethical considerations.
- Characteristics and pragmatic considerations of the intervention (e.g., goals, mechanisms, beneficiaries, activities, coverage, timing, costs).
- The purpose of the evaluation (and how this affects the evaluation approach).
- Evaluation questions (specifically relating to relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency and sustainability).
- The type of evidence and information needed (based on the purpose of the evaluation).
- Data (e.g., types of data [quantitative, qualitative, primary, secondary, etc.], data management, data protection, bias in CVE evaluation, sampling).
- Project management and data collection (e.g., documentation, resources, project team, quality standards, quality assurance).
- Data analysis (e.g., preliminary information regarding analysis of quantitative and qualitative data).
- Writing up and presenting evaluation findings.
- Potential follow-up activities after completion of an evaluation (e.g., preparing an action plan).

The toolkit is designed for individuals to use at various stages of the evaluation process (e.g., those planning an evaluation, conducting an evaluation and who have completed an evaluation). The ‘get started’ section of the toolkit helps the user to identify what evaluation phase they are in and provides them with information regarding how they may best use the toolkit. Users can then navigate through the toolkit using the main menus or the links on each page. Where available, links are also provided for useful tools (e.g., logic models) and relevant existing CVE interventions and evaluations.

In addition to the toolkit, Impact Europe has also developed an interventions database and a ‘lessons learned’ section. The interventions database provides details regarding a range of CVE interventions. The database can be searched using a variety of filters, including by intervention
type, radicalisation factor and evaluation characteristics. The ‘lessons learned’ section documents lessons learned through evaluations of CVE initiatives. In this section, users can review a collection of evaluated CVE interventions, with information provided regarding what worked, including how and why it worked, and experiences of implementing and evaluating CVE initiatives at different stages of the evaluation process. Additionally, users can also upload their own evidence and experiences to the ‘lessons learned’ section.
Summary of metrics/instruments tested in the CVE field

Introduction

This appendix provides a brief overview of key metrics and instruments that have been tested in the CVE field. Due to the wide variety of CVE programs and initiatives, from de-radicalisation programs involving convicted violent extremists to prevention programs targeting the wider community, objectives and outcomes of CVE initiatives vary. This is reflected in the range of outcome measures identified in the literature. It is important to note that there are relatively few published evaluations of CVE programs, and most of these predominantly only provide descriptive results of the program (e.g., number of attendees or participants in the program) (Mastroe & Szmania, 2016; Scarcella, Page & Furtado, 2016).

Overview of metrics and instruments tested in the CVE field

A brief overview of key metrics and instruments that have been tested in the CVE field is provided in Table 2, below.
Table 2 – Brief overview of key metrics and instruments tested in the CVE field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric/Instrument</th>
<th>Description of measure</th>
<th>Number of items and examples</th>
<th>Validity and reliability</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Acculturation scale       | This scale was developed to measure acculturation, specifically respondents’ own feelings about their cultural customs and values in relation to integration, assimilation, separation and marginalisation. | The number of items and measurement/response options for each item are not reported. Example items:  
  - I wish to maintain my heritage culture values and also adopt key features of American values.  
  - I wish to give up my heritage culture values for the sake of adopting American values.  
  - I wish to maintain my heritage culture customs rather than adopt American customs.  
| Adapted Collectivism Scale| This scale, designed to measure collectivism, was adapted from Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) Culture Orientation Scale.                                                                                              | Four items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Items: | Scale has been shown to have very good reliability (alpha = .93) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016). | Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Sheveland, A., Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, M., Bonto, M. N., & Gunaratna, R. (2016). What a difference two years make: |
| **Adapted Grievance, Activism, and Radicalism Scale** | This measure was designed to assess an individual’s level of political grievance, activism, and radicalism. | Eight items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘very unconcerned’ to ‘very concerned’). Example items: In the future, how concerned would you be if your best friend engaged in the activities described below?: • Join an organisation that fights for their group’s political and legal rights. • Participate in a public protest against oppression | The Adapted Grievance, Activism, and Radicalism Scale has been shown to have good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74–0.93) (see Williams et al., 2016). | Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 9(1-3), 13-36. Triandis, H., & Gelfand, M. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(1), 118-128. Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of Justice. |
of their group if they thought the protest might turn violent.
- Attack police or security forces if they saw them beating members of their group.

| Adapted Individualism Scale | This scale, designed to measure individualism, was adapted from Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) Culture Orientation Scale. | Three items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Items:
- I’d rather depend on myself than others.
- I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.
- It is important that I do my job better than others. | Scale has been shown to have very good reliability (alpha = .90) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016). |

| Adapted Investment Model of Program Commitment Scale | This measure was designed to assess an individual’s level of engagement with, and commitment to, a particular organisation. | 16 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’). Items are split across four areas: satisfaction level, quality of alternatives, investment size, and commitment level. Example items: | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (see Williams et al., 2016). |


| Adapted Modern Racism Scale | This scale was designed to assess an individual’s racial bias towards minority groups. | Six items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:
- Over the past few years, minorities have gotten more economically than they deserve.
- Minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. | Scale has been shown to have very good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93) (see Williams et al., 2016). |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Adapted Need for Cognitive Closure Scale | This scale, developed to measure need for cognitive closure, was adapted from Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) Need for Cognitive Close Scale. | 14 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:
- I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as me. | Scale has been shown to have high reliability (alpha = .87) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016). |

Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Sheveland, A., Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, M., Bonto, M. N., & Gunaratna, R. (2016). What a difference two years make: Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail. *Dynamics*
After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a useless waste of time to take into account diverse possible solutions. I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place. Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and controversial problems.

| Adapted Religiosity Scale | This scale was designed to measure religious activity, dedication and belief. Seven items (see Williams et al. (2016) for response categories). Example items: How close do you feel to God most of the time? Do you believe in life after death? | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (see Williams et al., 2016). | Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*(6), 1049-1062. |
| Adapted Significance Loss Scale | This scale, adapted from the Need Threat Scale (Williams, 2009), was developed to measure significance loss. 21 items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (categories not reported). Example items: I feel ashamed. I feel humiliated. I feel meaningless. I feel like an outsider. I feel disconnected from other people. | Information not reported. | Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, M. J., Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., & van Egmond, M. (2015). Belonging nowhere: Marginalization and radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants. *Behavioral Science & Policy, 1*(2), 1-12. |
- I feel welcome in most non-Muslim American social situations.
- There are times when I feel I don’t belong to any culture.

**Adapted Social Dominance Orientation Scale**

This scale, developed to measure social dominance orientation, was adapted from Pratto et al.’s (1994) Social Dominance Orientation Scale.

15 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:
- It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
- Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
- To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
- We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally (reverse coded).

Scale has been shown to have very good reliability (alpha = .90) (see Kruglanski et al. 2016).

**Attitudes towards de-radicalisation scale – version 1**

This scale was designed to measure the extent to which prisoners felt that the

Four items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from

Scale has been shown to have adequate reliability (Cronbach’s

| Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., |
| **Attitudes towards de-radicalisation scale – version 2** | This scale was designed to measure attitudes towards de-radicalisation, relating specifically to the time when respondents were detained. | Six items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:
- The rehabilitation program has helped me.
- My situation has improved since the rehabilitation program began. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) (see Webber et al., 2017b). | Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. Political Psychology. doi:10.1111/pops.12428 |
| **Australian identity scale** | This scale was designed to measure how strongly respondents identified as Australian. | Four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Items:
- I am proud to be Australian.
- I identify strongly with being Australian.
- Being an Australian is important to the way I think of myself as a person. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .81) (see Cherney & Murphy, 2017). | Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2017). Support for terrorism: The role of beliefs in jihad and institutional responses to terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1313735 |
| Brief Resiliency and Coping Scale | This scale was designed to measure an individual’s tendency to cope with stress in a highly adaptive manner. | Four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from 'does not describe me at all’ to 'describes me very well’). Example items:  
- Regardless of what happens to me, I believe I can control my reaction to it.  
- I actively look for ways to replace the losses I encounter in life. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (see Williams et al., 2016). | Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of Justice. |
| Beck Scale of Suicidal Ideation (BSI) | The scale was measured to assess suicidal ideation. | 19 items measured using a 3-point Likert scale. Example items unavailable. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .83) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). | Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107(3), 494-515.  
<p>| Brief Volunteer Program Outcome Assessment | This measure was designed to assess the strength of key | 14 items measures using a 7-point Likert scale (from Information not available. | Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., &amp; Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi- |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective relative deprivation scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure collective relative deprivation.</td>
<td>Six items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from 'totally disagree' to 'totally agree'). Example item: • I think Muslims are less well off than other groups in the Netherlands.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .82) (see Doosje et al., 2013). Doosje, B., Loseman, A., &amp; van den Bos, K. (2013). Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. <em>Journal of Social Issues</em>, 69(3), 586-604.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination scale</td>
<td>This scale was developed to measure discrimination against Muslims.</td>
<td>Eight items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from 'never' to 'all of the time'). Example items: • Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your religion? • Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair</td>
<td>Information not reported. Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, M. J., Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., &amp; van Egmond, M. (2015). Belonging nowhere: Marginalization and radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants. <em>Behavioral Science &amp; Policy</em>, 1(2), 1-12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Items/measurement scale</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>Embeddedness Scale</td>
<td>This scale was developed to measure the extent to which individuals and their families were integrated within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) social structure.</td>
<td>17 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items: • I was very active in the armed group. • I was very central in the armed group.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88-0.89) (see Webber et al., 2017b). Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. Political Psychology. doi:10.1111/pops.12428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Stability Scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure emotional stability.</td>
<td>Seven items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). Example items: These questions ask you about how often you have the following thoughts or emotions: • Feeling others are to blame for most of your problems. • Thoughts of ending your life. • Urges to injure or harm someone else.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have very high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96) (see Williams et al., 2016). Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., &amp; Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of Justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Uncertainty Scale</td>
<td>This subscale of the Uncertainty Response Scale (URS) was developed to measure emotional uncertainty.</td>
<td>15 items (measurement scale not described). Example items: • I feel anxious when things are changing.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have high reliability (alpha = .89) (see Doosje et al., 2013). Greco, V., &amp; Roger, D. (2001). Coping with uncertainty: The construction and validation of a new measure. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 519-534.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Historical Loss Scale** | This scale was designed to measure an individual’s sense of loss, based on their sense of their cultural heritage. | 12 items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (from ‘never’ to ‘several times a day’). Example items:  
- Loss of our language.  
- Loss of our people through wars or armed conflicts.  
- Loss of respect by our children for traditional ways. | Scale has been shown to have very high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96) (see Williams et al., 2016). | Whitbeck, L. B., Adams, G. W., Hoyt, D. R., & Chen, X. (2004). Conceptualizing and measuring historical trauma among American Indian people. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 33*(3-4), 119-130.  
<p>| <strong>Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) Guidance</strong> | This screening tool was developed to provide a checklist of key behaviours that may assist frontline workers (e.g., school teachers, health care professionals, police officers) | 16 items scored using a 4-point rating system (where 0 – no record/not known, 1 – low evidence, 2 – medium evidence, 3 – good evidence). Example items: | The screening tool has been shown to be reliable when using open source intelligence sources as the basis for information to score | Egan, V., Cole, J., Cole, B., Alison, L., Alison, E., Waring, S., &amp; Elntib, S. (2016). Can you identify violent extremists using a screening checklist and open-source intelligence |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Relative Deprivation Scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure individual relative deprivation.</td>
<td>Six items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’). Example item: I don’t think I get as many chances as others in the Netherlands.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = 0.82) (see Doosje et al., 2013).</td>
<td>Doosje, B., Loseman, A., &amp; van den Bos, K. (2013). Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 586-604.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Significance Scale (Webber et al., 2017a)</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure the frequency with which respondents experienced feelings of humiliation, shame, and ‘people laughing at them’ in their daily life.</td>
<td>Three items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘rarely or never’ to ‘very often’). Example items not available.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (alpha = .73) (see Webber et al., 2017a).</td>
<td>Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A., Hettiarachchi, M., Belanger, J. J., … Gelfand, M. J. (2017). The road to extremism: Field and experimental evidence that significance loss-induced need for closure fosters radicalization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Significance Scale – Version 1 (Webber et al., 2017b)</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure feelings of insignificance.</td>
<td>11 items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘rarely or never’ to ‘very often). Example items:</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77-0.78) (see Webber et al., 2017b).</td>
<td>Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Example Items</td>
<td>Scale Properties</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss of Significance Scale – Version 2</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure feelings of insignificance, particularly</td>
<td>- I feel humiliated in my daily life.</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71)</td>
<td>J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. Political Psychology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Webber et al., 2017b)</td>
<td>targeted at respondents reintegrating back into a community.</td>
<td>- I feel like hiding from the world in my daily life.</td>
<td>(see Webber et al., 2017b).</td>
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<td>Islamic Extremism Scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure Islamic extremism.</td>
<td>Seven items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have relatively weak reliability (alpha = .45-.47) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016).</td>
<td>Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A., Hettiarachchi, M., Bélanger, J. J., ... Gelfand, M. J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Kruglanski et al., 2016)</td>
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<td>- I feel ashamed of myself.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Because I am a Tamil person, I have been victimized/discriminated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Extremism Scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure Islamic extremism.</td>
<td>11 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (alpha = .70) (see Webber et al., 2017a).</td>
<td>Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Sheveland, A., Babush, M., Hettiarachchi, M., Bonto, M. N., &amp; Gunaratna, R. (2016). What a difference two years make: Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-3), 13-36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Webber et al., 2017a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Islam is the only true religion.</td>
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<td>- I think it is important to establish an Islamic state in my country.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The goal of jihad is to restore justice for Muslims worldwide.</td>
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<td><strong>Legitimacy of Counterterrorism Laws</strong></td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure respondents’ perceptions of the legitimacy of counterterrorism laws.</td>
<td>Four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Items:</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .80) (see Cherney &amp; Murphy, 2017).</td>
<td>Cherney, A., &amp; Murphy, K. (2017). Support for terrorism: The role of beliefs in Jihad and institutional responses to terrorism. <em>Terrorism and Political Violence</em>. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1313735</td>
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<td>• I question the fairness of some of Australia’s counterterrorism laws (reverse coded).</td>
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<td>• I have confidence in Australia’s counterterrorism laws.</td>
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<td>• I question the legitimacy of Australia’s counterterrorism laws (reverse coded).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Counterterrorism laws unfairly target Muslims (reverse coded).</strong></td>
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| **Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP)** | This scale was designed to assess two types of psychopathy: primary psychopathy and secondary psychopathy. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 26 items across primary psychopathy (16 items) and secondary psychopathy (10 items). Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items: |
| | • For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with. |
| | • Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don’t understand me. |
| | The subscales of the LSRP have been shown to have satisfactory to good reliability (primary psychopathy: alpha = .87; secondary psychopathy: alpha = .68) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). |

<p>| <strong>Meaning in Life Questionnaire</strong> | This questionnaire was designed to measure the presence of meaning in life. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Five items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘absolutely untrue’ to ‘absolutely true’). Example item: |
| | • I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful. |
| | Scale has been shown to have very high reliability (alpha = .93) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Scale Details</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity Scale</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure how strongly respondents identified as Muslim.</td>
<td>Four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .84) (see Cherney &amp; Murphy, 2017).</td>
<td>Cherney, A., &amp; Murphy, K. (2017). Support for terrorism: The role of beliefs in Jihad and institutional responses to terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1313735</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative Attitudes Toward the West</td>
<td>This scale was designed to assess respondents’ perceptions of Western nations as immoral and threatening.</td>
<td>Four items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have satisfactory to high reliability (alpha = .62-.81) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016).</td>
<td>Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Sheveland, A., Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, M., Bonto, M. N., &amp; Gunaratna, R. (2016). What a difference two years make: Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-3), 13-36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Beliefs about Anti-Semitic Aggression</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure normative beliefs about anti-Semitic aggression in Pakistan.</td>
<td>Six items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘absolutely the right thing to do’ to ‘completely wrong’).</td>
<td>Scale has been shown to have good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = )</td>
<td>Amjad, N., &amp; Wood, A. M. (2009). Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Nostalgia for Involvement in Extremist Group** | This scale was developed to measure the extent to which former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) missed their involvement in the group. | Five items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:  
- I currently find myself yearning for the sense of discipline that I had when I was a member of the LTTE.  
- When I think back to the time when I was with the LTTE, I felt that being a member gave my life purpose. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80) (see Webber et al., 2017b). | Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. *Political Psychology.* |
| **Own Violent Intentions** | This scale was designed to measure respondents’ violent intentions. | Three items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’). Example items:  
- I am prepared to use violence against other people in order to achieve | Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (alpha = .76) (see Doosje et al., 2013). | Doosje, B., Loseman, A., & van den Bos, K. (2013). Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. |
something I consider very important.
- I am prepared to disturb the orderliness in order to achieve something I consider very important.

| Passion Scale | This scale was designed to measure respondents’ passion regarding a particular cause. | 12 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘very strongly agree’).
Example items:
- My cause is in harmony with the other activities in my life.
- I have almost an obsessive feeling for my cause. | The two subscales of the Passion Scale have been shown to have good reliability (harmonious passion subscale: alpha = .87; obsessive passion subscale: alpha = .88) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). | *Journal of Social Issues, 69*(3), 586-604.


<p>| <strong>Peer-Assistance Barometer</strong> | This instrument was designed to measure willingness to engage with/assist peers who might be experiencing a personal crisis. | Eight items separated into two sections (see Williams et al. (2016) for full wording of instrument). Example items: Thinking now about your friends, imagine one of them started to say or do things that made you think they were thinking about committing violence against someone else. What (if anything) do you think you would say or do in response to that friend? • I would talk to another friend or family member about what to do. • I would contact the police. • I would try to get my friend to talk to a counsellor. | Information not available. | Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., &amp; Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of Justice. |
| <strong>Perceived Group Threat</strong> | This instrument was designed to measure three types of perceived group threat: symbolic threat, realistic threat and interpersonal anxiety. | 29 items across three sub-scales: symbolic threat (12 items), realistic threat (three items), and interpersonal anxiety (14 items). Example items: • Islamic and non-Islamic people in the Netherlands have different family values. • Non-Islamic Dutch people have too many positions of | The subscales have been shown to have satisfactory to good reliability (alpha = .70-.88) (see Doosje et al., 2013). | Doosje, B., Loseman, A., &amp; van den Bos, K. (2013). Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. <em>Journal of Social Issues</em>, 69(3), 586-604. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Reliability/Validity</th>
<th>References</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived in-group superiority</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure perceived in-group superiority.</td>
<td>Four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’). Example item: • I believe that Muslims are better people than people who endorse another religion. Scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability (alpha = .71) (see Doosje et al., 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Doojse, B., Loseman, A., &amp; van den Bos, K. (2013). Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat. <em>Journal of Social Issues</em>, 69(3), 586-604.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short Form (SRP-SF)</td>
<td>This scale was designed to measure self-report psychopathy.</td>
<td>29 items across four dimensions of psychopathy: interpersonal manipulation (seven items), callous affect (seven items), erratic lifestyle (seven items) and antisocial behaviours (eight items). Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items not available The subscales have been shown to have satisfactory to good reliability (alpha = .67-.83) (see Bélanger et al., 2014).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., Sharvit, K., &amp; Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. <em>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</em>, 107(3), 494-515. Paulhus, D. L., Neumann, C. S., &amp; Hare, R. D. (in press). <em>Manual for the Hare Self-Report Psychopathy Scale</em>. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Multi-Health Systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Self-Sacrifice Scale** | This scale was designed to measure an individual’s readiness to self-sacrifice. | 10 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘do not agree at all’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:  
- I would be prepared to endure intense suffering if it meant defending an important cause.  
- I would be ready to give up all my personal wealth for a highly important cause.  
- I would defend a cause to which I am truly committed even if my loved ones rejected me. | Scale has been shown to have high reliability (alpha = .90) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). | Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107*(3), 494-515. |
| **Short Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9)** | The Short Patient Health Questionnaire was designed to measure respondents’ tendency to feel depressed. | Nine items measured using a 4-point Likert scale (from ‘not at all’ to ‘nearly every day’). Example items:  
- Little interest or pleasure in doing things.  
- Feeling down, depressed or hopeless. | Scale has been shown to have good reliability (alpha = .89) (see Bélanger et al., 2014). | Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107*(3), 494-515. |

| **Support for Fundamentalist Groups** | This scale was developed to measure support for fundamentalist groups, using respondents’ perception of the extent to which most people they knew would be interested in the group as a proxy for their own attitudes and opinions. | 12 items measured using 7-point Likert scales (from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’ and ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’). Items:  
- To what extent do you think most people you know would…  
  - Want to join the group.  
  - Identify with the group.  
  - Like the group’s members and the group as a whole.  
  - Perceive personal similarity to the group and its members.  
- How likely do you think most people you know would participate in the following activities for the group?  
  - Attend monthly meetings.  
  - Lobby, petition, and letter-write on behalf of the group.  
| Support for a Radical Interpretation of Islam Scale | This scale was designed to measure respondents’ support for a radical interpretation of Islam. | 10 items (response options not reported). Example items:  
- Muslims in America should help their oppressed brothers and sisters in other parts of the world by participating in combative jihad.  
| **Support for Violence** | This scale was designed to measure respondents’ support for violence. | Three items measuring using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:

- If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not enough of it.
- The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer. | Scale has been shown to have adequate reliability (alpha = .50-.72) (see Kruglanski et al., 2016). | Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Sheveland, A., Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, M., Bonto, M. N., & Gunaratna, R. (2016). What a difference two years make: Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 9*(1-3), 13-36. |

| **SyfoR** | This scale was designed to measure an individual’s vulnerability to violent radicalisation/sympathies for violent extremism. | 16 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (categories not reported). Example items:

- Take part in non-violent protests.
- Organise radical terrorist groups without personally taking part.

| **Terrorists have Valid Grievances** | This single item was developed to measure respondents’ beliefs as to whether terrorists have valid grievances. | Single item measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Item:

| **Trust in Police Scale** | This scale was designed to measure trust in police. | Eight items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’). Example items: Imagine that you wanted to talk to the police, just to ask them for advice about what to do about a friend of yours, whom you believe might be considering doing something illegal that could end up injuring other people. How likely do you think the following would be to happen? The police would:  
- Overreact.  
- Try to monitor me or my friend.  
- Cause more harm than good. | Scale has been shown to have high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87) (see Williams et al., 2016). | Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of Justice. |
| **Trust in Police to Combat Terrorism Scale** | This scale was designed to measure trust in police to combat terrorism. | Seven items measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example items:  
- You trust police to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism. | Scale has been shown to have very good reliability (alpha = .91) (see Cherney & Murphy, 2017). | Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2017). Support for terrorism: The role of beliefs in Jihad and institutional responses to terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1313735 |
| Views of Jihad Items | These items were developed to measure attitudes towards the meaning of jihad. | Three single-item statements (not a summed scale). Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’).
Items:
- The concept of jihad in Islam supports the use of violence as a means to an end.
- Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness.